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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
|
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|
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|
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|
|
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|
|
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|
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|
|
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|
|
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|
|
676571e4a4 |
17
.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md
vendored
Normal file
17
.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: Bug report
|
||||
about: Something is not working as expected
|
||||
title: "[BUG]"
|
||||
labels: bug
|
||||
assignees: ''
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**Description**
|
||||
Concise description of what you're trying to do, the expected behavior and the current bug.
|
||||
|
||||
**How to reproduce**
|
||||
Give steps on how to reproduce the bug (e.g. : commands, configs, tests, environment, version, ...).
|
||||
|
||||
**Logs**
|
||||
The logs generated by bunkerized-nginx. **DON'T FORGET TO REMOVE PRIVATE DATA LIKE IP ADDRESSES !**
|
||||
14
.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.md
vendored
Normal file
14
.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.md
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
name: Feature request
|
||||
about: Suggest an idea for this project
|
||||
title: "[FEATURE]"
|
||||
labels: enhancement
|
||||
assignees: ''
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
**What's needed and why ?**
|
||||
Describe the feature you would like to see in the project and why it should be implemented.
|
||||
|
||||
**Implementations ideas (optional)**
|
||||
How it should be used and integrated into the project ? List some posts, research papers or codes that we can use as implementation.
|
||||
83
.github/workflows/build-bunkerized-nginx-autoconf.yml
vendored
Normal file
83
.github/workflows/build-bunkerized-nginx-autoconf.yml
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
|
||||
name: Build and push bunkerized-nginx-autoconf
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [dev, master]
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
test:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Checkout source code
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
|
||||
# temp fix : can't use buildx + load because of manifest error
|
||||
# so we need to build the image the traditional way
|
||||
- name: Temp build to check security issues
|
||||
run: docker build -t bunkerized-nginx-autoconf -f autoconf/Dockerfile .
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Run Trivy security scanner
|
||||
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
image-ref: 'bunkerized-nginx-autoconf'
|
||||
format: 'table'
|
||||
exit-code: '1'
|
||||
ignore-unfixed: true
|
||||
severity: 'UNKNOWN,LOW,MEDIUM,HIGH,CRITICAL'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Set variables
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
VER=$(cat VERSION | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
echo "VERSION=$VER" >> $GITHUB_ENV
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup QEMU
|
||||
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v1
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Buildx
|
||||
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v1
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Docker cache
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
key: ${{ runner.os }}-buildx-${{ github.sha }}
|
||||
restore-keys: |
|
||||
${{ runner.os }}-buildx-
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Login to Docker Hub
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build and push (dev)
|
||||
uses: docker/build-push-action@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
context: .
|
||||
file: autoconf/Dockerfile
|
||||
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/386,linux/arm/v7,linux/arm64/v8
|
||||
push: true
|
||||
tags: bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx-autoconf:dev
|
||||
cache-from: type=local,src=/tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
cache-to: type=local,dest=/tmp/.buildx-cache-new
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Move Docker cache
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
mv /tmp/.buildx-cache-new /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build and push (master)
|
||||
uses: docker/build-push-action@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
context: .
|
||||
file: autoconf/Dockerfile
|
||||
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/386,linux/arm/v7,linux/arm64/v8
|
||||
push: true
|
||||
tags: bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx-autoconf:latest,bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx-autoconf:${{ env.VERSION }}
|
||||
|
||||
82
.github/workflows/build-bunkerized-nginx-ui.yml
vendored
Normal file
82
.github/workflows/build-bunkerized-nginx-ui.yml
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
|
||||
name: Build and push bunkerized-nginx-ui
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [dev, master]
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
test:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Checkout source code
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
|
||||
# temp fix : can't use buildx + load because of manifest error
|
||||
# so we need to build the image the traditional way
|
||||
- name: Temp build to check security issues
|
||||
run: docker build -t bunkerized-nginx-ui -f ui/Dockerfile .
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Run Trivy security scanner
|
||||
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
image-ref: 'bunkerized-nginx-ui'
|
||||
format: 'table'
|
||||
exit-code: '1'
|
||||
ignore-unfixed: true
|
||||
severity: 'UNKNOWN,LOW,MEDIUM,HIGH,CRITICAL'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Set variables
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
VER=$(cat VERSION | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
echo "VERSION=$VER" >> $GITHUB_ENV
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup QEMU
|
||||
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v1
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Buildx
|
||||
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v1
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Docker cache
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
key: ${{ runner.os }}-buildx-${{ github.sha }}
|
||||
restore-keys: |
|
||||
${{ runner.os }}-buildx-
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Login to Docker Hub
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build and push (dev)
|
||||
uses: docker/build-push-action@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
context: .
|
||||
file: ui/Dockerfile
|
||||
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/386,linux/arm/v7,linux/arm64/v8
|
||||
push: true
|
||||
tags: bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx-ui:dev
|
||||
cache-from: type=local,src=/tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
cache-to: type=local,dest=/tmp/.buildx-cache-new
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Move Docker cache
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
mv /tmp/.buildx-cache-new /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build and push (master)
|
||||
uses: docker/build-push-action@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
context: .
|
||||
file: ui/Dockerfile
|
||||
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/386,linux/arm/v7,linux/arm64/v8
|
||||
push: true
|
||||
tags: bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx-ui:latest,bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx-ui:${{ env.VERSION }}
|
||||
83
.github/workflows/build-bunkerized-nginx.yml
vendored
Normal file
83
.github/workflows/build-bunkerized-nginx.yml
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
|
||||
name: Build and push bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [dev, master]
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
test:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Checkout source code
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
|
||||
# temp fix : can't use buildx + load because of manifest error
|
||||
# so we need to build the image the traditional way
|
||||
- name: Temp build to check security issues
|
||||
run: docker build -t bunkerized-nginx .
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Run Trivy security scanner
|
||||
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
|
||||
with:
|
||||
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
image-ref: 'bunkerized-nginx'
|
||||
format: 'table'
|
||||
exit-code: '1'
|
||||
ignore-unfixed: true
|
||||
severity: 'UNKNOWN,LOW,MEDIUM,HIGH,CRITICAL'
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Run autotest
|
||||
run: docker run bunkerized-nginx test
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Set variables
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
VER=$(cat VERSION | tr -d '\n')
|
||||
echo "VERSION=$VER" >> $GITHUB_ENV
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup QEMU
|
||||
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v1
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Buildx
|
||||
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v1
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Setup Docker cache
|
||||
uses: actions/cache@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
key: ${{ runner.os }}-buildx-${{ github.sha }}
|
||||
restore-keys: |
|
||||
${{ runner.os }}-buildx-
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Login to Docker Hub
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@v1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKER_TOKEN }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build and push (dev)
|
||||
uses: docker/build-push-action@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
context: .
|
||||
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/386,linux/arm/v7,linux/arm64/v8
|
||||
push: true
|
||||
tags: bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx:dev
|
||||
cache-from: type=local,src=/tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
cache-to: type=local,dest=/tmp/.buildx-cache-new
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Move Docker cache
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/dev'
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
mv /tmp/.buildx-cache-new /tmp/.buildx-cache
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Build and push (master)
|
||||
uses: docker/build-push-action@v2
|
||||
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/master'
|
||||
with:
|
||||
context: .
|
||||
platforms: linux/amd64,linux/386,linux/arm/v7,linux/arm64/v8
|
||||
push: true
|
||||
tags: bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx:latest,bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx:${{ env.VERSION }}
|
||||
30
.github/workflows/linux-bunkerized-nginx.yml
vendored
Normal file
30
.github/workflows/linux-bunkerized-nginx.yml
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
name: Automatic test for Linux
|
||||
|
||||
on:
|
||||
push:
|
||||
branches: [dev, master]
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
branches: [dev, master]
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
test:
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Checkout source code
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@v2
|
||||
- name: Build Debian with systemd
|
||||
run: docker build -t debian-systemd -f tests/Dockerfile-debian .
|
||||
- name: Build Ubuntu with systemd
|
||||
run: docker build -t ubuntu-systemd -f tests/Dockerfile-ubuntu .
|
||||
- name: Build CentOS with systemd
|
||||
run: docker build -t centos-systemd -f tests/Dockerfile-centos .
|
||||
- name: Build Fedora with systemd
|
||||
run: docker build -t fedora-systemd -f tests/Dockerfile-fedora .
|
||||
- name: Debian test
|
||||
run: ./tests/linux-run.sh debian-systemd test-debian
|
||||
- name: Ubuntu test
|
||||
run: ./tests/linux-run.sh ubuntu-systemd test-ubuntu
|
||||
- name: CentOS test
|
||||
run: ./tests/linux-run.sh centos-systemd test-centos
|
||||
- name: Fedora test
|
||||
run: ./tests/linux-run.sh fedora-systemd test-fedora
|
||||
2
.gitignore
vendored
Normal file
2
.gitignore
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
.idea/
|
||||
docs/_build/
|
||||
7
.gitmodules
vendored
Normal file
7
.gitmodules
vendored
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
[submodule "bunkerized-nginx-crowdsec"]
|
||||
path = examples/crowdsec/bunkerized-nginx-crowdsec
|
||||
url = https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx-crowdsec
|
||||
|
||||
[submodule "examples/clamav/bunkerized-nginx-clamav"]
|
||||
path = examples/clamav/bunkerized-nginx-clamav
|
||||
url = https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx-clamav.git
|
||||
78
CHANGELOG.md
Normal file
78
CHANGELOG.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
|
||||
# Changelog
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.3.1 - 2021/09/02
|
||||
|
||||
- Use ModSecurity v3.0.4 instead of v3.0.5 to fix memory leak
|
||||
- Fix ignored variables to control jobs
|
||||
- Fix bug when LISTEN_HTTP=no and MULTISITE=yes
|
||||
- Add CUSTOM_HEADER variable
|
||||
- Add REVERSE_PROXY_BUFFERING variable
|
||||
- Fix documentation for modsec and modsec-crs special folders
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.3.0 - 2021/08/23
|
||||
|
||||
- Kubernetes integration in beta
|
||||
- Linux integration in beta
|
||||
- autoconf refactoring
|
||||
- jobs refactoring
|
||||
- UI refactoring
|
||||
- UI security : login/password authentication and CRSF protection
|
||||
- various dependencies updates
|
||||
- move CrowdSec as an external plugin
|
||||
- Authelia support
|
||||
- improve various regexes
|
||||
- add INJECT_BODY variable
|
||||
- add WORKER_PROCESSES variable
|
||||
- add USE_LETS_ENCRYPT_STAGING variable
|
||||
- add LOCAL_PHP and LOCAL_PHP_PATH variables
|
||||
- add REDIRECT_TO variable
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.2.8 - 2021/07/22
|
||||
|
||||
- Fix broken links in README
|
||||
- Fix regex for EMAIL_LETS_ENCRYPT
|
||||
- Fix regex for REMOTE_PHP and REMOTE_PHP_PATH
|
||||
- Fix regex for SELF_SIGNED_*
|
||||
- Fix various bugs related to web UI
|
||||
- Fix bug in autoconf (missing instances parameter to reload function)
|
||||
- Remove old .env files when generating a new configuration
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.2.7 - 2021/06/14
|
||||
|
||||
- Add custom robots.txt and sitemap to RTD
|
||||
- Fix missing GeoIP DB bug when using BLACKLIST/WHITELIST_COUNTRY
|
||||
- Add underscore "_" to allowed chars for CUSTOM_HTTPS_CERT/KEY
|
||||
- Fix bug when using automatic self-signed certificate
|
||||
- Build and push images from GitHub actions instead of Docker Hub autobuild
|
||||
- Display the reason when generator is ignoring a variable
|
||||
- Various bug fixes related to certbot and jobs
|
||||
- Split jobs into pre and post jobs
|
||||
- Add HEALTHCHECK to image
|
||||
- Fix race condition when using autoconf without Swarm by checking healthy state
|
||||
- Bump modsecurity-nginx to v1.0.2
|
||||
- Community chat with bridged platforms
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.2.6 - 2021/06/06
|
||||
|
||||
- Move from "ghetto-style" shell scripts to generic jinja2 templating
|
||||
- Init work on a basic plugins system
|
||||
- Move ClamAV to external plugin
|
||||
- Reduce image size by removing unnecessary dependencies
|
||||
- Fix CrowdSec example
|
||||
- Change some global variables to multisite
|
||||
- Add LOG_LEVEL environment variable
|
||||
- Read-only container support
|
||||
- Improved antibot javascript with a basic proof of work
|
||||
- Update nginx to 1.20.1
|
||||
- Support of docker-socket-proxy with web UI
|
||||
- Add certbot-cloudflare example
|
||||
- Disable DNSBL checks when IP is local
|
||||
|
||||
## v1.2.5 - 2021/05/14
|
||||
|
||||
- Performance improvement : move some nginx security checks to LUA and external blacklist parsing enhancement
|
||||
- Init work on official documentation on readthedocs
|
||||
- Fix default value for CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY to allow file downloads
|
||||
- Add ROOT_SITE_SUBFOLDER environment variable
|
||||
|
||||
## TODO - retrospective changelog
|
||||
24
CONTRIBUTING.md
Normal file
24
CONTRIBUTING.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
# Contributing to bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
|
||||
First off all, thanks for being here and showing your support to the project !
|
||||
|
||||
We accept many types of contributions whether they are technical or not. Every community feedback, work or help is, and will always be, appreciated.
|
||||
|
||||
## Talk about the project
|
||||
|
||||
The first thing you can do is to talk about the project. You can share it on social media, make a blog post about it or simply tell your friends/colleagues that's an awesome project.
|
||||
|
||||
## Join the community chat
|
||||
|
||||
You can join [the community chat](https://coso.me/bunkerity-chat) to talk about the project and ask for help. Please note that you can choose the platform you want, thanks to [matterbridge](https://github.com/42wim/matterbridge) all messages coming from a platform are relayed to the others.
|
||||
|
||||
## Reporting bugs / ask for features
|
||||
|
||||
The preferred way to report bugs and asking for features is using [issues](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/issues). Before opening a new one, please check if a related issue is already opened using the "filters" bar. When creating a new issue please select and fill the "Bug report" or "Feature request" template.
|
||||
|
||||
## Code contribution
|
||||
|
||||
The preferred way to contribute code is using [pull requests](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/pulls). Before creating a pull request, please check if your code is related to an opened issue. If that's not the case, you should first create an issue so we can discuss about it. This procedure is here to avoid wasting your time in case the PR will be rejected. For minor changes (e.g. : typo, quick fix, ...), opening an issue might be facultative. **Don't forget to edit the documentations when needed !**
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
38
Dockerfile
38
Dockerfile
@@ -1,24 +1,26 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine
|
||||
FROM nginx:1.20.1-alpine
|
||||
|
||||
COPY compile.sh /tmp/compile.sh
|
||||
RUN chmod +x /tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
/tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/*
|
||||
COPY . /tmp/bunkerized-nginx-docker
|
||||
COPY helpers/install.sh /tmp/install.sh
|
||||
RUN apk --no-cache add bash && \
|
||||
chmod +x /tmp/install.sh && \
|
||||
/tmp/install.sh && \
|
||||
rm -f /tmp/install.sh
|
||||
|
||||
COPY entrypoint.sh /opt/entrypoint.sh
|
||||
COPY confs/ /opt/confs
|
||||
COPY scripts/ /opt/scripts
|
||||
COPY fail2ban/ /opt/fail2ban
|
||||
COPY logs/ /opt/logs
|
||||
COPY lua/ /opt/lua
|
||||
COPY helpers/docker.sh /tmp/docker.sh
|
||||
RUN chmod +x /tmp/docker.sh && \
|
||||
/tmp/docker.sh && \
|
||||
rm -f /tmp/docker.sh
|
||||
|
||||
RUN apk --no-cache add php7-fpm certbot libstdc++ libmaxminddb geoip pcre yajl fail2ban clamav apache2-utils rsyslog openssl lua libgd && \
|
||||
chmod +x /opt/entrypoint.sh /opt/scripts/* && \
|
||||
mkdir /opt/entrypoint.d && \
|
||||
adduser -h /dev/null -g '' -s /sbin/nologin -D -H nginx
|
||||
# Fix CVE-2021-22901, CVE-2021-22898, CVE-2021-22897, CVE-2021-33560 and CVE-2021-36159
|
||||
RUN apk add "curl>=7.77.0-r0" "libgcrypt>=1.8.8-r0" "apk-tools>=2.12.6-r0"
|
||||
|
||||
VOLUME /www /http-confs /server-confs /modsec-confs /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
VOLUME /www /http-confs /server-confs /modsec-confs /modsec-crs-confs /cache /pre-server-confs /acme-challenge /plugins
|
||||
|
||||
EXPOSE 80/tcp 443/tcp
|
||||
EXPOSE 8080/tcp 8443/tcp
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/entrypoint.sh"]
|
||||
USER nginx:nginx
|
||||
|
||||
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --start-period=120s --retries=3 CMD [ -f /tmp/nginx.pid ] || [ -f /tmp/nginx-temp.pid ] || exit 1
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/entrypoint.sh"]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
|
||||
FROM amd64/alpine
|
||||
|
||||
COPY compile.sh /tmp/compile.sh
|
||||
RUN chmod +x /tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
/tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/*
|
||||
|
||||
COPY entrypoint.sh /opt/entrypoint.sh
|
||||
COPY confs/ /opt/confs
|
||||
COPY scripts/ /opt/scripts
|
||||
COPY fail2ban/ /opt/fail2ban
|
||||
COPY logs/ /opt/logs
|
||||
COPY lua/ /opt/lua
|
||||
|
||||
RUN apk --no-cache add php7-fpm certbot libstdc++ libmaxminddb geoip pcre yajl fail2ban clamav apache2-utils rsyslog openssl lua libgd && \
|
||||
chmod +x /opt/entrypoint.sh /opt/scripts/* && \
|
||||
mkdir /opt/entrypoint.d && \
|
||||
adduser -h /dev/null -g '' -s /sbin/nologin -D -H nginx
|
||||
|
||||
VOLUME /www /http-confs /server-confs /modsec-confs /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
|
||||
EXPOSE 80/tcp 443/tcp
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/entrypoint.sh"]
|
||||
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine AS builder
|
||||
|
||||
ENV QEMU_URL https://github.com/balena-io/qemu/releases/download/v4.0.0%2Bbalena2/qemu-4.0.0.balena2-arm.tar.gz
|
||||
RUN apk add curl && curl -L ${QEMU_URL} | tar zxvf - -C . --strip-components 1
|
||||
|
||||
FROM arm32v7/alpine
|
||||
|
||||
COPY --from=builder qemu-arm-static /usr/bin
|
||||
|
||||
COPY compile.sh /tmp/compile.sh
|
||||
RUN chmod +x /tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
/tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/*
|
||||
|
||||
COPY entrypoint.sh /opt/entrypoint.sh
|
||||
COPY confs/ /opt/confs
|
||||
COPY scripts/ /opt/scripts
|
||||
COPY fail2ban/ /opt/fail2ban
|
||||
COPY logs/ /opt/logs
|
||||
COPY lua/ /opt/lua
|
||||
|
||||
RUN apk --no-cache add php7-fpm certbot libstdc++ libmaxminddb geoip pcre yajl fail2ban clamav apache2-utils rsyslog openssl lua libgd && \
|
||||
chmod +x /opt/entrypoint.sh /opt/scripts/* && \
|
||||
mkdir /opt/entrypoint.d && \
|
||||
adduser -h /dev/null -g '' -s /sbin/nologin -D -H nginx
|
||||
|
||||
VOLUME /www /http-confs /server-confs /modsec-confs /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
|
||||
EXPOSE 80/tcp 443/tcp
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/entrypoint.sh"]
|
||||
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine AS builder
|
||||
|
||||
ENV QEMU_URL https://github.com/balena-io/qemu/releases/download/v4.0.0%2Bbalena2/qemu-4.0.0.balena2-aarch64.tar.gz
|
||||
RUN apk add curl && curl -L ${QEMU_URL} | tar zxvf - -C . --strip-components 1
|
||||
|
||||
FROM arm64v8/alpine
|
||||
|
||||
COPY --from=builder qemu-aarch64-static /usr/bin
|
||||
|
||||
COPY compile.sh /tmp/compile.sh
|
||||
RUN chmod +x /tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
/tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/*
|
||||
|
||||
COPY entrypoint.sh /opt/entrypoint.sh
|
||||
COPY confs/ /opt/confs
|
||||
COPY scripts/ /opt/scripts
|
||||
COPY fail2ban/ /opt/fail2ban
|
||||
COPY logs/ /opt/logs
|
||||
COPY lua/ /opt/lua
|
||||
|
||||
RUN apk --no-cache add php7-fpm certbot libstdc++ libmaxminddb geoip pcre yajl fail2ban clamav apache2-utils rsyslog openssl lua libgd && \
|
||||
chmod +x /opt/entrypoint.sh /opt/scripts/* && \
|
||||
mkdir /opt/entrypoint.d && \
|
||||
adduser -h /dev/null -g '' -s /sbin/nologin -D -H nginx
|
||||
|
||||
VOLUME /www /http-confs /server-confs /modsec-confs /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
|
||||
EXPOSE 80/tcp 443/tcp
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/entrypoint.sh"]
|
||||
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
|
||||
FROM i386/alpine
|
||||
|
||||
COPY compile.sh /tmp/compile.sh
|
||||
RUN chmod +x /tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
/tmp/compile.sh && \
|
||||
rm -rf /tmp/*
|
||||
|
||||
COPY entrypoint.sh /opt/entrypoint.sh
|
||||
COPY confs/ /opt/confs
|
||||
COPY scripts/ /opt/scripts
|
||||
COPY fail2ban/ /opt/fail2ban
|
||||
COPY logs/ /opt/logs
|
||||
COPY lua/ /opt/lua
|
||||
|
||||
RUN apk --no-cache add php7-fpm certbot libstdc++ libmaxminddb geoip pcre yajl fail2ban clamav apache2-utils rsyslog openssl lua libgd && \
|
||||
chmod +x /opt/entrypoint.sh /opt/scripts/* && \
|
||||
mkdir /opt/entrypoint.d && \
|
||||
adduser -h /dev/null -g '' -s /sbin/nologin -D -H nginx
|
||||
|
||||
VOLUME /www /http-confs /server-confs /modsec-confs /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
|
||||
EXPOSE 80/tcp 443/tcp
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/entrypoint.sh"]
|
||||
660
LICENSE.md
Normal file
660
LICENSE.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,660 @@
|
||||
### GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
|
||||
|
||||
Version 3, 19 November 2007
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
|
||||
<https://fsf.org/>
|
||||
|
||||
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this
|
||||
license document, but changing it is not allowed.
|
||||
|
||||
### Preamble
|
||||
|
||||
The GNU Affero General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
|
||||
software and other kinds of works, specifically designed to ensure
|
||||
cooperation with the community in the case of network server software.
|
||||
|
||||
The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
|
||||
to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast,
|
||||
our General Public Licenses are intended to guarantee your freedom to
|
||||
share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains
|
||||
free software for all its users.
|
||||
|
||||
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
|
||||
price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
|
||||
have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
|
||||
them if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you
|
||||
want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new
|
||||
free programs, and that you know you can do these things.
|
||||
|
||||
Developers that use our General Public Licenses protect your rights
|
||||
with two steps: (1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer
|
||||
you this License which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute
|
||||
and/or modify the software.
|
||||
|
||||
A secondary benefit of defending all users' freedom is that
|
||||
improvements made in alternate versions of the program, if they
|
||||
receive widespread use, become available for other developers to
|
||||
incorporate. Many developers of free software are heartened and
|
||||
encouraged by the resulting cooperation. However, in the case of
|
||||
software used on network servers, this result may fail to come about.
|
||||
The GNU General Public License permits making a modified version and
|
||||
letting the public access it on a server without ever releasing its
|
||||
source code to the public.
|
||||
|
||||
The GNU Affero General Public License is designed specifically to
|
||||
ensure that, in such cases, the modified source code becomes available
|
||||
to the community. It requires the operator of a network server to
|
||||
provide the source code of the modified version running there to the
|
||||
users of that server. Therefore, public use of a modified version, on
|
||||
a publicly accessible server, gives the public access to the source
|
||||
code of the modified version.
|
||||
|
||||
An older license, called the Affero General Public License and
|
||||
published by Affero, was designed to accomplish similar goals. This is
|
||||
a different license, not a version of the Affero GPL, but Affero has
|
||||
released a new version of the Affero GPL which permits relicensing
|
||||
under this license.
|
||||
|
||||
The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and
|
||||
modification follow.
|
||||
|
||||
### TERMS AND CONDITIONS
|
||||
|
||||
#### 0. Definitions.
|
||||
|
||||
"This License" refers to version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public
|
||||
License.
|
||||
|
||||
"Copyright" also means copyright-like laws that apply to other kinds
|
||||
of works, such as semiconductor masks.
|
||||
|
||||
"The Program" refers to any copyrightable work licensed under this
|
||||
License. Each licensee is addressed as "you". "Licensees" and
|
||||
"recipients" may be individuals or organizations.
|
||||
|
||||
To "modify" a work means to copy from or adapt all or part of the work
|
||||
in a fashion requiring copyright permission, other than the making of
|
||||
an exact copy. The resulting work is called a "modified version" of
|
||||
the earlier work or a work "based on" the earlier work.
|
||||
|
||||
A "covered work" means either the unmodified Program or a work based
|
||||
on the Program.
|
||||
|
||||
To "propagate" a work means to do anything with it that, without
|
||||
permission, would make you directly or secondarily liable for
|
||||
infringement under applicable copyright law, except executing it on a
|
||||
computer or modifying a private copy. Propagation includes copying,
|
||||
distribution (with or without modification), making available to the
|
||||
public, and in some countries other activities as well.
|
||||
|
||||
To "convey" a work means any kind of propagation that enables other
|
||||
parties to make or receive copies. Mere interaction with a user
|
||||
through a computer network, with no transfer of a copy, is not
|
||||
conveying.
|
||||
|
||||
An interactive user interface displays "Appropriate Legal Notices" to
|
||||
the extent that it includes a convenient and prominently visible
|
||||
feature that (1) displays an appropriate copyright notice, and (2)
|
||||
tells the user that there is no warranty for the work (except to the
|
||||
extent that warranties are provided), that licensees may convey the
|
||||
work under this License, and how to view a copy of this License. If
|
||||
the interface presents a list of user commands or options, such as a
|
||||
menu, a prominent item in the list meets this criterion.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 1. Source Code.
|
||||
|
||||
The "source code" for a work means the preferred form of the work for
|
||||
making modifications to it. "Object code" means any non-source form of
|
||||
a work.
|
||||
|
||||
A "Standard Interface" means an interface that either is an official
|
||||
standard defined by a recognized standards body, or, in the case of
|
||||
interfaces specified for a particular programming language, one that
|
||||
is widely used among developers working in that language.
|
||||
|
||||
The "System Libraries" of an executable work include anything, other
|
||||
than the work as a whole, that (a) is included in the normal form of
|
||||
packaging a Major Component, but which is not part of that Major
|
||||
Component, and (b) serves only to enable use of the work with that
|
||||
Major Component, or to implement a Standard Interface for which an
|
||||
implementation is available to the public in source code form. A
|
||||
"Major Component", in this context, means a major essential component
|
||||
(kernel, window system, and so on) of the specific operating system
|
||||
(if any) on which the executable work runs, or a compiler used to
|
||||
produce the work, or an object code interpreter used to run it.
|
||||
|
||||
The "Corresponding Source" for a work in object code form means all
|
||||
the source code needed to generate, install, and (for an executable
|
||||
work) run the object code and to modify the work, including scripts to
|
||||
control those activities. However, it does not include the work's
|
||||
System Libraries, or general-purpose tools or generally available free
|
||||
programs which are used unmodified in performing those activities but
|
||||
which are not part of the work. For example, Corresponding Source
|
||||
includes interface definition files associated with source files for
|
||||
the work, and the source code for shared libraries and dynamically
|
||||
linked subprograms that the work is specifically designed to require,
|
||||
such as by intimate data communication or control flow between those
|
||||
subprograms and other parts of the work.
|
||||
|
||||
The Corresponding Source need not include anything that users can
|
||||
regenerate automatically from other parts of the Corresponding Source.
|
||||
|
||||
The Corresponding Source for a work in source code form is that same
|
||||
work.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 2. Basic Permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
All rights granted under this License are granted for the term of
|
||||
copyright on the Program, and are irrevocable provided the stated
|
||||
conditions are met. This License explicitly affirms your unlimited
|
||||
permission to run the unmodified Program. The output from running a
|
||||
covered work is covered by this License only if the output, given its
|
||||
content, constitutes a covered work. This License acknowledges your
|
||||
rights of fair use or other equivalent, as provided by copyright law.
|
||||
|
||||
You may make, run and propagate covered works that you do not convey,
|
||||
without conditions so long as your license otherwise remains in force.
|
||||
You may convey covered works to others for the sole purpose of having
|
||||
them make modifications exclusively for you, or provide you with
|
||||
facilities for running those works, provided that you comply with the
|
||||
terms of this License in conveying all material for which you do not
|
||||
control copyright. Those thus making or running the covered works for
|
||||
you must do so exclusively on your behalf, under your direction and
|
||||
control, on terms that prohibit them from making any copies of your
|
||||
copyrighted material outside their relationship with you.
|
||||
|
||||
Conveying under any other circumstances is permitted solely under the
|
||||
conditions stated below. Sublicensing is not allowed; section 10 makes
|
||||
it unnecessary.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 3. Protecting Users' Legal Rights From Anti-Circumvention Law.
|
||||
|
||||
No covered work shall be deemed part of an effective technological
|
||||
measure under any applicable law fulfilling obligations under article
|
||||
11 of the WIPO copyright treaty adopted on 20 December 1996, or
|
||||
similar laws prohibiting or restricting circumvention of such
|
||||
measures.
|
||||
|
||||
When you convey a covered work, you waive any legal power to forbid
|
||||
circumvention of technological measures to the extent such
|
||||
circumvention is effected by exercising rights under this License with
|
||||
respect to the covered work, and you disclaim any intention to limit
|
||||
operation or modification of the work as a means of enforcing, against
|
||||
the work's users, your or third parties' legal rights to forbid
|
||||
circumvention of technological measures.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 4. Conveying Verbatim Copies.
|
||||
|
||||
You may convey verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you
|
||||
receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and
|
||||
appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate copyright notice;
|
||||
keep intact all notices stating that this License and any
|
||||
non-permissive terms added in accord with section 7 apply to the code;
|
||||
keep intact all notices of the absence of any warranty; and give all
|
||||
recipients a copy of this License along with the Program.
|
||||
|
||||
You may charge any price or no price for each copy that you convey,
|
||||
and you may offer support or warranty protection for a fee.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 5. Conveying Modified Source Versions.
|
||||
|
||||
You may convey a work based on the Program, or the modifications to
|
||||
produce it from the Program, in the form of source code under the
|
||||
terms of section 4, provided that you also meet all of these
|
||||
conditions:
|
||||
|
||||
- a) The work must carry prominent notices stating that you modified
|
||||
it, and giving a relevant date.
|
||||
- b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is
|
||||
released under this License and any conditions added under
|
||||
section 7. This requirement modifies the requirement in section 4
|
||||
to "keep intact all notices".
|
||||
- c) You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this
|
||||
License to anyone who comes into possession of a copy. This
|
||||
License will therefore apply, along with any applicable section 7
|
||||
additional terms, to the whole of the work, and all its parts,
|
||||
regardless of how they are packaged. This License gives no
|
||||
permission to license the work in any other way, but it does not
|
||||
invalidate such permission if you have separately received it.
|
||||
- d) If the work has interactive user interfaces, each must display
|
||||
Appropriate Legal Notices; however, if the Program has interactive
|
||||
interfaces that do not display Appropriate Legal Notices, your
|
||||
work need not make them do so.
|
||||
|
||||
A compilation of a covered work with other separate and independent
|
||||
works, which are not by their nature extensions of the covered work,
|
||||
and which are not combined with it such as to form a larger program,
|
||||
in or on a volume of a storage or distribution medium, is called an
|
||||
"aggregate" if the compilation and its resulting copyright are not
|
||||
used to limit the access or legal rights of the compilation's users
|
||||
beyond what the individual works permit. Inclusion of a covered work
|
||||
in an aggregate does not cause this License to apply to the other
|
||||
parts of the aggregate.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 6. Conveying Non-Source Forms.
|
||||
|
||||
You may convey a covered work in object code form under the terms of
|
||||
sections 4 and 5, provided that you also convey the machine-readable
|
||||
Corresponding Source under the terms of this License, in one of these
|
||||
ways:
|
||||
|
||||
- a) Convey the object code in, or embodied in, a physical product
|
||||
(including a physical distribution medium), accompanied by the
|
||||
Corresponding Source fixed on a durable physical medium
|
||||
customarily used for software interchange.
|
||||
- b) Convey the object code in, or embodied in, a physical product
|
||||
(including a physical distribution medium), accompanied by a
|
||||
written offer, valid for at least three years and valid for as
|
||||
long as you offer spare parts or customer support for that product
|
||||
model, to give anyone who possesses the object code either (1) a
|
||||
copy of the Corresponding Source for all the software in the
|
||||
product that is covered by this License, on a durable physical
|
||||
medium customarily used for software interchange, for a price no
|
||||
more than your reasonable cost of physically performing this
|
||||
conveying of source, or (2) access to copy the Corresponding
|
||||
Source from a network server at no charge.
|
||||
- c) Convey individual copies of the object code with a copy of the
|
||||
written offer to provide the Corresponding Source. This
|
||||
alternative is allowed only occasionally and noncommercially, and
|
||||
only if you received the object code with such an offer, in accord
|
||||
with subsection 6b.
|
||||
- d) Convey the object code by offering access from a designated
|
||||
place (gratis or for a charge), and offer equivalent access to the
|
||||
Corresponding Source in the same way through the same place at no
|
||||
further charge. You need not require recipients to copy the
|
||||
Corresponding Source along with the object code. If the place to
|
||||
copy the object code is a network server, the Corresponding Source
|
||||
may be on a different server (operated by you or a third party)
|
||||
that supports equivalent copying facilities, provided you maintain
|
||||
clear directions next to the object code saying where to find the
|
||||
Corresponding Source. Regardless of what server hosts the
|
||||
Corresponding Source, you remain obligated to ensure that it is
|
||||
available for as long as needed to satisfy these requirements.
|
||||
- e) Convey the object code using peer-to-peer transmission,
|
||||
provided you inform other peers where the object code and
|
||||
Corresponding Source of the work are being offered to the general
|
||||
public at no charge under subsection 6d.
|
||||
|
||||
A separable portion of the object code, whose source code is excluded
|
||||
from the Corresponding Source as a System Library, need not be
|
||||
included in conveying the object code work.
|
||||
|
||||
A "User Product" is either (1) a "consumer product", which means any
|
||||
tangible personal property which is normally used for personal,
|
||||
family, or household purposes, or (2) anything designed or sold for
|
||||
incorporation into a dwelling. In determining whether a product is a
|
||||
consumer product, doubtful cases shall be resolved in favor of
|
||||
coverage. For a particular product received by a particular user,
|
||||
"normally used" refers to a typical or common use of that class of
|
||||
product, regardless of the status of the particular user or of the way
|
||||
in which the particular user actually uses, or expects or is expected
|
||||
to use, the product. A product is a consumer product regardless of
|
||||
whether the product has substantial commercial, industrial or
|
||||
non-consumer uses, unless such uses represent the only significant
|
||||
mode of use of the product.
|
||||
|
||||
"Installation Information" for a User Product means any methods,
|
||||
procedures, authorization keys, or other information required to
|
||||
install and execute modified versions of a covered work in that User
|
||||
Product from a modified version of its Corresponding Source. The
|
||||
information must suffice to ensure that the continued functioning of
|
||||
the modified object code is in no case prevented or interfered with
|
||||
solely because modification has been made.
|
||||
|
||||
If you convey an object code work under this section in, or with, or
|
||||
specifically for use in, a User Product, and the conveying occurs as
|
||||
part of a transaction in which the right of possession and use of the
|
||||
User Product is transferred to the recipient in perpetuity or for a
|
||||
fixed term (regardless of how the transaction is characterized), the
|
||||
Corresponding Source conveyed under this section must be accompanied
|
||||
by the Installation Information. But this requirement does not apply
|
||||
if neither you nor any third party retains the ability to install
|
||||
modified object code on the User Product (for example, the work has
|
||||
been installed in ROM).
|
||||
|
||||
The requirement to provide Installation Information does not include a
|
||||
requirement to continue to provide support service, warranty, or
|
||||
updates for a work that has been modified or installed by the
|
||||
recipient, or for the User Product in which it has been modified or
|
||||
installed. Access to a network may be denied when the modification
|
||||
itself materially and adversely affects the operation of the network
|
||||
or violates the rules and protocols for communication across the
|
||||
network.
|
||||
|
||||
Corresponding Source conveyed, and Installation Information provided,
|
||||
in accord with this section must be in a format that is publicly
|
||||
documented (and with an implementation available to the public in
|
||||
source code form), and must require no special password or key for
|
||||
unpacking, reading or copying.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 7. Additional Terms.
|
||||
|
||||
"Additional permissions" are terms that supplement the terms of this
|
||||
License by making exceptions from one or more of its conditions.
|
||||
Additional permissions that are applicable to the entire Program shall
|
||||
be treated as though they were included in this License, to the extent
|
||||
that they are valid under applicable law. If additional permissions
|
||||
apply only to part of the Program, that part may be used separately
|
||||
under those permissions, but the entire Program remains governed by
|
||||
this License without regard to the additional permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
When you convey a copy of a covered work, you may at your option
|
||||
remove any additional permissions from that copy, or from any part of
|
||||
it. (Additional permissions may be written to require their own
|
||||
removal in certain cases when you modify the work.) You may place
|
||||
additional permissions on material, added by you to a covered work,
|
||||
for which you have or can give appropriate copyright permission.
|
||||
|
||||
Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, for material you
|
||||
add to a covered work, you may (if authorized by the copyright holders
|
||||
of that material) supplement the terms of this License with terms:
|
||||
|
||||
- a) Disclaiming warranty or limiting liability differently from the
|
||||
terms of sections 15 and 16 of this License; or
|
||||
- b) Requiring preservation of specified reasonable legal notices or
|
||||
author attributions in that material or in the Appropriate Legal
|
||||
Notices displayed by works containing it; or
|
||||
- c) Prohibiting misrepresentation of the origin of that material,
|
||||
or requiring that modified versions of such material be marked in
|
||||
reasonable ways as different from the original version; or
|
||||
- d) Limiting the use for publicity purposes of names of licensors
|
||||
or authors of the material; or
|
||||
- e) Declining to grant rights under trademark law for use of some
|
||||
trade names, trademarks, or service marks; or
|
||||
- f) Requiring indemnification of licensors and authors of that
|
||||
material by anyone who conveys the material (or modified versions
|
||||
of it) with contractual assumptions of liability to the recipient,
|
||||
for any liability that these contractual assumptions directly
|
||||
impose on those licensors and authors.
|
||||
|
||||
All other non-permissive additional terms are considered "further
|
||||
restrictions" within the meaning of section 10. If the Program as you
|
||||
received it, or any part of it, contains a notice stating that it is
|
||||
governed by this License along with a term that is a further
|
||||
restriction, you may remove that term. If a license document contains
|
||||
a further restriction but permits relicensing or conveying under this
|
||||
License, you may add to a covered work material governed by the terms
|
||||
of that license document, provided that the further restriction does
|
||||
not survive such relicensing or conveying.
|
||||
|
||||
If you add terms to a covered work in accord with this section, you
|
||||
must place, in the relevant source files, a statement of the
|
||||
additional terms that apply to those files, or a notice indicating
|
||||
where to find the applicable terms.
|
||||
|
||||
Additional terms, permissive or non-permissive, may be stated in the
|
||||
form of a separately written license, or stated as exceptions; the
|
||||
above requirements apply either way.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 8. Termination.
|
||||
|
||||
You may not propagate or modify a covered work except as expressly
|
||||
provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to propagate or
|
||||
modify it is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under
|
||||
this License (including any patent licenses granted under the third
|
||||
paragraph of section 11).
|
||||
|
||||
However, if you cease all violation of this License, then your license
|
||||
from a particular copyright holder is reinstated (a) provisionally,
|
||||
unless and until the copyright holder explicitly and finally
|
||||
terminates your license, and (b) permanently, if the copyright holder
|
||||
fails to notify you of the violation by some reasonable means prior to
|
||||
60 days after the cessation.
|
||||
|
||||
Moreover, your license from a particular copyright holder is
|
||||
reinstated permanently if the copyright holder notifies you of the
|
||||
violation by some reasonable means, this is the first time you have
|
||||
received notice of violation of this License (for any work) from that
|
||||
copyright holder, and you cure the violation prior to 30 days after
|
||||
your receipt of the notice.
|
||||
|
||||
Termination of your rights under this section does not terminate the
|
||||
licenses of parties who have received copies or rights from you under
|
||||
this License. If your rights have been terminated and not permanently
|
||||
reinstated, you do not qualify to receive new licenses for the same
|
||||
material under section 10.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 9. Acceptance Not Required for Having Copies.
|
||||
|
||||
You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or run
|
||||
a copy of the Program. Ancillary propagation of a covered work
|
||||
occurring solely as a consequence of using peer-to-peer transmission
|
||||
to receive a copy likewise does not require acceptance. However,
|
||||
nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or
|
||||
modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do
|
||||
not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or propagating a
|
||||
covered work, you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 10. Automatic Licensing of Downstream Recipients.
|
||||
|
||||
Each time you convey a covered work, the recipient automatically
|
||||
receives a license from the original licensors, to run, modify and
|
||||
propagate that work, subject to this License. You are not responsible
|
||||
for enforcing compliance by third parties with this License.
|
||||
|
||||
An "entity transaction" is a transaction transferring control of an
|
||||
organization, or substantially all assets of one, or subdividing an
|
||||
organization, or merging organizations. If propagation of a covered
|
||||
work results from an entity transaction, each party to that
|
||||
transaction who receives a copy of the work also receives whatever
|
||||
licenses to the work the party's predecessor in interest had or could
|
||||
give under the previous paragraph, plus a right to possession of the
|
||||
Corresponding Source of the work from the predecessor in interest, if
|
||||
the predecessor has it or can get it with reasonable efforts.
|
||||
|
||||
You may not impose any further restrictions on the exercise of the
|
||||
rights granted or affirmed under this License. For example, you may
|
||||
not impose a license fee, royalty, or other charge for exercise of
|
||||
rights granted under this License, and you may not initiate litigation
|
||||
(including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging that
|
||||
any patent claim is infringed by making, using, selling, offering for
|
||||
sale, or importing the Program or any portion of it.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 11. Patents.
|
||||
|
||||
A "contributor" is a copyright holder who authorizes use under this
|
||||
License of the Program or a work on which the Program is based. The
|
||||
work thus licensed is called the contributor's "contributor version".
|
||||
|
||||
A contributor's "essential patent claims" are all patent claims owned
|
||||
or controlled by the contributor, whether already acquired or
|
||||
hereafter acquired, that would be infringed by some manner, permitted
|
||||
by this License, of making, using, or selling its contributor version,
|
||||
but do not include claims that would be infringed only as a
|
||||
consequence of further modification of the contributor version. For
|
||||
purposes of this definition, "control" includes the right to grant
|
||||
patent sublicenses in a manner consistent with the requirements of
|
||||
this License.
|
||||
|
||||
Each contributor grants you a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free
|
||||
patent license under the contributor's essential patent claims, to
|
||||
make, use, sell, offer for sale, import and otherwise run, modify and
|
||||
propagate the contents of its contributor version.
|
||||
|
||||
In the following three paragraphs, a "patent license" is any express
|
||||
agreement or commitment, however denominated, not to enforce a patent
|
||||
(such as an express permission to practice a patent or covenant not to
|
||||
sue for patent infringement). To "grant" such a patent license to a
|
||||
party means to make such an agreement or commitment not to enforce a
|
||||
patent against the party.
|
||||
|
||||
If you convey a covered work, knowingly relying on a patent license,
|
||||
and the Corresponding Source of the work is not available for anyone
|
||||
to copy, free of charge and under the terms of this License, through a
|
||||
publicly available network server or other readily accessible means,
|
||||
then you must either (1) cause the Corresponding Source to be so
|
||||
available, or (2) arrange to deprive yourself of the benefit of the
|
||||
patent license for this particular work, or (3) arrange, in a manner
|
||||
consistent with the requirements of this License, to extend the patent
|
||||
license to downstream recipients. "Knowingly relying" means you have
|
||||
actual knowledge that, but for the patent license, your conveying the
|
||||
covered work in a country, or your recipient's use of the covered work
|
||||
in a country, would infringe one or more identifiable patents in that
|
||||
country that you have reason to believe are valid.
|
||||
|
||||
If, pursuant to or in connection with a single transaction or
|
||||
arrangement, you convey, or propagate by procuring conveyance of, a
|
||||
covered work, and grant a patent license to some of the parties
|
||||
receiving the covered work authorizing them to use, propagate, modify
|
||||
or convey a specific copy of the covered work, then the patent license
|
||||
you grant is automatically extended to all recipients of the covered
|
||||
work and works based on it.
|
||||
|
||||
A patent license is "discriminatory" if it does not include within the
|
||||
scope of its coverage, prohibits the exercise of, or is conditioned on
|
||||
the non-exercise of one or more of the rights that are specifically
|
||||
granted under this License. You may not convey a covered work if you
|
||||
are a party to an arrangement with a third party that is in the
|
||||
business of distributing software, under which you make payment to the
|
||||
third party based on the extent of your activity of conveying the
|
||||
work, and under which the third party grants, to any of the parties
|
||||
who would receive the covered work from you, a discriminatory patent
|
||||
license (a) in connection with copies of the covered work conveyed by
|
||||
you (or copies made from those copies), or (b) primarily for and in
|
||||
connection with specific products or compilations that contain the
|
||||
covered work, unless you entered into that arrangement, or that patent
|
||||
license was granted, prior to 28 March 2007.
|
||||
|
||||
Nothing in this License shall be construed as excluding or limiting
|
||||
any implied license or other defenses to infringement that may
|
||||
otherwise be available to you under applicable patent law.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 12. No Surrender of Others' Freedom.
|
||||
|
||||
If conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or
|
||||
otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not
|
||||
excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot convey a
|
||||
covered work so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under
|
||||
this License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a
|
||||
consequence you may not convey it at all. For example, if you agree to
|
||||
terms that obligate you to collect a royalty for further conveying
|
||||
from those to whom you convey the Program, the only way you could
|
||||
satisfy both those terms and this License would be to refrain entirely
|
||||
from conveying the Program.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 13. Remote Network Interaction; Use with the GNU General Public License.
|
||||
|
||||
Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, if you modify the
|
||||
Program, your modified version must prominently offer all users
|
||||
interacting with it remotely through a computer network (if your
|
||||
version supports such interaction) an opportunity to receive the
|
||||
Corresponding Source of your version by providing access to the
|
||||
Corresponding Source from a network server at no charge, through some
|
||||
standard or customary means of facilitating copying of software. This
|
||||
Corresponding Source shall include the Corresponding Source for any
|
||||
work covered by version 3 of the GNU General Public License that is
|
||||
incorporated pursuant to the following paragraph.
|
||||
|
||||
Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have
|
||||
permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed
|
||||
under version 3 of the GNU General Public License into a single
|
||||
combined work, and to convey the resulting work. The terms of this
|
||||
License will continue to apply to the part which is the covered work,
|
||||
but the work with which it is combined will remain governed by version
|
||||
3 of the GNU General Public License.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 14. Revised Versions of this License.
|
||||
|
||||
The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions
|
||||
of the GNU Affero General Public License from time to time. Such new
|
||||
versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may
|
||||
differ in detail to address new problems or concerns.
|
||||
|
||||
Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program
|
||||
specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU Affero General
|
||||
Public License "or any later version" applies to it, you have the
|
||||
option of following the terms and conditions either of that numbered
|
||||
version or of any later version published by the Free Software
|
||||
Foundation. If the Program does not specify a version number of the
|
||||
GNU Affero General Public License, you may choose any version ever
|
||||
published by the Free Software Foundation.
|
||||
|
||||
If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future versions
|
||||
of the GNU Affero General Public License can be used, that proxy's
|
||||
public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you
|
||||
to choose that version for the Program.
|
||||
|
||||
Later license versions may give you additional or different
|
||||
permissions. However, no additional obligations are imposed on any
|
||||
author or copyright holder as a result of your choosing to follow a
|
||||
later version.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 15. Disclaimer of Warranty.
|
||||
|
||||
THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY
|
||||
APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT
|
||||
HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT
|
||||
WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
|
||||
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
|
||||
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND
|
||||
PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE
|
||||
DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR
|
||||
CORRECTION.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 16. Limitation of Liability.
|
||||
|
||||
IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
|
||||
WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MODIFIES AND/OR
|
||||
CONVEYS THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
|
||||
INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
|
||||
ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT
|
||||
NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR
|
||||
LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM
|
||||
TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER
|
||||
PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
|
||||
|
||||
#### 17. Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16.
|
||||
|
||||
If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided
|
||||
above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms,
|
||||
reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates
|
||||
an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the
|
||||
Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a
|
||||
copy of the Program in return for a fee.
|
||||
|
||||
END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
|
||||
|
||||
### How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
|
||||
|
||||
If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
|
||||
possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
|
||||
free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these
|
||||
terms.
|
||||
|
||||
To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest to
|
||||
attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively state
|
||||
the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least the
|
||||
"copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
|
||||
|
||||
<one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
|
||||
Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
|
||||
|
||||
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
|
||||
published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
|
||||
License, or (at your option) any later version.
|
||||
|
||||
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
||||
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
||||
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
||||
GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
|
||||
|
||||
You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
|
||||
along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
||||
|
||||
Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper
|
||||
mail.
|
||||
|
||||
If your software can interact with users remotely through a computer
|
||||
network, you should also make sure that it provides a way for users to
|
||||
get its source. For example, if your program is a web application, its
|
||||
interface could display a "Source" link that leads users to an archive
|
||||
of the code. There are many ways you could offer source, and different
|
||||
solutions will be better for different programs; see section 13 for
|
||||
the specific requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or
|
||||
school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if
|
||||
necessary. For more information on this, and how to apply and follow
|
||||
the GNU AGPL, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
||||
870
README.md
870
README.md
@@ -1,744 +1,222 @@
|
||||
# bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/docs/img/logo.png?raw=true" width="425" />
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/logo.png?raw=true" width="425" />
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/bunkerized--nginx-1.3.1-blue" />
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/nginx-1.20.1-blue" />
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/last-commit/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx" />
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/workflow/status/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/Automatic%20test?label=automatic%20test" />
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/github/workflow/status/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/Build%20and%20push%20bunkerized-nginx?label=docker%20build" />
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/readthedocs/bunkerized-nginx" />
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/nginx-1.18.0-blue" /> <img src="https://img.shields.io/docker/cloud/build/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx" /> <img src="https://img.shields.io/github/last-commit/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx" />
|
||||
<p align="center">
|
||||
<strong>
|
||||
<a href="https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io">Documentation</a>
|
||||
|
|
||||
<a href="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/tree/master/examples">Examples</a>
|
||||
|
|
||||
<a href="https://www.bunkerity.com/category/bunkerized-nginx/">Blog posts</a>
|
||||
|
|
||||
<a href="https://coso.me/bunkerity-chat">Community chat</a>
|
||||
|
|
||||
<a href="https://coso.me/bunkerity">Follow us</a>
|
||||
</strong>
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
|
||||
nginx Docker image secure by default.
|
||||
> Make security by default great again !
|
||||
|
||||
Avoid the hassle of following security best practices each time you need a web server or reverse proxy. Bunkerized-nginx provides generic security configs, settings and tools so you don't need to do it yourself.
|
||||
bunkerized-nginx is a web server based on the notorious nginx and focused on security. It integrates into existing environments (Linux, Docker, Swarm, Kubernetes, ...) to make your web services "secure by default" without any hassle. The security best practices are automatically applied for you while keeping control of every settings to meet your own use case.
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/docs/img/overview.png?raw=true" />
|
||||
|
||||
Non-exhaustive list of features :
|
||||
- HTTPS support with transparent Let's Encrypt automation
|
||||
- State-of-the-art web security : HTTP security headers, php.ini hardening, prevent leaks, ...
|
||||
- State-of-the-art web security : HTTP security headers, prevent leaks, TLS hardening, ...
|
||||
- Integrated ModSecurity WAF with the OWASP Core Rule Set
|
||||
- Automatic ban of strange behaviors with fail2ban
|
||||
- Automatic ban of strange behaviors
|
||||
- Antibot challenge through cookie, javascript, captcha or recaptcha v3
|
||||
- Block TOR, proxies, bad user-agents, countries, ...
|
||||
- Perform automatic DNSBL checks to block known bad IP
|
||||
- Block known bad IP with DNSBL
|
||||
- Prevent bruteforce attacks with rate limiting
|
||||
- Detect bad files with ClamAV
|
||||
- Easy to configure with environment variables
|
||||
- Plugins system for external security checks (ClamAV, CrowdSec, ...)
|
||||
- Easy to configure with environment variables or web UI
|
||||
- Seamless integration into existing environments : Linux, Docker, Swarm, Kubernetes, ...
|
||||
|
||||
Fooling automated tools/scanners :
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/demo.gif?raw=true" />
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/docs/img/demo.gif?raw=true" />
|
||||
|
||||
You can find a live demo at [https://demo-nginx.bunkerity.com](https://demo-nginx.bunkerity.com), feel free to do some security tests.
|
||||
|
||||
# Table of contents
|
||||
- [bunkerized-nginx](#bunkerized-nginx)
|
||||
<details>
|
||||
<summary>Click to show</summary>
|
||||
|
||||
- [Table of contents](#table-of-contents)
|
||||
- [Live demo](#live-demo)
|
||||
- [Quickstart guide](#quickstart-guide)
|
||||
* [Run HTTP server with default settings](#run-http-server-with-default-settings)
|
||||
* [In combination with PHP](#in-combination-with-php)
|
||||
* [Run HTTPS server with automated Let's Encrypt](#run-https-server-with-automated-let-s-encrypt)
|
||||
* [Behind a reverse proxy](#behind-a-reverse-proxy)
|
||||
* [As a reverse proxy](#as-a-reverse-proxy)
|
||||
* [Antibot challenge](#antibot-challenge)
|
||||
- [Tutorials and examples](#tutorials-and-examples)
|
||||
- [List of environment variables](#list-of-environment-variables)
|
||||
* [nginx](#nginx)
|
||||
+ [Misc](#misc)
|
||||
+ [Information leak](#information-leak)
|
||||
+ [Custom error pages](#custom-error-pages)
|
||||
+ [HTTP basic authentication](#http-basic-authentication)
|
||||
+ [Reverse proxy](#reverse-proxy)
|
||||
* [HTTPS](#https)
|
||||
+ [Let's Encrypt](#let-s-encrypt)
|
||||
+ [HTTP](#http)
|
||||
+ [Custom certificate](#custom-certificate)
|
||||
+ [Self-signed certificate](#self-signed-certificate)
|
||||
+ [Misc](#misc)
|
||||
* [ModSecurity](#modsecurity)
|
||||
* [Security headers](#security-headers)
|
||||
* [Blocking](#blocking)
|
||||
+ [Antibot](#antibot)
|
||||
+ [External blacklist](#external-blacklist)
|
||||
+ [DNSBL](#dnsbl)
|
||||
+ [Custom whitelisting](#custom-whitelisting)
|
||||
+ [Custom blacklisting](#custom-blacklisting)
|
||||
+ [Requests limiting](#requests-limiting)
|
||||
+ [Countries](#countries)
|
||||
* [PHP](#php)
|
||||
+ [Remote PHP](#remote-php)
|
||||
+ [Local PHP (will be removed)](#local-php--will-be-removed-)
|
||||
* [Fail2ban](#fail2ban)
|
||||
* [ClamAV](#clamav)
|
||||
* [Misc](#misc-2)
|
||||
- [Create your own image](#create-your-own-image)
|
||||
- [Include custom configurations](#include-custom-configurations)
|
||||
- [Integrations](#integrations)
|
||||
* [Docker](#docker)
|
||||
* [Docker autoconf](#docker-autoconf)
|
||||
* [Swarm](#swarm)
|
||||
* [Kubernetes](#kubernetes)
|
||||
* [Linux](#linux)
|
||||
- [Configuration](#configuration)
|
||||
* [Singlesite](#singlesite)
|
||||
* [Multisite](#multisite)
|
||||
* [Special folders](#special-folders)
|
||||
- [Web UI](#web-ui)
|
||||
- [Security tuning](#security-tuning)
|
||||
- [Going further](#going-further)
|
||||
- [License](#license)
|
||||
- [Contributing](#contributing)
|
||||
- [Security policy](#security-policy)
|
||||
</details>
|
||||
|
||||
# Live demo
|
||||
You can find a live demo at https://demo-nginx.bunkerity.com.
|
||||
# Integrations
|
||||
|
||||
# Quickstart guide
|
||||
|
||||
## Run HTTP server with default settings
|
||||
## Docker
|
||||
|
||||
You can get official prebuilt Docker images of bunkerized-nginx for x86, x64, armv7 and aarch64/arm64 architectures on Docker Hub :
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
docker run -p 80:80 -v /path/to/web/files:/www bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
$ docker pull bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Web files are stored in the /www directory, the container will serve files from there.
|
||||
|
||||
## In combination with PHP
|
||||
|
||||
Or you can build it from source if you wish :
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
docker network create mynet
|
||||
docker run --network mynet -p 80:80 -v /path/to/web/files:/www -e REMOTE_PHP=myphp -e REMOTE_PHP_PATH=/app bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
docker run --network mynet --name=myphp -v /path/to/web/files:/app php:fpm
|
||||
$ git clone https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx.git
|
||||
$ cd bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
$ docker build -t bunkerized-nginx .
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `REMOTE_PHP` environment variable lets you define the address of a remote PHP-FPM instance that will execute the .php files. `REMOTE_PHP_PATH` must be set to the directory where the PHP container will find the files.
|
||||
To use bunkerized-nginx as a Docker container you have to pass specific environment variables, mount volumes and redirect ports to make it accessible from the outside.
|
||||
|
||||
## Run HTTPS server with automated Let's Encrypt
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
docker run -p 80:80 -p 443:443 -v /path/to/web/files:/www -v /where/to/save/certificates:/etc/letsencrypt -e SERVER_NAME=www.yourdomain.com -e AUTO_LETS_ENCRYPT=yes -e REDIRECT_HTTP_TO_HTTPS=yes bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/docs/img/docker.png?raw=true" />
|
||||
|
||||
You will find more information about Docker integration in the [documentation](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/integrations.html#docker).
|
||||
|
||||
## Docker autoconf
|
||||
|
||||
The downside of using environment variables is that the container needs to be recreated each time there is an update which is not very convenient. To counter that issue, you can use another image called bunkerized-nginx-autoconf which will listen for Docker events and automatically configure bunkerized-nginx instance in real time without recreating the container. Instead of defining environment variables for the bunkerized-nginx container, you simply add labels to your web services and bunkerized-nginx-autoconf will "automagically" take care of the rest.
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/docs/img/autoconf-docker.png?raw=true" />
|
||||
|
||||
You will find more information about Docker autoconf feature in the [documentation](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/integrations.html#docker-autoconf).
|
||||
|
||||
## Swarm
|
||||
|
||||
Using bunkerized-nginx in a Docker Swarm cluster requires a shared folder accessible from both managers and workers (anything like NFS, GlusterFS, CephFS or even SSHFS will work). The deployment and configuration is very similar to the "Docker autoconf" one but with services instead of containers. A service based on the bunkerized-nginx-autoconf image needs to be scheduled on a manager node (don't worry it doesn't expose any network port for obvious security reasons). This service will listen for Docker Swarm events like service creation or deletion and generate the configuration according to the labels of each service. Once configuration generation is done, the bunkerized-nginx-autoconf service will send a reload order to all the bunkerized-nginx tasks so they can load the new configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/docs/img/swarm.png?raw=true" />
|
||||
|
||||
You will find more information about Docker Swarm integration in the [documentation](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/integrations.html#docker-swarm).
|
||||
|
||||
## Kubernetes
|
||||
|
||||
**This integration is still in beta, please fill an issue if you find a bug or have an idea on how to improve it.**
|
||||
|
||||
Using bunkerized-nginx in a Kubernetes cluster requires a shared folder accessible from the nodes (anything like NFS, GlusterFS, CephFS or even SSHFS will work). The bunkerized-nginx-autoconf acts as an Ingress Controller and connects to the k8s API to get cluster events and generate a new configuration when it's needed. Once the configuration is generated, the Ingress Controller sends a reload order to the bunkerized-nginx instances running in the cluster.
|
||||
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/docs/img/kubernetes.png?raw=true" />
|
||||
|
||||
You will find more information about Kubernetes integration in the [documentation](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/integrations.html#kubernetes).
|
||||
|
||||
## Linux
|
||||
|
||||
**This integration is still in beta, please fill an issue if you find a bug or have an idea on how to improve it.**
|
||||
|
||||
List of supported Linux distributions :
|
||||
- Debian buster (10)
|
||||
- Ubuntu focal (20.04)
|
||||
- CentOS 7
|
||||
- Fedora 34
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike containers, Linux integration can be tedious because bunkerized-nginx has a bunch of dependencies that need to be installed before we can use it. Fortunately, we provide a [helper script](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/helpers/install.sh) to make the process easier and automatic. Once installed, the configuration is really simple, all you have to do is to edit the `/opt/bunkerized-nginx/variables.env` configuration file and run the `bunkerized-nginx` command to apply it.
|
||||
|
||||
You will find more information about Linux integration in the [documentation](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/integrations.html#linux).
|
||||
|
||||
# Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
The configuration is made through what we call "environment variables" as a form of key/value pairs. You will find the [quickstart guide](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/quickstart_guide.html) and the complete [list of environment variables](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/environment_variables.html) in the documentation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Singlesite
|
||||
|
||||
By default, bunkerized-nginx will only create one server block in the nginx configuration. This cover the simplest use-case where you want to protect one service easily and quickly.
|
||||
|
||||
Here is a dummy configuration as an example :
|
||||
```conf
|
||||
SERVER_NAME=example.com www.example.com
|
||||
AUTO_LETS_ENCRYPT=yes
|
||||
DISABLE_DEFAULT_SERVER=yes
|
||||
USE_REVERSE_PROXY=yes
|
||||
REVERSE_PROXY_URL=/
|
||||
REVERSE_PROXY_HOST=http://internal-service.example.local:8080
|
||||
# Uncomment the HTTP_PORT and HTTPS_PORTS variables when using Linux configuration
|
||||
#HTTP_PORT=80
|
||||
#HTTPS_PORT=443
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Certificates are stored in the /etc/letsencrypt directory, you should save it on your local drive.
|
||||
If you don't want your webserver to listen on HTTP add the environment variable `LISTEN_HTTP` with a *no* value. But Let's Encrypt needs the port 80 to be opened so redirecting the port is mandatory.
|
||||
## Multisite
|
||||
|
||||
Here you have three environment variables :
|
||||
- `SERVER_NAME` : define the FQDN of your webserver, this is mandatory for Let's Encrypt (www.yourdomain.com should point to your IP address)
|
||||
- `AUTO_LETS_ENCRYPT` : enable automatic Let's Encrypt creation and renewal of certificates
|
||||
- `REDIRECT_HTTP_TO_HTTPS` : enable HTTP to HTTPS redirection
|
||||
If you have multiple services to protect, the easiest way to do it is by enabling the "multisite" mode. When using multisite, bunkerized-nginx will create one server block per server defined in the `SERVER_NAME` environment variable. You can configure each servers independently by adding the server name as a prefix.
|
||||
|
||||
## Behind a reverse proxy
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
docker run -p 80:80 -v /path/to/web/files:/www -e PROXY_REAL_IP=yes bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
Here is a dummy configuration as an example :
|
||||
```conf
|
||||
SERVER_NAME=app1.example.com app2.example.com
|
||||
# Without prefix the variables are applied globally but can still be overriden
|
||||
AUTO_LETS_ENCRYPT=yes
|
||||
DISABLE_DEFAULT_SERVER=yes
|
||||
# Specific configurations for first service
|
||||
app1.example.com_USE_REVERSE_PROXY=yes
|
||||
app1.example.com_REVERSE_PROXY_URL=/
|
||||
app1.example.com_REVERSE_PROXY_HOST=http://internal-service.example.local:8080
|
||||
# Specific configuration for second service
|
||||
app2.example.com_REMOTE_PHP=my-fpm
|
||||
app2.example.com_REMOTE_PHP_PATH=/var/www/html
|
||||
# Uncomment the HTTP_PORT and HTTPS_PORTS variables when using Linux configuration
|
||||
#HTTP_PORT=80
|
||||
#HTTPS_PORT=443
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The `PROXY_REAL_IP` environment variable, when set to *yes*, activates the [ngx_http_realip_module](https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_realip_module.html) to get the real client IP from the reverse proxy.
|
||||
## Special folders
|
||||
|
||||
See [this section](#reverse-proxy) if you need to tweak some values (trusted ip/network, header, ...).
|
||||
| Name | Location | Purpose | Multisite |
|
||||
|:----------------:|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------:|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------:|:---------:|
|
||||
| www | /www (container)<br> /opt/bunkerized-nginx/www (Linux) | Static files that need to be delivered by bunkerized-nginx. | Yes |
|
||||
| http-confs | /http-confs (container)<br> /opt/bunkerized-nginx/http-confs (Linux) | Custom nginx configuration files loaded at http context. | No |
|
||||
| server-confs | /server-confs (container)<br> /opt/bunkerized-nginx/server-confs (Linux) | Custom nginx configuration files loaded at server context. | Yes |
|
||||
| modsec-confs | /modsec-confs (container)<br> /opt/bunkerized-nginx/modsec-confs (Linux) | Custom ModSecurity configuration files loaded before the Core Rule Set. | Yes |
|
||||
| modsec-crs-confs | /modsec-crs-confs (container)<br> /opt/bunkerized-nginx/modsec-crs-confs (Linux) | Custom ModSecurity configuration files loaded after the Core Rule Set. | Yes |
|
||||
| plugins | /plugins (container)<br> /opt/bunkerized-nginx/plugins (Linux) | Location of bunkerized-nginx plugins. | No |
|
||||
| cache | /cache (container)<br> /opt/bunkerized-nginx/plugins (Linux) | Placeholder for caching data like external blacklists. | No |
|
||||
| acme-challenge | /acme-challenge (container)<br> /opt/bunkerized-nginx/acme-challenge (Linux) | Placeholder for Let's Encrypt challenges. | No |
|
||||
|
||||
## As a reverse proxy
|
||||
You can setup a reverse proxy by adding your own custom configurations at server context.
|
||||
For example, this is a dummy reverse proxy configuration :
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
location / {
|
||||
if ($host = www.website1.com) {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://192.168.42.10$request_uri;
|
||||
}
|
||||
You will find more information about the special folders in the [documentation](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/special_folders.html).
|
||||
|
||||
if ($host = www.website2.com) {
|
||||
proxy_pass http://192.168.42.11$request_uri;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
All files (ending with .conf) in /server-confs inside the container will be included at server context. You can simply mount a volume where your config files are located :
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
docker run -p 80:80 -e SERVER_NAME="www.website1.com www.website2.com" -e SERVE_FILES=no -e DISABLE_DEFAULT_SERVER=yes -v /path/to/server/conf:/server-confs bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
```
|
||||
# Web UI
|
||||
|
||||
Here you have three environment variables :
|
||||
- `SERVER_NAME` : list of valid Host headers sent by clients
|
||||
- `SERVE_FILES` : nginx will not serve files from the /www directory
|
||||
- `DISABLE_DEFAULT_SERVER` : nginx will not respond to requests if Host header is not in the SERVER_NAME list
|
||||
<img src="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/docs/img/web-ui.gif?raw=true" />
|
||||
|
||||
## Antibot challenge
|
||||
```shell
|
||||
docker run -p 80:80 -v /path/to/web/files:/www -e USE_ANTIBOT=captcha bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
```
|
||||
You will find more information about the web UI in the [documentation](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/web_ui.html).
|
||||
|
||||
When `USE_ANTIBOT` is set to *captcha*, every users visiting your website must complete a captcha before accessing the pages. Others challenges are also available : *cookie*, *javascript* or *recaptcha* (more info [here](#antibot)).
|
||||
# Security tuning
|
||||
|
||||
# Tutorials and examples
|
||||
bunkerized-nginx comes with a set of predefined security settings that you can (and you should) tune to meet your own use case. We recommend you to read the [security tuning](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security_tuning.html) section of the documentation.
|
||||
|
||||
You will some docker-compose.yml examples in the [examples directory](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/tree/master/examples) and tutorials about bunkerized-nginx in our [blog](https://www.bunkerity.com/category/bunkerized-nginx/).
|
||||
# Going further
|
||||
|
||||
# List of environment variables
|
||||
- [Official documentation](https://bunkerized-nginx.readthedocs.io/)
|
||||
- [Full concrete examples](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/tree/master/examples)
|
||||
- [Tutorials in our blog](https://www.bunkerity.com/blog)
|
||||
|
||||
## nginx
|
||||
# License
|
||||
|
||||
### Misc
|
||||
This project is licensed under the terms of the [GNU Affero General Public License (AGPL) version 3](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/LICENSE.md).
|
||||
|
||||
`SERVER_NAME`
|
||||
Values : *<first name> <second name> ...*
|
||||
Default value : *www.bunkerity.com*
|
||||
Sets the host names of the webserver separated with spaces. This must match the Host header sent by clients.
|
||||
Useful when used with `AUTO_LETSENCRYPT=yes` and/or `DISABLE_DEFAULT_SERVER=yes`.
|
||||
# Contributing
|
||||
|
||||
`MAX_CLIENT_SIZE`
|
||||
Values : *0* | *Xm*
|
||||
Default value : *10m*
|
||||
Sets the maximum body size before nginx returns a 413 error code.
|
||||
Setting to 0 means "infinite" body size.
|
||||
If you would like to contribute to the project you can read the [contributing guidelines](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md) to get started.
|
||||
|
||||
`ALLOWED_METHODS`
|
||||
Values : *allowed HTTP methods separated with | char*
|
||||
Default value : *GET|POST|HEAD*
|
||||
Only the HTTP methods listed here will be accepted by nginx. If not listed, nginx will close the connection.
|
||||
# Security policy
|
||||
|
||||
`DISABLE_DEFAULT_SERVER`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, nginx will only respond to HTTP request when the Host header match a FQDN specified in the `SERVER_NAME` environment variable.
|
||||
For example, it will close the connection if a bot access the site with direct ip.
|
||||
|
||||
`SERVE_FILES`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, nginx will serve files from /www directory within the container.
|
||||
A use case to not serving files is when you setup bunkerized-nginx as a reverse proxy via a custom configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
`DNS_RESOLVERS`
|
||||
Values : *\<two IP addresses separated with a space\>*
|
||||
Default value : *127.0.0.11 8.8.8.8*
|
||||
The IP addresses of the DNS resolvers to use when performing DNS lookups.
|
||||
|
||||
`WRITE_ACCESS`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, nginx will be granted write access to the /www directory.
|
||||
Set it to yes if your website uses file upload or creates dynamic files for example.
|
||||
|
||||
`ROOT_FOLDER`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid path to web files\>
|
||||
Default value : */www*
|
||||
The default folder where nginx will search for web files. Don't change it unless you want to make your own image.
|
||||
|
||||
### Information leak
|
||||
|
||||
`SERVER_TOKENS`
|
||||
Values : *on* | *off*
|
||||
Default value : *off*
|
||||
If set to on, nginx will display server version in Server header and default error pages.
|
||||
|
||||
`HEADER_SERVER`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to no, nginx will remove the Server header in HTTP responses.
|
||||
|
||||
### Custom error pages
|
||||
|
||||
`ERROR_XXX`
|
||||
Values : *\<relative path to the error page\>*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
Use this kind of environment variable to define custom error page depending on the HTTP error code. Replace XXX with HTTP code.
|
||||
For example : `ERROR_404=/404.html` means the /404.html page will be displayed when 404 code is generated. The path is relative to the root web folder.
|
||||
|
||||
### HTTP basic authentication
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_AUTH_BASIC`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, enables HTTP basic authentication at the location `AUTH_BASIC_LOCATION` with user `AUTH_BASIC_USER` and password `AUTH_BASIC_PASSWORD`.
|
||||
|
||||
`AUTH_BASIC_LOCATION`
|
||||
Values : *sitewide* | */somedir* | *\<any valid location\>*
|
||||
Default value : *sitewide*
|
||||
The location to restrict when `USE_AUTH_BASIC` is set to *yes*. If the special value *sitewide* is used then auth basic will be set at server level outside any location context.
|
||||
|
||||
`AUTH_BASIC_USER`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid username\>*
|
||||
Default value : *changeme*
|
||||
The username allowed to access `AUTH_BASIC_LOCATION` when `USE_AUTH_BASIC` is set to yes.
|
||||
|
||||
`AUTH_BASIC_PASSWORD`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid password\>*
|
||||
Default value : *changeme*
|
||||
The password of `AUTH_BASIC_USER` when `USE_AUTH_BASIC` is set to yes.
|
||||
|
||||
`AUTH_BASIC_TEXT`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid text\>*
|
||||
Default value : *Restricted area*
|
||||
The text displayed inside the login prompt when `USE_AUTH_BASIC` is set to yes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Reverse proxy
|
||||
|
||||
`PROXY_REAL_IP`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
Set this environment variable to *yes* if you're using bunkerized-nginx behind a reverse proxy. This means you will see the real client address instead of the proxy one inside your logs. Modsecurity, fail2ban and others security tools will also then work correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
`PROXY_REAL_IP_FROM`
|
||||
Values : *\<list of trusted IP addresses and/or networks separated with spaces\>*
|
||||
Default value : *192.168.0.0/16 172.16.0.0/12 10.0.0.0/8*
|
||||
When `PROXY_REAL_IP` is set to *yes*, lets you define the trusted IPs/networks allowed to send the correct client address.
|
||||
|
||||
`PROXY_REAL_IP_HEADER`
|
||||
Values : *X-Forwarded-For* | *X-Real-IP* | *custom header*
|
||||
Default value : *X-Forwarded-For*
|
||||
When `PROXY_REAL_IP` is set to *yes*, lets you define the header that contains the real client IP address.
|
||||
|
||||
`PROXY_REAL_IP_RECURSIVE`
|
||||
Values : *on* | *off*
|
||||
Default value : *on*
|
||||
When `PROXY_REAL_IP` is set to *yes*, setting this to *on* avoid spoofing attacks using the header defined in `PROXY_REAL_IP_HEADER`.
|
||||
|
||||
## HTTPS
|
||||
|
||||
### Let's Encrypt
|
||||
|
||||
`AUTO_LETS_ENCRYPT`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, automatic certificate generation and renewal will be setup through Let's Encrypt. This will enable HTTPS on your website for free.
|
||||
You will need to redirect both 80 and 443 port to your container and also set the `SERVER_NAME` environment variable.
|
||||
|
||||
### HTTP
|
||||
|
||||
`LISTEN_HTTP`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to no, nginx will not in listen on HTTP (port 80).
|
||||
Useful if you only want HTTPS access to your website.
|
||||
|
||||
`REDIRECT_HTTP_TO_HTTPS`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, nginx will redirect all HTTP requests to HTTPS.
|
||||
|
||||
### Custom certificate
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_CUSTOM_HTTPS`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, HTTPS will be enabled with certificate/key of your choice.
|
||||
|
||||
`CUSTOM_HTTPS_CERT`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid path inside the container\>*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
Full path of the certificate file to use when `USE_CUSTOM_HTTPS` is set to yes.
|
||||
|
||||
`CUSTOM_HTTPS_KEY`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid path inside the container\>*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
Full path of the key file to use when `USE_CUSTOM_HTTPS` is set to yes.
|
||||
|
||||
### Self-signed certificate
|
||||
|
||||
`GENERATE_SELF_SIGNED_SSL`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, HTTPS will be enabled with a container generated self-signed certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
`SELF_SIGNED_SSL_EXPIRY`
|
||||
Values : *integer*
|
||||
Default value : *365* (1 year)
|
||||
Needs `GENERATE_SELF_SIGNED_SSL` to work.
|
||||
Sets the expiry date for the self generated certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
`SELF_SIGNED_SSL_COUNTRY`
|
||||
Values : *text*
|
||||
Default value : *Switzerland*
|
||||
Needs `GENERATE_SELF_SIGNED_SSL` to work.
|
||||
Sets the country for the self generated certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
`SELF_SIGNED_SSL_STATE`
|
||||
Values : *text*
|
||||
Default value : *Switzerland*
|
||||
Needs `GENERATE_SELF_SIGNED_SSL` to work.
|
||||
Sets the state for the self generated certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
`SELF_SIGNED_SSL_CITY`
|
||||
Values : *text*
|
||||
Default value : *Bern*
|
||||
Needs `GENERATE_SELF_SIGNED_SSL` to work.
|
||||
Sets the city for the self generated certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
`SELF_SIGNED_SSL_ORG`
|
||||
Values : *text*
|
||||
Default value : *AcmeInc*
|
||||
Needs `GENERATE_SELF_SIGNED_SSL` to work.
|
||||
Sets the organisation name for the self generated certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
`SELF_SIGNED_SSL_OU`
|
||||
Values : *text*
|
||||
Default value : *IT*
|
||||
Needs `GENERATE_SELF_SIGNED_SSL` to work.
|
||||
Sets the organisitional unit for the self generated certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
`SELF_SIGNED_SSL_CN`
|
||||
Values : *text*
|
||||
Default value : *bunkerity-nginx*
|
||||
Needs `GENERATE_SELF_SIGNED_SSL` to work.
|
||||
Sets the CN server name for the self generated certificate.
|
||||
|
||||
### Misc
|
||||
|
||||
`HTTP2`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, nginx will use HTTP2 protocol when HTTPS is enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
## ModSecurity
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_MODSECURITY`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, the ModSecurity WAF will be enabled.
|
||||
You can include custom rules by adding .conf files into the /modsec-confs/ directory inside the container (i.e : through a volume).
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_MODSECURITY_CRS`
|
||||
Values: *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, the [OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set](https://coreruleset.org/) will be used. It provides generic rules to detect common web attacks.
|
||||
You can customize the CRS (i.e. : add WordPress exclusions) by adding custom .conf files into the /modsec-crs-confs/ directory inside the container (i.e : through a volume). Files inside this directory are included before the CRS rules. If you need to tweak (i.e. : SecRuleUpdateTargetById) put .conf files inside the /modsec-confs/ which is included after the CRS rules.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security headers
|
||||
|
||||
`X_FRAME_OPTIONS`
|
||||
Values : *DENY* | *SAMEORIGIN* | *ALLOW-FROM https://www.website.net* | *ALLOWALL*
|
||||
Default value : *DENY*
|
||||
Policy to be used when the site is displayed through iframe. Can be used to mitigate clickjacking attacks.
|
||||
More info [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Frame-Options).
|
||||
|
||||
`X_XSS_PROTECTION`
|
||||
Values : *0* | *1* | *1; mode=block*
|
||||
Default value : *1; mode=block*
|
||||
Policy to be used when XSS is detected by the browser. Only works with Internet Explorer.
|
||||
More info [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-XSS-Protection).
|
||||
|
||||
`X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS`
|
||||
Values : *nosniff*
|
||||
Default value : *nosniff*
|
||||
Tells the browser to be strict about MIME type.
|
||||
More info [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options).
|
||||
|
||||
`REFERRER_POLICY`
|
||||
Values : *no-referrer* | *no-referrer-when-downgrade* | *origin* | *origin-when-cross-origin* | *same-origin* | *strict-origin* | *strict-origin-when-cross-origin* | *unsafe-url*
|
||||
Default value : *no-referrer*
|
||||
Policy to be used for the Referer header.
|
||||
More info [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referrer-Policy).
|
||||
|
||||
`FEATURE_POLICY`
|
||||
Values : *<directive> <allow list>*
|
||||
Default value : *accelerometer 'none'; ambient-light-sensor 'none'; autoplay 'none'; camera 'none'; display-capture 'none'; document-domain 'none'; encrypted-media 'none'; fullscreen 'none'; geolocation 'none'; gyroscope 'none'; magnetometer 'none'; microphone 'none'; midi 'none'; payment 'none'; picture-in-picture 'none'; speaker 'none'; sync-xhr 'none'; usb 'none'; vibrate 'none'; vr 'none'*
|
||||
Tells the browser which features can be used on the website.
|
||||
More info [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Feature-Policy).
|
||||
|
||||
`COOKIE_FLAGS`
|
||||
Values : *\* HttpOnly* | *MyCookie secure SameSite* | *...*
|
||||
Default value : *\* HttpOnly*
|
||||
Adds some security to the cookies set by the server.
|
||||
Accepted value can be found [here](https://github.com/AirisX/nginx_cookie_flag_module).
|
||||
|
||||
`STRICT_TRANSPORT_POLICY`
|
||||
Values : *max-age=expireTime [; includeSubDomains] [; preload]*
|
||||
Default value : *max-age=31536000*
|
||||
Tells the browser to use exclusively HTTPS instead of HTTP when communicating with the server.
|
||||
More info [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security).
|
||||
|
||||
`CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY`
|
||||
Values : *\<directive 1\>; \<directive 2\>; ...*
|
||||
Default value : *default-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'; form-action 'self'; block-all-mixed-content; sandbox allow-forms allow-same-origin allow-scripts; reflected-xss block; base-uri 'self'; referrer no-referrer*
|
||||
Policy to be used when loading resources (scripts, forms, frames, ...).
|
||||
More info [here](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy).
|
||||
|
||||
## Blocking
|
||||
|
||||
### Antibot
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_ANTIBOT`
|
||||
Values : *no* | *cookie* | *javascript* | *captcha* | *recaptcha*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to another allowed value than *no*, users must complete a "challenge" before accessing the pages on your website :
|
||||
- *cookie* : asks the users to set a cookie
|
||||
- *javascript* : users must execute a javascript code
|
||||
- *captcha* : a text captcha must be resolved by the users
|
||||
- *recaptcha* : use [Google reCAPTCHA v3](https://developers.google.com/recaptcha/intro) score to allow/deny users
|
||||
|
||||
`ANTIBOT_URI`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid uri\>*
|
||||
Default value : */challenge*
|
||||
A valid and unused URI to redirect users when `USE_ANTIBOT` is used. Be sure that it doesn't exist on your website.
|
||||
|
||||
`ANTIBOT_SESSION_SECRET`
|
||||
Values : *random* | *\<32 chars of your choice\>*
|
||||
Default value : *random*
|
||||
A secret used to generate sessions when `USE_ANTIBOT is set. Using the special *random* value will generate a random one. Be sure to use the same value when you are in a multi-server environment (so sessions are valid in all the servers).
|
||||
|
||||
`ANTIBOT_RECAPTCHA_SCORE`
|
||||
Values : *\<0.0 to 1.0\>*
|
||||
Default value : *0.7*
|
||||
The minimum score required when `USE_ANTIBOT` is set to *recaptcha*.
|
||||
|
||||
`ANTIBOT_RECAPTCHA_SITEKEY`
|
||||
Values : *\<public key given by Google\>*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
The sitekey given by Google when `USE_ANTIBOT` is set to *recaptcha*.
|
||||
|
||||
`ANTIBOT_RECAPTCHA_SECRET`
|
||||
Values : *\<private key given by Google\>*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
The secret given by Google when `USE_ANTIBOT` is set to *recaptcha*.
|
||||
|
||||
### External blacklist
|
||||
|
||||
`BLOCK_USER_AGENT`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, block clients with "bad" user agent.
|
||||
Blacklist can be found [here](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mitchellkrogza/nginx-ultimate-bad-bot-blocker/master/_generator_lists/bad-user-agents.list).
|
||||
|
||||
`BLOCK_TOR_EXIT_NODE`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
Is set to yes, will block known TOR exit nodes.
|
||||
Blacklist can be found [here](https://iplists.firehol.org/?ipset=tor_exits).
|
||||
|
||||
`BLOCK_PROXIES`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
Is set to yes, will block known proxies.
|
||||
Blacklist can be found [here](https://iplists.firehol.org/?ipset=firehol_proxies).
|
||||
|
||||
`BLOCK_ABUSERS`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
Is set to yes, will block known abusers.
|
||||
Blacklist can be found [here](https://iplists.firehol.org/?ipset=firehol_abusers_30d).
|
||||
|
||||
### DNSBL
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_DNSBL`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to *yes*, DNSBL checks will be performed to the servers specified in the `DNSBL_LIST` environment variable.
|
||||
|
||||
`DNSBL_LIST`
|
||||
Values : *\<list of DNS zones separated with spaces\>*
|
||||
Default value : *bl.blocklist.de problems.dnsbl.sorbs.net sbl.spamhaus.org xbl.spamhaus.org*
|
||||
The list of DNSBL zones to query when `USE_DNSBL` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
### Custom whitelisting
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_WHITELIST_IP`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to *yes*, lets you define custom IP addresses to be whitelisted through the `WHITELIST_IP_LIST` environment variable.
|
||||
|
||||
`WHITELIST_IP_LIST`
|
||||
Values : *\<list of IP addresses separated with spaces\>*
|
||||
Default value : *23.21.227.69 40.88.21.235 50.16.241.113 50.16.241.114 50.16.241.117 50.16.247.234 52.204.97.54 52.5.190.19 54.197.234.188 54.208.100.253 54.208.102.37 107.21.1.8*
|
||||
The list of IP addresses to whitelist when `USE_WHITELIST_IP` is set to *yes*. The default list contains IP addresses of the [DuckDuckGo crawler](https://help.duckduckgo.com/duckduckgo-help-pages/results/duckduckbot/).
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_WHITELIST_REVERSE`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to *yes*, lets you define custom reverse DNS suffixes to be whitelisted through the `WHITELIST_REVERSE_LIST` environment variable.
|
||||
|
||||
`WHITELIST_REVERSE_LIST`
|
||||
Values : *\<list of reverse DNS suffixes separated with spaces\>*
|
||||
Default value : *.googlebot.com .google.com .search.msn.com .crawl.yahoot.net .crawl.baidu.jp .crawl.baidu.com .yandex.com .yandex.ru .yandex.net*
|
||||
The list of reverse DNS suffixes to whitelist when `USE_WHITELIST_REVERSE` is set to *yes*. The default list contains suffixes of major search engines.
|
||||
|
||||
### Custom blacklisting
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_BLACKLIST_IP`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to *yes*, lets you define custom IP addresses to be blacklisted through the `BLACKLIST_IP_LIST` environment variable.
|
||||
|
||||
`BLACKLIST_IP_LIST`
|
||||
Values : *\<list of IP addresses separated with spaces\>*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
The list of IP addresses to blacklist when `USE_BLACKLIST_IP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_BLACKLIST_REVERSE`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to *yes*, lets you define custom reverse DNS suffixes to be blacklisted through the `BLACKLIST_REVERSE_LIST` environment variable.
|
||||
|
||||
`BLACKLIST_REVERSE_LIST`
|
||||
Values : *\<list of reverse DNS suffixes separated with spaces\>*
|
||||
Default value : *.shodan.io*
|
||||
The list of reverse DNS suffixes to blacklist when `USE_BLACKLIST_REVERSE` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
### Requests limiting
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_LIMIT_REQ`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, the amount of HTTP requests made by a user will be limited during a period of time.
|
||||
More info rate limiting [here](https://www.nginx.com/blog/rate-limiting-nginx/).
|
||||
|
||||
`LIMIT_REQ_RATE`
|
||||
Values : *Xr/s* | *Xr/m*
|
||||
Default value : *20r/s*
|
||||
The rate limit to apply when `USE_LIMIT_REQ` is set to *yes*. Default is 10 requests per second.
|
||||
|
||||
`LIMIT_REQ_BURST`
|
||||
Values : *<any valid integer\>*
|
||||
Default value : *40*
|
||||
The number of of requests to put in queue before rejecting requests.
|
||||
|
||||
`LIMIT_REQ_CACHE`
|
||||
Values : *Xm* | *Xk*
|
||||
Default value : *10m*
|
||||
The size of the cache to store information about request limiting.
|
||||
|
||||
### Countries
|
||||
|
||||
`BLOCK_COUNTRY`
|
||||
Values : *\<country code 1\> \<country code 2\> ...*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
Block some countries from accessing your website. Use 2 letters country code separated with space.
|
||||
|
||||
## PHP
|
||||
|
||||
### Remote PHP
|
||||
`REMOTE_PHP`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid IP/hostname\>*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
Set the IP/hostname address of a remote PHP-FPM to execute .php files. See `USE_PHP` if you want to run a PHP-FPM instance on the same container as bunkerized-nginx.
|
||||
|
||||
`REMOTE_PHP_PATH`
|
||||
Values : *\<any valid absolute path\>*
|
||||
Default value : */app*
|
||||
The path where the PHP files are located inside the server specified in `REMOTE_PHP`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Local PHP (will be removed)
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_PHP`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, a local PHP-FPM instance will be run inside the container to execute PHP files.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_DISPLAY_ERRORS`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, PHP errors will be shown to clients. Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_EXPOSE`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, the PHP version will be sent within the X-Powered-By header. Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_OPEN_BASEDIR`
|
||||
Values : *\<directories separated with : char\>*
|
||||
Default value : */www/:/tmp/*
|
||||
Limits access to files within the given directories. For example include() or fopen() calls outside the directory will fail. Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_ALLOW_URL_FOPEN`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, allows using url in fopen() calls (i.e. : ftp://, http://, ...). Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_ALLOW_URL_INCLUDE`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *no*
|
||||
If set to yes, allows using url in include() calls (i.e. : ftp://, http://, ...). Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_FILE_UPLOADS`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, allows clients to upload files. Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_UPLOAD_MAX_FILESIZE`
|
||||
Values : *\<size in bytes\>* | *XM*
|
||||
Default value : *10M*
|
||||
Sets the maximum file size allowed when uploading files. Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_POST_MAX_SIZE`
|
||||
Values : *\<size in bytes\>* | *XM*
|
||||
Default value : *10M*
|
||||
Sets the maximum POST size allowed for clients. Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
`PHP_DISABLE_FUNCTIONS`
|
||||
Values : *\<function 1\>, \<function 2\> ...*
|
||||
Default value : *system, exec, shell_exec, passthru, phpinfo, show_source, highlight_file, popen, proc_open, fopen_with_path, dbmopen, dbase_open, putenv, filepro, filepro_rowcount, filepro_retrieve, posix_mkfifo*
|
||||
List of PHP functions blacklisted separated with commas. They can't be used anywhere in PHP code. Only meaningful if `USE_PHP` is set to *yes*.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fail2ban
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_FAIL2BAN`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, fail2ban will be used to block users getting too much "strange" HTTP codes in a period of time.
|
||||
Instead of using iptables which is not possible inside a container, fail2ban will dynamically update nginx to ban/unban IP addresses.
|
||||
If a number (`FAIL2BAN_MAXRETRY`) of "strange" HTTP codes (`FAIL2BAN_STATUS_CODES`) is found between a time interval (`FAIL2BAN_FINDTIME`) then the originating IP address will be ban for a specific period of time (`FAIL2BAN_BANTIME`).
|
||||
|
||||
`FAIL2BAN_STATUS_CODES`
|
||||
Values : *\<HTTP status codes separated with | char\>*
|
||||
Default value : *400|401|403|404|405|444*
|
||||
List of "strange" error codes that fail2ban will search for.
|
||||
|
||||
`FAIL2BAN_BANTIME`
|
||||
Values : *<number of seconds>*
|
||||
Default value : *3600*
|
||||
The duration time, in seconds, of a ban.
|
||||
|
||||
`FAIL2BAN_FINDTIME`
|
||||
Values : *<number of seconds>*
|
||||
Default : value : *60*
|
||||
The time interval, in seconds, to search for "strange" HTTP status codes.
|
||||
|
||||
`FAIL2BAN_MAXRETRY`
|
||||
Values : *\<any positive integer\>*
|
||||
Default : value : *15*
|
||||
The number of "strange" HTTP status codes to find between the time interval.
|
||||
|
||||
## ClamAV
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_CLAMAV_UPLOAD`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, ClamAV will scan every file uploads and block the upload if the file is detected.
|
||||
|
||||
`USE_CLAMAV_SCAN`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, ClamAV will scan all the files inside the container every day.
|
||||
|
||||
`CLAMAV_SCAN_REMOVE`
|
||||
Values : *yes* | *no*
|
||||
Default value : *yes*
|
||||
If set to yes, ClamAV will automatically remove the detected files.
|
||||
|
||||
## Misc
|
||||
|
||||
`ADDITIONAL_MODULES`
|
||||
Values : *\<list of packages separated with space\>*
|
||||
Default value :
|
||||
You can specify additional modules to install. All [alpine packages](https://pkgs.alpinelinux.org/packages) are valid.
|
||||
|
||||
`LOGROTATE_MINSIZE`
|
||||
Values : *x* | *xk* | *xM* | *xG*
|
||||
Default value : 10M
|
||||
The minimum size of a log file before being rotated (no letter = bytes, k = kilobytes, M = megabytes, G = gigabytes).
|
||||
|
||||
`LOGROTATE_MAXAGE`
|
||||
Values : *\<any integer\>*
|
||||
Default value : 7
|
||||
The number of days before rotated files are deleted.
|
||||
|
||||
# Create your own image
|
||||
|
||||
You can use bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx as a base image for your web application.
|
||||
Here is a Dockerfile example :
|
||||
```
|
||||
FROM bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
|
||||
# Copy your web files to a folder
|
||||
COPY ./web-files/ /opt/web-files
|
||||
|
||||
# Optional : add your own script to be executed on startup
|
||||
COPY ./my-entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.d/my-entrypoint.sh
|
||||
RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.d/my-entrypoint.sh
|
||||
|
||||
# Mandatory variables to make things working
|
||||
ENV ROOT_FOLDER /opt/web-files
|
||||
ENV PHP_OPEN_BASEDIR /opt/web-files/:/tmp/
|
||||
|
||||
# Optional variables
|
||||
ENV MAX_CLIENT_SIZE 100m
|
||||
ENV PHP_UPLOAD_MAX_FILESIZE 100M
|
||||
ENV WRITE_ACCESS yes
|
||||
ENV ADDITIONAL_MODULES php7-mysqli php7-json php7-session
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
You can have a look at [bunkerized-phpmyadmin](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-phpmyadmin) which is a secure phpMyAdmin Docker image based on bunkerized-nginx.
|
||||
|
||||
# Include custom configurations
|
||||
Custom configurations files (ending with .conf suffix) can be added in some directory inside the container :
|
||||
- /http-confs : http context
|
||||
- /server-confs : server context
|
||||
|
||||
You just need to use a volume like this :
|
||||
```
|
||||
docker run ... -v /path/to/http/confs:/http-confs ... bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
```
|
||||
We take security bugs as serious issues and encourage responsible disclosure, see our [security policy](https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx/blob/master/SECURITY.md) for more information.
|
||||
|
||||
17
SECURITY.md
Normal file
17
SECURITY.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
# Security policy
|
||||
|
||||
Even though this project is focused on security, it is still prone to possible vulnerabilities. We consider every security bug as a serious issue and will try our best to address it.
|
||||
|
||||
## Responsible disclosure
|
||||
|
||||
If you have found a security bug, please send us an email at security \[@\] bunkerity.com with technical details so we can resolve it as soon as possible.
|
||||
|
||||
Here is a non-exhaustive list of issues we consider as high risk :
|
||||
- Vulnerability in the core
|
||||
- Bypass of a security feature
|
||||
- Vulnerability in a third-party dependency
|
||||
- Risk in the supply chain
|
||||
|
||||
## Bounty
|
||||
|
||||
To encourage responsible disclosure, we may reward you with a bounty at the sole discretion of the maintainers.
|
||||
5
antibot/captcha.data
Normal file
5
antibot/captcha.data
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
<form method="POST" action="%s">
|
||||
<img src="data:image/jpeg;base64,%s" /><br>
|
||||
Captcha : <input type="text" name="captcha" /><br />
|
||||
<input type="submit" value="send" />
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
24
antibot/captcha.html
Normal file
24
antibot/captcha.html
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
<html>
|
||||
<head>
|
||||
<title>Website protection</title>
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
body {
|
||||
background-color: #1d70b7;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.centered {
|
||||
position: fixed;
|
||||
top: 50%;
|
||||
left: 50%;
|
||||
transform: translate(-50%, -50%);
|
||||
text-align: center;
|
||||
}
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<div class="centered" style="color: white;">
|
||||
<h1>As a security measure, we ask you to complete this captcha to access our website :</h1>
|
||||
%CAPTCHA%
|
||||
<div>🛡️ this website is protected with <a href="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx" target="_blank">bunkerized-nginx</a> 🛡️</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
29
antibot/javascript.data
Normal file
29
antibot/javascript.data
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
<script>
|
||||
async function digestMessage(message) {
|
||||
const msgUint8 = new TextEncoder().encode(message);
|
||||
const hashBuffer = await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-256', msgUint8);
|
||||
const hashArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(hashBuffer));
|
||||
const hashHex = hashArray.map(b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
|
||||
return hashHex;
|
||||
}
|
||||
(async () => {
|
||||
const nonce = '%s';
|
||||
var i = 0;
|
||||
while (true) {
|
||||
var digestHex = await digestMessage(nonce + i.toString());
|
||||
if (digestHex.startsWith("0000")) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
i++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
|
||||
xhr.open('POST', '%s');
|
||||
xhr.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded');
|
||||
xhr.onload = function() {
|
||||
if (xhr.status === 200) {
|
||||
window.location.replace('%s');
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
xhr.send(encodeURI('challenge=' + i.toString()));
|
||||
})();
|
||||
</script>
|
||||
43
antibot/javascript.html
Normal file
43
antibot/javascript.html
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
||||
<html>
|
||||
<head>
|
||||
<title>Website protection</title>
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
body {
|
||||
background-color: #1d70b7;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.centered {
|
||||
position: fixed;
|
||||
top: 50%;
|
||||
left: 50%;
|
||||
transform: translate(-50%, -50%);
|
||||
text-align: center;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.loader {
|
||||
border: 16px solid #1d70b7;
|
||||
border-top: 16px solid #2dab66;
|
||||
border-radius: 50%;
|
||||
width: 120px;
|
||||
height: 120px;
|
||||
animation: spin 2s linear infinite;
|
||||
display: block;
|
||||
margin-left: auto;
|
||||
margin-right: auto;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@keyframes spin {
|
||||
0% { transform: rotate(0deg); }
|
||||
100% { transform: rotate(360deg); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<div class="centered" style="color: white;">
|
||||
<div class="loader"></div>
|
||||
<noscript>
|
||||
<h1 style="color: red;">In order to access this website, you need to enable JavaScript.</h1>
|
||||
</noscript>
|
||||
<h1>Please wait while we are doing some security checks...</h1>
|
||||
🛡️ this website is protected with <a href="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx" target="_blank">bunkerized-nginx</a> 🛡️
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
%JAVASCRIPT%
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
11
antibot/recaptcha-body.data
Normal file
11
antibot/recaptcha-body.data
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
<form method="POST" action="%s" id="form">
|
||||
<input type="hidden" name="token" id="token">
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
<script>
|
||||
grecaptcha.ready(function() {
|
||||
grecaptcha.execute('%s', {action: 'recaptcha'}).then(function(token) {
|
||||
document.getElementById("token").value = token;
|
||||
document.getElementById("form").submit();
|
||||
});;
|
||||
});
|
||||
</script>
|
||||
1
antibot/recaptcha-head.data
Normal file
1
antibot/recaptcha-head.data
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
<script src="https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js?render=%s"></script>
|
||||
44
antibot/recaptcha.html
Normal file
44
antibot/recaptcha.html
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
||||
<html>
|
||||
<head>
|
||||
<title>Website protection</title>
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
body {
|
||||
background-color: #1d70b7;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.centered {
|
||||
position: fixed;
|
||||
top: 50%;
|
||||
left: 50%;
|
||||
transform: translate(-50%, -50%);
|
||||
text-align: center;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.loader {
|
||||
border: 16px solid #1d70b7;
|
||||
border-top: 16px solid #2dab66;
|
||||
border-radius: 50%;
|
||||
width: 120px;
|
||||
height: 120px;
|
||||
animation: spin 2s linear infinite;
|
||||
display: block;
|
||||
margin-left: auto;
|
||||
margin-right: auto;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@keyframes spin {
|
||||
0% { transform: rotate(0deg); }
|
||||
100% { transform: rotate(360deg); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
</style>
|
||||
%RECAPTCHA_HEAD%
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<div class="centered" style="color: white;">
|
||||
<div class="loader"></div>
|
||||
<noscript>
|
||||
<h1 style="color: red;">In order to access this website, you need to enable JavaScript.</h1>
|
||||
</noscript>
|
||||
<h1>Please wait while we are doing some security checks...</h1>
|
||||
🛡️ this website is protected with <a href="https://github.com/bunkerity/bunkerized-nginx" target="_blank">bunkerized-nginx</a> 🛡️
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
%RECAPTCHA_BODY%
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
27
autoconf/Dockerfile
Normal file
27
autoconf/Dockerfile
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
|
||||
FROM alpine
|
||||
|
||||
COPY gen/ /opt/bunkerized-nginx/gen
|
||||
COPY entrypoint/ /opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint
|
||||
COPY confs/global/ /opt/bunkerized-nginx/confs/global
|
||||
COPY confs/site/ /opt/bunkerized-nginx/confs/site
|
||||
COPY jobs/ /opt/bunkerized-nginx/jobs
|
||||
COPY settings.json /opt/bunkerized-nginx/
|
||||
COPY misc/cron-autoconf /etc/crontabs/root
|
||||
COPY autoconf/entrypoint.sh /opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/
|
||||
COPY autoconf/requirements.txt /opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/
|
||||
COPY autoconf/src/* /opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/
|
||||
|
||||
RUN apk add --no-cache py3-pip bash certbot curl openssl && \
|
||||
pip3 install -r /opt/bunkerized-nginx/gen/requirements.txt && \
|
||||
pip3 install -r /opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/requirements.txt && \
|
||||
pip3 install -r /opt/bunkerized-nginx/jobs/requirements.txt
|
||||
|
||||
COPY autoconf/prepare.sh /tmp
|
||||
RUN chmod +x /tmp/prepare.sh && \
|
||||
/tmp/prepare.sh && \
|
||||
rm -f /tmp/prepare.sh
|
||||
|
||||
# Fix CVE-2021-36159
|
||||
RUN apk add "apk-tools>=2.12.6-r0"
|
||||
|
||||
ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/entrypoint.sh"]
|
||||
33
autoconf/entrypoint.sh
Normal file
33
autoconf/entrypoint.sh
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[*] Starting autoconf ..."
|
||||
|
||||
# check permissions
|
||||
su -s "/opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/permissions.sh" nginx
|
||||
if [ "$?" -ne 0 ] ; then
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# trap SIGTERM and SIGINT
|
||||
function trap_exit() {
|
||||
echo "[*] Catched stop operation"
|
||||
echo "[*] Stopping crond ..."
|
||||
pkill -TERM crond
|
||||
echo "[*] Stopping autoconf ..."
|
||||
pkill -TERM python3
|
||||
}
|
||||
trap "trap_exit" TERM INT QUIT
|
||||
|
||||
# start cron
|
||||
crond
|
||||
|
||||
# run autoconf app
|
||||
/opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/app.py &
|
||||
pid="$!"
|
||||
|
||||
# wait while app is up
|
||||
wait "$pid"
|
||||
|
||||
# stop
|
||||
echo "[*] autoconf stopped"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
63
autoconf/prepare.sh
Normal file
63
autoconf/prepare.sh
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
|
||||
# create nginx user
|
||||
addgroup -g 101 nginx
|
||||
adduser -h /var/cache/nginx -g nginx -s /bin/sh -G nginx -D -H -u 101 nginx
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /opt
|
||||
chown root:nginx /opt
|
||||
chmod 750 /opt
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /opt/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
chown -R root:nginx /opt/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
find /opt/bunkerized-nginx -type f -exec chmod 0740 {} \;
|
||||
find /opt/bunkerized-nginx -type d -exec chmod 0750 {} \;
|
||||
chmod ugo+x /opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/* /opt/bunkerized-nginx/scripts/*
|
||||
chmod ugo+x /opt/bunkerized-nginx/gen/main.py
|
||||
chmod ugo+x /opt/bunkerized-nginx/jobs/main.py
|
||||
chmod ugo+x /opt/bunkerized-nginx/jobs/reload.py
|
||||
chmod 770 /opt/bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
chmod 440 /opt/bunkerized-nginx/settings.json
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /var/log
|
||||
mkdir /var/log/nginx
|
||||
chown root:nginx /var/log/nginx
|
||||
chmod 770 /var/log/nginx
|
||||
ln -s /proc/1/fd/1 /var/log/nginx/jobs.log
|
||||
mkdir /var/log/letsencrypt
|
||||
chown nginx:nginx /var/log/letsencrypt
|
||||
chmod 770 /var/log/letsencrypt
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /etc/letsencrypt
|
||||
mkdir /etc/letsencrypt
|
||||
chown root:nginx /etc/letsencrypt
|
||||
chmod 770 /etc/letsencrypt
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /var/lib/letsencrypt
|
||||
mkdir /var/lib/letsencrypt
|
||||
chown root:nginx /var/lib/letsencrypt
|
||||
chmod 770 /var/lib/letsencrypt
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /opt/bunkerized-nginx/cache
|
||||
ln -s /cache /opt/bunkerized-nginx/cache
|
||||
mkdir /cache
|
||||
chown root:nginx /cache
|
||||
chmod 770 /cache
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /acme-challenge
|
||||
ln -s /acme-challenge /opt/bunkerized-nginx/acme-challenge
|
||||
mkdir /acme-challenge
|
||||
chown root:nginx /acme-challenge
|
||||
chmod 770 /acme-challenge
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /modsec-confs
|
||||
ln -s /modsec-confs /opt/bunkerized-nginx/modsec-confs
|
||||
mkdir /modsec-confs
|
||||
chown root:nginx /modsec-confs
|
||||
chmod 770 /modsec-confs
|
||||
|
||||
# prepare /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
ln -s /modsec-crs-confs /opt/bunkerized-nginx/modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
mkdir /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
chown root:nginx /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
chmod 770 /modsec-crs-confs
|
||||
5
autoconf/requirements.txt
Normal file
5
autoconf/requirements.txt
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
docker
|
||||
requests
|
||||
jinja2
|
||||
kubernetes
|
||||
dnspython
|
||||
158
autoconf/src/Config.py
Normal file
158
autoconf/src/Config.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/python3
|
||||
|
||||
import subprocess, shutil, os, traceback, requests, time, dns.resolver
|
||||
|
||||
import Controller
|
||||
|
||||
from logger import log
|
||||
|
||||
class Config :
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, type, api_uri, http_port="8080") :
|
||||
self.__type = type
|
||||
self.__api_uri = api_uri
|
||||
self.__http_port = http_port
|
||||
|
||||
def __jobs(self) :
|
||||
log("config", "INFO", "starting jobs ...")
|
||||
proc = subprocess.run(["/bin/su", "-c", "/opt/bunkerized-nginx/entrypoint/jobs.sh", "nginx"], capture_output=True)
|
||||
stdout = proc.stdout.decode("ascii")
|
||||
stderr = proc.stderr.decode("ascii")
|
||||
if len(stdout) > 1 :
|
||||
log("config", "INFO", "jobs stdout : " + stdout)
|
||||
if stderr != "" :
|
||||
log("config", "ERROR", "jobs stderr : " + stderr)
|
||||
if proc.returncode != 0 :
|
||||
log("config", "ERROR", "jobs error (return code = " + str(proc.returncode) + ")")
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
def gen(self, env) :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
# Write environment variables to a file
|
||||
with open("/tmp/variables.env", "w") as f :
|
||||
for k, v in env.items() :
|
||||
f.write(k + "=" + v + "\n")
|
||||
|
||||
# Call the generator
|
||||
proc = subprocess.run(["/bin/su", "-c", "/opt/bunkerized-nginx/gen/main.py --settings /opt/bunkerized-nginx/settings.json --templates /opt/bunkerized-nginx/confs --output /etc/nginx --variables /tmp/variables.env", "nginx"], capture_output=True)
|
||||
|
||||
# Print stdout/stderr
|
||||
stdout = proc.stdout.decode("ascii")
|
||||
stderr = proc.stderr.decode("ascii")
|
||||
if len(stdout) > 1 :
|
||||
log("config", "INFO", "generator output : " + stdout)
|
||||
if stderr != "" :
|
||||
log("config", "ERROR", "generator error : " + stderr)
|
||||
|
||||
# We're done
|
||||
if proc.returncode == 0 :
|
||||
if self.__type == Controller.Type.SWARM or self.__type == Controller.Type.KUBERNETES :
|
||||
return self.__jobs()
|
||||
return True
|
||||
log("config", "ERROR", "error while generating config (return code = " + str(proc.returncode) + ")")
|
||||
|
||||
except Exception as e :
|
||||
log("config", "ERROR", "exception while generating site config : " + traceback.format_exc())
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def reload(self, instances) :
|
||||
ret = True
|
||||
if self.__type == Controller.Type.DOCKER :
|
||||
for instance in instances :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
instance.kill("SIGHUP")
|
||||
except :
|
||||
ret = False
|
||||
elif self.__type == Controller.Type.SWARM :
|
||||
ret = self.__api_call(instances, "/reload")
|
||||
elif self.__type == Controller.Type.KUBERNETES :
|
||||
ret = self.__api_call(instances, "/reload")
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
|
||||
def __ping(self, instances) :
|
||||
return self.__api_call(instances, "/ping")
|
||||
|
||||
def wait(self, instances) :
|
||||
ret = True
|
||||
if self.__type == Controller.Type.DOCKER :
|
||||
ret = self.__wait_docker(instances)
|
||||
elif self.__type == Controller.Type.SWARM or self.__type == Controller.Type.KUBERNETES :
|
||||
ret = self.__wait_api(instances)
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
|
||||
def __wait_docker(self, instances) :
|
||||
all_healthy = False
|
||||
i = 0
|
||||
while i < 120 :
|
||||
one_not_healthy = False
|
||||
for instance in instances :
|
||||
instance.reload()
|
||||
if instance.attrs["State"]["Health"]["Status"] != "healthy" :
|
||||
one_not_healthy = True
|
||||
break
|
||||
if not one_not_healthy :
|
||||
all_healthy = True
|
||||
break
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
i += 1
|
||||
return all_healthy
|
||||
|
||||
def __wait_api(self, instances) :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
with open("/etc/nginx/autoconf", "w") as f :
|
||||
f.write("ok")
|
||||
i = 1
|
||||
started = False
|
||||
while i <= 10 :
|
||||
time.sleep(i)
|
||||
if self.__ping(instances) :
|
||||
started = True
|
||||
break
|
||||
i = i + 1
|
||||
log("config", "INFO", "waiting " + str(i) + " seconds before retrying to contact bunkerized-nginx instances")
|
||||
if started :
|
||||
log("config", "INFO", "bunkerized-nginx instances started")
|
||||
return True
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("config", "ERROR", "bunkerized-nginx instances are not started")
|
||||
except Exception as e :
|
||||
log("config", "ERROR", "exception while waiting for bunkerized-nginx instances : " + traceback.format_exc())
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
def __api_call(self, instances, path) :
|
||||
ret = True
|
||||
nb = 0
|
||||
urls = []
|
||||
if self.__type == Controller.Type.SWARM :
|
||||
for instance in instances :
|
||||
name = instance.name
|
||||
try :
|
||||
dns_result = dns.resolver.query("tasks." + name)
|
||||
for ip in dns_result :
|
||||
urls.append("http://" + ip.to_text() + ":" + self.__http_port + self.__api_uri + path)
|
||||
except :
|
||||
ret = False
|
||||
elif self.__type == Controller.Type.KUBERNETES :
|
||||
for instance in instances :
|
||||
name = instance.metadata.name
|
||||
try :
|
||||
dns_result = dns.resolver.query(name + "." + instance.metadata.namespace + ".svc.cluster.local")
|
||||
for ip in dns_result :
|
||||
urls.append("http://" + ip.to_text() + ":" + self.__http_port + self.__api_uri + path)
|
||||
except :
|
||||
ret = False
|
||||
|
||||
for url in urls :
|
||||
req = None
|
||||
try :
|
||||
req = requests.post(url)
|
||||
except :
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if req and req.status_code == 200 and req.text == "ok" :
|
||||
log("config", "INFO", "successfully sent API order to " + url)
|
||||
nb += 1
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("config", "INFO", "failed API order to " + url)
|
||||
ret = False
|
||||
return ret and nb > 0
|
||||
53
autoconf/src/Controller.py
Normal file
53
autoconf/src/Controller.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
||||
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
|
||||
from enum import Enum
|
||||
|
||||
from Config import Config
|
||||
|
||||
class Type(Enum) :
|
||||
DOCKER = 1
|
||||
SWARM = 2
|
||||
KUBERNETES = 3
|
||||
|
||||
class Controller(ABC) :
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, type, api_uri=None, lock=None, http_port="8080") :
|
||||
self._config = Config(type, api_uri, http_port=http_port)
|
||||
self.lock = lock
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
def get_env(self) :
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
def _fix_env(self, env) :
|
||||
fixed_env = env.copy()
|
||||
blacklist = ["NGINX_VERSION", "NJS_VERSION", "PATH", "PKG_RELEASE"]
|
||||
for key in blacklist :
|
||||
if key in fixed_env :
|
||||
del fixed_env[key]
|
||||
return fixed_env
|
||||
|
||||
def gen_conf(self, env) :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
ret = self._config.gen(env)
|
||||
except :
|
||||
ret = False
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
def wait(self) :
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
def process_events(self, current_env) :
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
@abstractmethod
|
||||
def reload(self) :
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
def _reload(self, instances) :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
ret = self._config.reload(instances)
|
||||
except :
|
||||
ret = False
|
||||
return ret
|
||||
78
autoconf/src/DockerController.py
Normal file
78
autoconf/src/DockerController.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
|
||||
import docker, time
|
||||
import Controller
|
||||
|
||||
from logger import log
|
||||
|
||||
class DockerController(Controller.Controller) :
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, docker_host) :
|
||||
super().__init__(Controller.Type.DOCKER)
|
||||
self.__client = docker.DockerClient(base_url=docker_host)
|
||||
|
||||
def __get_instances(self) :
|
||||
return self.__client.containers.list(filters={"label" : "bunkerized-nginx.AUTOCONF"})
|
||||
|
||||
def __get_containers(self) :
|
||||
return self.__client.containers.list(filters={"label" : "bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME"})
|
||||
|
||||
def get_env(self) :
|
||||
env = {}
|
||||
for instance in self.__get_instances() :
|
||||
for variable in instance.attrs["Config"]["Env"] :
|
||||
env[variable.split("=")[0]] = variable.replace(variable.split("=")[0] + "=", "", 1)
|
||||
first_servers = []
|
||||
if "SERVER_NAME" in env and env["SERVER_NAME"] != "" :
|
||||
first_servers = env["SERVER_NAME"].split(" ")
|
||||
for container in self.__get_containers() :
|
||||
first_server = container.labels["bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME"].split(" ")[0]
|
||||
first_servers.append(first_server)
|
||||
for variable, value in container.labels.items() :
|
||||
if variable.startswith("bunkerized-nginx.") and variable != "bunkerized-nginx.AUTOCONF" :
|
||||
env[first_server + "_" + variable.replace("bunkerized-nginx.", "", 1)] = value
|
||||
if len(first_servers) == 0 :
|
||||
env["SERVER_NAME"] = ""
|
||||
else :
|
||||
env["SERVER_NAME"] = " ".join(first_servers)
|
||||
return self._fix_env(env)
|
||||
|
||||
def process_events(self, current_env) :
|
||||
old_env = current_env
|
||||
# TODO : check why filter isn't working as expected
|
||||
#for event in self.__client.events(decode=True, filters={"type": "container", "label": ["bunkerized-nginx.AUTOCONF", "bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME"]}) :
|
||||
for event in self.__client.events(decode=True, filters={"type": "container"}) :
|
||||
new_env = self.get_env()
|
||||
if new_env != old_env :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "generating new configuration")
|
||||
if self.gen_conf(new_env) :
|
||||
old_env = new_env.copy()
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "successfully generated new configuration")
|
||||
if self.reload() :
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "successful reload")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "failed reload")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "can't generate new configuration")
|
||||
except :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "exception while receiving event")
|
||||
|
||||
def reload(self) :
|
||||
return self._reload(self.__get_instances())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def wait(self) :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
# Wait for a container
|
||||
instances = self.__get_instances()
|
||||
while len(instances) == 0 :
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
instances = self.__get_instances()
|
||||
# Generate first config
|
||||
env = self.get_env()
|
||||
if not self.gen_conf(env) :
|
||||
return False, env
|
||||
# Wait for nginx
|
||||
return self._config.wait(instances), env
|
||||
except :
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return False, {}
|
||||
193
autoconf/src/IngressController.py
Normal file
193
autoconf/src/IngressController.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
|
||||
from kubernetes import client, config, watch
|
||||
from threading import Thread, Lock
|
||||
import time
|
||||
|
||||
import Controller
|
||||
|
||||
from logger import log
|
||||
|
||||
class IngressController(Controller.Controller) :
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, api_uri, http_port) :
|
||||
super().__init__(Controller.Type.KUBERNETES, api_uri=api_uri, lock=Lock(), http_port=http_port)
|
||||
config.load_incluster_config()
|
||||
self.__api = client.CoreV1Api()
|
||||
self.__extensions_api = client.ExtensionsV1beta1Api()
|
||||
self.__old_env = {}
|
||||
|
||||
def __get_pods(self) :
|
||||
return self.__api.list_pod_for_all_namespaces(watch=False, label_selector="bunkerized-nginx").items
|
||||
|
||||
def __get_ingresses(self) :
|
||||
return self.__extensions_api.list_ingress_for_all_namespaces(watch=False, label_selector="bunkerized-nginx").items
|
||||
|
||||
def __get_services(self, autoconf=False) :
|
||||
services = self.__api.list_service_for_all_namespaces(watch=False, label_selector="bunkerized-nginx").items
|
||||
if not autoconf :
|
||||
return services
|
||||
services_autoconf = []
|
||||
for service in services :
|
||||
if service.metadata.annotations != None and "bunkerized-nginx.AUTOCONF" in service.metadata.annotations :
|
||||
services_autoconf.append(service)
|
||||
return services_autoconf
|
||||
|
||||
def __pod_to_env(self, pod_env) :
|
||||
env = {}
|
||||
for env_var in pod_env :
|
||||
env[env_var.name] = env_var.value
|
||||
if env_var.value == None :
|
||||
env[env_var.name] = ""
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
def __annotations_to_env(self, annotations) :
|
||||
env = {}
|
||||
prefix = annotations["bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME"].split(" ")[0] + "_"
|
||||
for annotation in annotations :
|
||||
if annotation.startswith("bunkerized-nginx.") and annotation.replace("bunkerized-nginx.", "", 1) != "" and annotation.replace("bunkerized-nginx.", "", 1) != "AUTOCONF" :
|
||||
env[prefix + annotation.replace("bunkerized-nginx.", "", 1)] = annotations[annotation]
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
def __rules_to_env(self, rules, namespace="default") :
|
||||
env = {}
|
||||
first_servers = []
|
||||
for rule in rules :
|
||||
rule = rule.to_dict()
|
||||
prefix = ""
|
||||
if "host" in rule :
|
||||
prefix = rule["host"] + "_"
|
||||
first_servers.append(rule["host"])
|
||||
if not "http" in rule or not "paths" in rule["http"] :
|
||||
continue
|
||||
for path in rule["http"]["paths"] :
|
||||
env[prefix + "USE_REVERSE_PROXY"] = "yes"
|
||||
env[prefix + "REVERSE_PROXY_URL"] = path["path"]
|
||||
env[prefix + "REVERSE_PROXY_HOST"] = "http://" + path["backend"]["service_name"] + "." + namespace + ".svc.cluster.local:" + str(path["backend"]["service_port"])
|
||||
env["SERVER_NAME"] = " ".join(first_servers)
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
def get_env(self) :
|
||||
pods = self.__get_pods()
|
||||
ingresses = self.__get_ingresses()
|
||||
services = self.__get_services()
|
||||
env = {}
|
||||
first_servers = []
|
||||
for pod in pods :
|
||||
env.update(self.__pod_to_env(pod.spec.containers[0].env))
|
||||
if "SERVER_NAME" in env and env["SERVER_NAME"] != "" :
|
||||
first_servers.extend(env["SERVER_NAME"].split(" "))
|
||||
for ingress in ingresses :
|
||||
env.update(self.__rules_to_env(ingress.spec.rules, namespace=ingress.metadata.namespace))
|
||||
if ingress.spec.tls :
|
||||
for tls_entry in ingress.spec.tls :
|
||||
for host in tls_entry.hosts :
|
||||
env[host + "_AUTO_LETS_ENCRYPT"] = "yes"
|
||||
if "SERVER_NAME" in env and env["SERVER_NAME"] != "" :
|
||||
first_servers.extend(env["SERVER_NAME"].split(" "))
|
||||
for service in services :
|
||||
if service.metadata.annotations != None and "bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME" in service.metadata.annotations :
|
||||
env.update(self.__annotations_to_env(service.metadata.annotations))
|
||||
first_servers.append(service.metadata.annotations["bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME"])
|
||||
first_servers = list(dict.fromkeys(first_servers))
|
||||
if len(first_servers) == 0 :
|
||||
env["SERVER_NAME"] = ""
|
||||
else :
|
||||
env["SERVER_NAME"] = " ".join(first_servers)
|
||||
return self._fix_env(env)
|
||||
|
||||
def process_events(self, current_env) :
|
||||
self.__old_env = current_env
|
||||
t_pod = Thread(target=self.__watch_pod)
|
||||
t_ingress = Thread(target=self.__watch_ingress)
|
||||
t_service = Thread(target=self.__watch_service)
|
||||
t_pod.start()
|
||||
t_ingress.start()
|
||||
t_service.start()
|
||||
t_pod.join()
|
||||
t_ingress.join()
|
||||
t_service.join()
|
||||
|
||||
def __watch_pod(self) :
|
||||
w = watch.Watch()
|
||||
for event in w.stream(self.__api.list_pod_for_all_namespaces, label_selector="bunkerized-nginx") :
|
||||
self.lock.acquire()
|
||||
new_env = self.get_env()
|
||||
if new_env != self.__old_env :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
if self.gen_conf(new_env) :
|
||||
self.__old_env = new_env.copy()
|
||||
log("CONTROLLER", "INFO", "successfully generated new configuration")
|
||||
if self.reload() :
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "successful reload")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "failed reload")
|
||||
except :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "exception while receiving event")
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
|
||||
def __watch_ingress(self) :
|
||||
w = watch.Watch()
|
||||
for event in w.stream(self.__extensions_api.list_ingress_for_all_namespaces, label_selector="bunkerized-nginx") :
|
||||
self.lock.acquire()
|
||||
new_env = self.get_env()
|
||||
if new_env != self.__old_env :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
if self.gen_conf(new_env) :
|
||||
self.__old_env = new_env.copy()
|
||||
log("CONTROLLER", "INFO", "successfully generated new configuration")
|
||||
if self.reload() :
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "successful reload")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "failed reload")
|
||||
except :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "exception while receiving event")
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
|
||||
def __watch_service(self) :
|
||||
w = watch.Watch()
|
||||
for event in w.stream(self.__api.list_service_for_all_namespaces, label_selector="bunkerized-nginx") :
|
||||
self.lock.acquire()
|
||||
new_env = self.get_env()
|
||||
if new_env != self.__old_env :
|
||||
try :
|
||||
if self.gen_conf(new_env) :
|
||||
self.__old_env = new_env.copy()
|
||||
log("CONTROLLER", "INFO", "successfully generated new configuration")
|
||||
if self.reload() :
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "successful reload")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "failed reload")
|
||||
except :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "exception while receiving event")
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
|
||||
def reload(self) :
|
||||
return self._reload(self.__get_services(autoconf=True))
|
||||
|
||||
def wait(self) :
|
||||
self.lock.acquire()
|
||||
try :
|
||||
# Wait for at least one bunkerized-nginx pod
|
||||
pods = self.__get_pods()
|
||||
while len(pods) == 0 :
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
pods = self.__get_pods()
|
||||
|
||||
# Wait for at least one bunkerized-nginx service
|
||||
services = self.__get_services(autoconf=True)
|
||||
while len(services) == 0 :
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
services = self.__get_services(autoconf=True)
|
||||
|
||||
# Generate first config
|
||||
env = self.get_env()
|
||||
if not self.gen_conf(env) :
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
return False, env
|
||||
|
||||
# Wait for bunkerized-nginx
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
return self._config.wait(services), env
|
||||
except :
|
||||
pass
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
return False, {}
|
||||
42
autoconf/src/ReloadServer.py
Normal file
42
autoconf/src/ReloadServer.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
import socketserver, threading, os, stat
|
||||
|
||||
from logger import log
|
||||
|
||||
class ReloadServerHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
|
||||
|
||||
def handle(self) :
|
||||
locked = False
|
||||
try :
|
||||
|
||||
while True :
|
||||
data = self.request.recv(512)
|
||||
if not data or not data in [b"lock", b"reload", b"unlock"] :
|
||||
break
|
||||
if data == b"lock" :
|
||||
self.server.controller.lock.acquire()
|
||||
locked = True
|
||||
self.request.sendall(b"ok")
|
||||
elif data == b"unlock" :
|
||||
self.server.controller.lock.release()
|
||||
locked = False
|
||||
self.request.sendall(b"ok")
|
||||
elif data == b"reload" :
|
||||
ret = self.server.controller.reload()
|
||||
if ret :
|
||||
self.request.sendall(b"ok")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
self.request.sendall(b"ko")
|
||||
except Exception as e :
|
||||
log("RELOADSERVER", "ERROR", "exception : " + str(e))
|
||||
if locked :
|
||||
self.server.controller.lock.release()
|
||||
|
||||
def run_reload_server(controller) :
|
||||
server = socketserver.UnixStreamServer("/tmp/autoconf.sock", ReloadServerHandler)
|
||||
os.chown("/tmp/autoconf.sock", 0, 101)
|
||||
os.chmod("/tmp/autoconf.sock", 0o770)
|
||||
server.controller = controller
|
||||
thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever)
|
||||
thread.daemon = True
|
||||
thread.start()
|
||||
return (server, thread)
|
||||
85
autoconf/src/SwarmController.py
Normal file
85
autoconf/src/SwarmController.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
import docker, time
|
||||
from threading import Lock
|
||||
|
||||
from logger import log
|
||||
|
||||
import Controller
|
||||
|
||||
class SwarmController(Controller.Controller) :
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, docker_host, api_uri, http_port) :
|
||||
super().__init__(Controller.Type.SWARM, api_uri=api_uri, lock=Lock(), http_port=http_port)
|
||||
self.__client = docker.DockerClient(base_url=docker_host)
|
||||
|
||||
def __get_instances(self) :
|
||||
return self.__client.services.list(filters={"label" : "bunkerized-nginx.AUTOCONF"})
|
||||
|
||||
def __get_services(self) :
|
||||
return self.__client.services.list(filters={"label" : "bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME"})
|
||||
|
||||
def get_env(self) :
|
||||
env = {}
|
||||
for instance in self.__get_instances() :
|
||||
for variable in instance.attrs["Spec"]["TaskTemplate"]["ContainerSpec"]["Env"] :
|
||||
env[variable.split("=")[0]] = variable.replace(variable.split("=")[0] + "=", "", 1)
|
||||
first_servers = []
|
||||
if "SERVER_NAME" in env and env["SERVER_NAME"] != "" :
|
||||
first_servers = env["SERVER_NAME"].split(" ")
|
||||
for service in self.__get_services() :
|
||||
first_server = service.attrs["Spec"]["Labels"]["bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME"].split(" ")[0]
|
||||
first_servers.append(first_server)
|
||||
for variable, value in service.attrs["Spec"]["Labels"].items() :
|
||||
if variable.startswith("bunkerized-nginx.") and variable != "bunkerized-nginx.AUTOCONF" :
|
||||
env[first_server + "_" + variable.replace("bunkerized-nginx.", "", 1)] = value
|
||||
if len(first_servers) == 0 :
|
||||
env["SERVER_NAME"] = ""
|
||||
else :
|
||||
env["SERVER_NAME"] = " ".join(first_servers)
|
||||
return self._fix_env(env)
|
||||
|
||||
def process_events(self, current_env) :
|
||||
old_env = current_env
|
||||
# TODO : check why filter isn't working as expected
|
||||
#for event in self.__client.events(decode=True, filters={"type": "service", "label": ["bunkerized-nginx.AUTOCONF", "bunkerized-nginx.SERVER_NAME"]}) :
|
||||
for event in self.__client.events(decode=True, filters={"type": "service"}) :
|
||||
new_env = self.get_env()
|
||||
if new_env != old_env :
|
||||
self.lock.acquire()
|
||||
try :
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "generating new configuration")
|
||||
if self.gen_conf(new_env) :
|
||||
old_env = new_env.copy()
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "successfully generated new configuration")
|
||||
if self.reload() :
|
||||
log("controller", "INFO", "successful reload")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "failed reload")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "can't generate new configuration")
|
||||
except :
|
||||
log("controller", "ERROR", "exception while receiving event")
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
|
||||
def reload(self) :
|
||||
return self._reload(self.__get_instances())
|
||||
|
||||
def wait(self) :
|
||||
self.lock.acquire()
|
||||
try :
|
||||
# Wait for a service
|
||||
instances = self.__get_instances()
|
||||
while len(instances) == 0 :
|
||||
time.sleep(1)
|
||||
instances = self.__get_instances()
|
||||
# Generate first config
|
||||
env = self.get_env()
|
||||
if not self.gen_conf(env) :
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
return False, env
|
||||
# Wait for nginx
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
return self._config.wait(instances), env
|
||||
except :
|
||||
pass
|
||||
self.lock.release()
|
||||
return False, {}
|
||||
46
autoconf/src/app.py
Normal file
46
autoconf/src/app.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/python3
|
||||
|
||||
from ReloadServer import run_reload_server
|
||||
|
||||
import docker, os, stat, sys, select, threading
|
||||
|
||||
from DockerController import DockerController
|
||||
from SwarmController import SwarmController
|
||||
from IngressController import IngressController
|
||||
|
||||
from logger import log
|
||||
|
||||
# Get variables
|
||||
swarm = os.getenv("SWARM_MODE", "no") == "yes"
|
||||
kubernetes = os.getenv("KUBERNETES_MODE", "no") == "yes"
|
||||
api_uri = os.getenv("API_URI", "")
|
||||
docker_host = os.getenv("DOCKER_HOST", "unix:///var/run/docker.sock")
|
||||
http_port = os.getenv("HTTP_PORT", "8080")
|
||||
|
||||
# Instantiate the controller
|
||||
if swarm :
|
||||
log("autoconf", "INFO", "swarm mode detected")
|
||||
controller = SwarmController(docker_host, api_uri, http_port)
|
||||
elif kubernetes :
|
||||
log("autoconf", "INFO", "kubernetes mode detected")
|
||||
controller = IngressController(api_uri, http_port)
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("autoconf", "INFO", "docker mode detected")
|
||||
controller = DockerController(docker_host)
|
||||
|
||||
# Run the reload server in background if needed
|
||||
if swarm or kubernetes :
|
||||
log("autoconf", "INFO", "start reload server in background")
|
||||
(server, thread) = run_reload_server(controller)
|
||||
|
||||
# Wait for instances
|
||||
log("autoconf", "INFO", "wait until a bunkerized-nginx instance is started ...")
|
||||
ret, env = controller.wait()
|
||||
if ret :
|
||||
log("autoconf", "INFO", "bunkerized-nginx instances started")
|
||||
else :
|
||||
log("autoconf", "ERROR", "bunkerized-nginx instances not started")
|
||||
|
||||
# Process events
|
||||
log("autoconf", "INFO", "waiting for events ...")
|
||||
controller.process_events(env)
|
||||
6
autoconf/src/logger.py
Normal file
6
autoconf/src/logger.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
import datetime
|
||||
|
||||
def log(title, severity, msg) :
|
||||
when = datetime.datetime.today().strftime("[%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S]")
|
||||
what = title + " - " + severity + " - " + msg
|
||||
print(when + " " + what, flush=True)
|
||||
91
compile.sh
91
compile.sh
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/sh
|
||||
|
||||
NTASK=$(nproc)
|
||||
|
||||
# install build dependencies
|
||||
apk add --no-cache --virtual build autoconf libtool automake git geoip-dev yajl-dev g++ curl-dev libxml2-dev pcre-dev make linux-headers libmaxminddb-dev musl-dev lua-dev gd-dev
|
||||
|
||||
# compile and install ModSecurity library
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity.git
|
||||
cd ModSecurity
|
||||
./build.sh
|
||||
git submodule init
|
||||
git submodule update
|
||||
./configure --enable-static=no --disable-doxygen-doc --disable-dependency-tracking
|
||||
make -j $NTASK
|
||||
make install-strip
|
||||
|
||||
# get nginx modules
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
# ModSecurity connector for nginx
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity-nginx.git
|
||||
# headers more
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/openresty/headers-more-nginx-module.git
|
||||
# geoip
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/leev/ngx_http_geoip2_module.git
|
||||
# cookie
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/AirisX/nginx_cookie_flag_module.git
|
||||
|
||||
# LUA requirements
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/openresty/luajit2.git
|
||||
cd luajit2
|
||||
make -j $NTASK
|
||||
make install
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/openresty/lua-resty-core.git
|
||||
cd lua-resty-core
|
||||
make install
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/openresty/lua-resty-lrucache.git
|
||||
cd lua-resty-lrucache
|
||||
make install
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/openresty/lua-resty-dns.git
|
||||
cd lua-resty-dns
|
||||
make install
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/bungle/lua-resty-session.git
|
||||
cd lua-resty-session
|
||||
cp -r lib/resty/* /usr/local/lib/lua/resty
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/bungle/lua-resty-random.git
|
||||
cd lua-resty-random
|
||||
make install
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/openresty/lua-resty-string.git
|
||||
cd lua-resty-string
|
||||
make install
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/openresty/lua-cjson.git
|
||||
cd lua-cjson
|
||||
make -j $NTASK
|
||||
make install
|
||||
make install-extra
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/ittner/lua-gd.git
|
||||
cd lua-gd
|
||||
make -j $NTASK
|
||||
make INSTALL_PATH=/usr/local/lib/lua/5.1 install
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/ledgetech/lua-resty-http.git
|
||||
cd lua-resty-http
|
||||
make install
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
git clone https://github.com/openresty/lua-nginx-module.git
|
||||
export LUAJIT_LIB=/usr/local/lib
|
||||
export LUAJIT_INC=/usr/local/include/luajit-2.1
|
||||
|
||||
# compile and install nginx
|
||||
cd /tmp
|
||||
VERSION="1.18.0"
|
||||
wget https://nginx.org/download/nginx-${VERSION}.tar.gz
|
||||
tar -xvzf nginx-${VERSION}.tar.gz
|
||||
cd nginx-${VERSION}
|
||||
./configure --prefix=/etc/nginx --sbin-path=/usr/sbin/nginx --conf-path=/etc/nginx/nginx.conf --pid-path=/run/nginx/nginx.pid --modules-path=/usr/lib/nginx/modules --with-file-aio --with-http_ssl_module --with-http_v2_module --with-http_realip_module --add-module=/tmp/ModSecurity-nginx --add-module=/tmp/headers-more-nginx-module --add-module=/tmp/ngx_http_geoip2_module --add-module=/tmp/nginx_cookie_flag_module --add-module=/tmp/lua-nginx-module
|
||||
make -j $NTASK
|
||||
make install
|
||||
strip /usr/sbin/nginx
|
||||
|
||||
# remove build dependencies
|
||||
apk del build
|
||||
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
|
||||
auth_basic "%AUTH_BASIC_TEXT%";
|
||||
auth_basic_user_file /etc/nginx/.htpasswd;
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
location %AUTH_BASIC_LOCATION% {
|
||||
auth_basic "%AUTH_BASIC_TEXT%";
|
||||
auth_basic_user_file /etc/nginx/.htpasswd;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
listen 0.0.0.0:443 ssl %HTTP2%;
|
||||
ssl_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/live/%FIRST_SERVER_NAME%/fullchain.pem;
|
||||
ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/%FIRST_SERVER_NAME%/privkey.pem;
|
||||
ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
|
||||
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
|
||||
ssl_session_tickets off;
|
||||
%STRICT_TRANSPORT_SECURITY%
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
if ($bad_user_agent = yes) {
|
||||
return 444;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
open_file_cache %CACHE%;
|
||||
open_file_cache_errors %CACHE_ERRORS%;
|
||||
open_file_cache_min_uses %CACHE_USES%;
|
||||
open_file_cache_valid %CACHE_VALID%;
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
more_set_headers "Content-Security-Policy: %CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY%";
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
set_cookie_flag %COOKIE_FLAGS%;
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
listen 0.0.0.0:443 ssl %HTTP2%;
|
||||
ssl_certificate %HTTPS_CUSTOM_CERT%;
|
||||
ssl_certificate_key %HTTPS_CUSTOM_KEY%;
|
||||
ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
|
||||
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
|
||||
ssl_session_tickets off;
|
||||
%STRICT_TRANSPORT_SECURITY%
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
if ($host !~ ^(%SERVER_NAME%)$) {
|
||||
return 444;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
error_page %CODE% %PAGE%;
|
||||
|
||||
location = %PAGE% {
|
||||
root %ROOT_FOLDER%;
|
||||
modsecurity off;
|
||||
internal;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
more_set_headers "Feature-Policy: %FEATURE_POLICY%";
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
if ($allowed_country = no) {
|
||||
return 444;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
|
||||
geoip2 /etc/nginx/geoip.mmdb {
|
||||
auto_reload 5m;
|
||||
$geoip2_metadata_country_build metadata build_epoch;
|
||||
$geoip2_data_country_code country iso_code;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
map $geoip2_data_country_code $allowed_country {
|
||||
default yes;
|
||||
%BLOCK_COUNTRY%
|
||||
}
|
||||
31
confs/global/api-temp.conf
Normal file
31
confs/global/api-temp.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
location ~ ^%API_URI%/ping {
|
||||
return 444;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
location ~ %API_URI% {
|
||||
|
||||
rewrite_by_lua_block {
|
||||
|
||||
local api = require "api"
|
||||
local api_whitelist_ip = { %API_WHITELIST_IP% }
|
||||
local api_uri = "%API_URI%"
|
||||
local logger = require "logger"
|
||||
|
||||
if api.is_api_call(api_uri, api_whitelist_ip) then
|
||||
ngx.header.content_type = 'text/plain'
|
||||
if api.do_api_call(api_uri) then
|
||||
logger.log(ngx.NOTICE, "API", "API call " .. ngx.var.request_uri .. " successfull from " .. ngx.var.remote_addr)
|
||||
ngx.say("ok")
|
||||
else
|
||||
logger.log(ngx.WARN, "API", "API call " .. ngx.var.request_uri .. " failed from " .. ngx.var.remote_addr)
|
||||
ngx.say("ko")
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_OK)
|
||||
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.OK)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
24
confs/global/api.conf
Normal file
24
confs/global/api.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
||||
# todo : if api_uri == "random"
|
||||
rewrite_by_lua_block {
|
||||
|
||||
local api = require "api"
|
||||
local api_whitelist_ip = {% raw %}{{% endraw %}{% if API_WHITELIST_IP != ""%}{% set elements = API_WHITELIST_IP.split(" ") %}{% for i in range(0, elements|length) %}"{{ elements[i] }}"{% if i < elements|length-1 %},{% endif %}{% endfor %}{% endif %}{% raw %}}{% endraw +%}
|
||||
local api_uri = "{{ API_URI }}"
|
||||
local logger = require "logger"
|
||||
|
||||
if api.is_api_call(api_uri, api_whitelist_ip) then
|
||||
ngx.header.content_type = 'text/plain'
|
||||
if api.do_api_call(api_uri) then
|
||||
logger.log(ngx.NOTICE, "API", "API call " .. ngx.var.request_uri .. " successfull from " .. ngx.var.remote_addr)
|
||||
ngx.print("ok")
|
||||
else
|
||||
logger.log(ngx.WARN, "API", "API call " .. ngx.var.request_uri .. " failed from " .. ngx.var.remote_addr)
|
||||
ngx.print("ko")
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_OK)
|
||||
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.OK)
|
||||
}
|
||||
5
confs/global/crowdsec.conf
Normal file
5
confs/global/crowdsec.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
API_URL={{ CROWDSEC_HOST }}
|
||||
API_KEY={{ CROWDSEC_KEY }}
|
||||
LOG_FILE=/tmp/lua_mod.log
|
||||
CACHE_EXPIRATION=1
|
||||
CACHE_SIZE=1000
|
||||
8
confs/global/dhparam
Normal file
8
confs/global/dhparam
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
||||
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----
|
||||
MIIBCAKCAQEA//////////+t+FRYortKmq/cViAnPTzx2LnFg84tNpWp4TZBFGQz
|
||||
+8yTnc4kmz75fS/jY2MMddj2gbICrsRhetPfHtXV/WVhJDP1H18GbtCFY2VVPe0a
|
||||
87VXE15/V8k1mE8McODmi3fipona8+/och3xWKE2rec1MKzKT0g6eXq8CrGCsyT7
|
||||
YdEIqUuyyOP7uWrat2DX9GgdT0Kj3jlN9K5W7edjcrsZCwenyO4KbXCeAvzhzffi
|
||||
7MA0BM0oNC9hkXL+nOmFg/+OTxIy7vKBg8P+OxtMb61zO7X8vC7CIAXFjvGDfRaD
|
||||
ssbzSibBsu/6iGtCOGEoXJf//////////wIBAg==
|
||||
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
|
||||
25
confs/global/fastcgi.conf
Normal file
25
confs/global/fastcgi.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
|
||||
fastcgi_param SCRIPT_FILENAME $document_root$fastcgi_script_name;
|
||||
fastcgi_param QUERY_STRING $query_string;
|
||||
fastcgi_param REQUEST_METHOD $request_method;
|
||||
fastcgi_param CONTENT_TYPE $content_type;
|
||||
fastcgi_param CONTENT_LENGTH $content_length;
|
||||
|
||||
fastcgi_param SCRIPT_NAME $fastcgi_script_name;
|
||||
fastcgi_param REQUEST_URI $request_uri;
|
||||
fastcgi_param DOCUMENT_URI $document_uri;
|
||||
fastcgi_param DOCUMENT_ROOT $document_root;
|
||||
fastcgi_param SERVER_PROTOCOL $server_protocol;
|
||||
fastcgi_param REQUEST_SCHEME $scheme;
|
||||
fastcgi_param HTTPS $https if_not_empty;
|
||||
|
||||
fastcgi_param GATEWAY_INTERFACE CGI/1.1;
|
||||
fastcgi_param SERVER_SOFTWARE nginx/$nginx_version;
|
||||
|
||||
fastcgi_param REMOTE_ADDR $remote_addr;
|
||||
fastcgi_param REMOTE_PORT $remote_port;
|
||||
fastcgi_param SERVER_ADDR $server_addr;
|
||||
fastcgi_param SERVER_PORT $server_port;
|
||||
fastcgi_param SERVER_NAME $server_name;
|
||||
|
||||
# PHP only, required if PHP was built with --enable-force-cgi-redirect
|
||||
fastcgi_param REDIRECT_STATUS 200;
|
||||
19
confs/global/geoip.conf
Normal file
19
confs/global/geoip.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
|
||||
geoip2 /etc/nginx/geoip.mmdb {
|
||||
auto_reload 5m;
|
||||
$geoip2_metadata_country_build metadata build_epoch;
|
||||
$geoip2_data_country_code country iso_code;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
map $geoip2_data_country_code $allowed_country {
|
||||
default {% if WHITELIST_COUNTRY != "" %}no{% else %}yes{% endif +%};
|
||||
{% if WHITELIST_COUNTRY != "" %}
|
||||
{% for country in WHITELIST_COUNTRY.split(" ") +%}
|
||||
{{ country }} yes;
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% if BLACKLIST_COUNTRY != "" %}
|
||||
{% for country in BLACKLIST_COUNTRY.split(" ") +%}
|
||||
{{ country }} no;
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
}
|
||||
75
confs/global/init-lua.conf
Normal file
75
confs/global/init-lua.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
|
||||
init_by_lua_block {
|
||||
|
||||
local dataloader = require "dataloader"
|
||||
local logger = require "logger"
|
||||
local cjson = require "cjson"
|
||||
|
||||
local use_redis = {% if USE_REDIS == "yes" %}true{% else %}false{% endif +%}
|
||||
|
||||
local use_proxies = {% if has_value("BLOCK_PROXIES", "yes") %}true{% else %}false{% endif +%}
|
||||
local use_abusers = {% if has_value("BLOCK_ABUSERS", "yes") %}true{% else %}false{% endif +%}
|
||||
local use_tor_exit_nodes = {% if has_value("BLOCK_TOR_EXIT_NODE", "yes") %}true{% else %}false{% endif +%}
|
||||
local use_user_agents = {% if has_value("BLOCK_USER_AGENT", "yes") %}true{% else %}false{% endif +%}
|
||||
local use_referrers = {% if has_value("BLOCK_REFERRER", "yes") %}true{% else %}false{% endif +%}
|
||||
|
||||
if not use_redis then
|
||||
if use_proxies then
|
||||
dataloader.load_ip("/etc/nginx/proxies.list", ngx.shared.proxies_data)
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
if use_abusers then
|
||||
dataloader.load_ip("/etc/nginx/abusers.list", ngx.shared.abusers_data)
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
if use_tor_exit_nodes then
|
||||
dataloader.load_ip("/etc/nginx/tor-exit-nodes.list", ngx.shared.tor_exit_nodes_data)
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
if use_user_agents then
|
||||
dataloader.load_raw("/etc/nginx/user-agents.list", ngx.shared.user_agents_data)
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
if use_referrers then
|
||||
dataloader.load_raw("/etc/nginx/referrers.list", ngx.shared.referrers_data)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- Load plugins
|
||||
ngx.shared.plugins_data:safe_set("plugins", nil, 0)
|
||||
local p = io.popen("find /opt/bunkerized-nginx/plugins -maxdepth 1 -type d ! -path /opt/bunkerized-nginx/plugins")
|
||||
for dir in p:lines() do
|
||||
-- read JSON
|
||||
local file = io.open(dir .. "/plugin.json")
|
||||
if file then
|
||||
-- store settings
|
||||
local data = cjson.decode(file:read("*a"))
|
||||
for k, v in pairs(data.settings) do
|
||||
ngx.shared.plugins_data:safe_set(data.id .. "_" .. k, v, 0)
|
||||
end
|
||||
file:close()
|
||||
-- call init
|
||||
local plugin = require(data.id .. "/" .. data.id)
|
||||
local init = true
|
||||
if plugin["init"] ~= nil then
|
||||
init = plugin.init()
|
||||
end
|
||||
-- store plugin
|
||||
if init then
|
||||
local plugins, flags = ngx.shared.plugins_data:get("plugins")
|
||||
if plugins == nil then
|
||||
ngx.shared.plugins_data:safe_set("plugins", data.id, 0)
|
||||
else
|
||||
ngx.shared.plugins_data:safe_set("plugins", plugins .. " " .. data.id, 0)
|
||||
end
|
||||
logger.log(ngx.ERR, "PLUGINS", "*NOT AN ERROR* plugin " .. data.name .. "/" .. data.version .. " has been loaded")
|
||||
else
|
||||
logger.log(ngx.ERR, "PLUGINS", "init failed for plugin " .. data.name .. "/" .. data.version)
|
||||
end
|
||||
else
|
||||
logger.log(ngx.ERR, "PLUGINS", "Can't load " .. dir .. "/plugin.json")
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
end
|
||||
p:close()
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
96
confs/global/mime-types.conf
Normal file
96
confs/global/mime-types.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
|
||||
types {
|
||||
text/html html htm shtml;
|
||||
text/css css;
|
||||
text/xml xml;
|
||||
image/gif gif;
|
||||
image/jpeg jpeg jpg;
|
||||
application/javascript js;
|
||||
application/atom+xml atom;
|
||||
application/rss+xml rss;
|
||||
|
||||
text/mathml mml;
|
||||
text/plain txt;
|
||||
text/vnd.sun.j2me.app-descriptor jad;
|
||||
text/vnd.wap.wml wml;
|
||||
text/x-component htc;
|
||||
|
||||
image/png png;
|
||||
image/svg+xml svg svgz;
|
||||
image/tiff tif tiff;
|
||||
image/vnd.wap.wbmp wbmp;
|
||||
image/webp webp;
|
||||
image/x-icon ico;
|
||||
image/x-jng jng;
|
||||
image/x-ms-bmp bmp;
|
||||
|
||||
font/woff woff;
|
||||
font/woff2 woff2;
|
||||
|
||||
application/java-archive jar war ear;
|
||||
application/json json;
|
||||
application/mac-binhex40 hqx;
|
||||
application/msword doc;
|
||||
application/pdf pdf;
|
||||
application/postscript ps eps ai;
|
||||
application/rtf rtf;
|
||||
application/vnd.apple.mpegurl m3u8;
|
||||
application/vnd.google-earth.kml+xml kml;
|
||||
application/vnd.google-earth.kmz kmz;
|
||||
application/vnd.ms-excel xls;
|
||||
application/vnd.ms-fontobject eot;
|
||||
application/vnd.ms-powerpoint ppt;
|
||||
application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.graphics odg;
|
||||
application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.presentation odp;
|
||||
application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.spreadsheet ods;
|
||||
application/vnd.oasis.opendocument.text odt;
|
||||
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation
|
||||
pptx;
|
||||
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet
|
||||
xlsx;
|
||||
application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document
|
||||
docx;
|
||||
application/vnd.wap.wmlc wmlc;
|
||||
application/x-7z-compressed 7z;
|
||||
application/x-cocoa cco;
|
||||
application/x-java-archive-diff jardiff;
|
||||
application/x-java-jnlp-file jnlp;
|
||||
application/x-makeself run;
|
||||
application/x-perl pl pm;
|
||||
application/x-pilot prc pdb;
|
||||
application/x-rar-compressed rar;
|
||||
application/x-redhat-package-manager rpm;
|
||||
application/x-sea sea;
|
||||
application/x-shockwave-flash swf;
|
||||
application/x-stuffit sit;
|
||||
application/x-tcl tcl tk;
|
||||
application/x-x509-ca-cert der pem crt;
|
||||
application/x-xpinstall xpi;
|
||||
application/xhtml+xml xhtml;
|
||||
application/xspf+xml xspf;
|
||||
application/zip zip;
|
||||
|
||||
application/octet-stream bin exe dll;
|
||||
application/octet-stream deb;
|
||||
application/octet-stream dmg;
|
||||
application/octet-stream iso img;
|
||||
application/octet-stream msi msp msm;
|
||||
|
||||
audio/midi mid midi kar;
|
||||
audio/mpeg mp3;
|
||||
audio/ogg ogg;
|
||||
audio/x-m4a m4a;
|
||||
audio/x-realaudio ra;
|
||||
|
||||
video/3gpp 3gpp 3gp;
|
||||
video/mp2t ts;
|
||||
video/mp4 mp4;
|
||||
video/mpeg mpeg mpg;
|
||||
video/quicktime mov;
|
||||
video/webm webm;
|
||||
video/x-flv flv;
|
||||
video/x-m4v m4v;
|
||||
video/x-mng mng;
|
||||
video/x-ms-asf asx asf;
|
||||
video/x-ms-wmv wmv;
|
||||
video/x-msvideo avi;
|
||||
}
|
||||
12
confs/global/multisite-default-server-https.conf
Normal file
12
confs/global/multisite-default-server-https.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
||||
listen 0.0.0.0:{{ HTTPS_PORT }} default_server ssl {% if USE_HTTP2 == "yes" %}http2{% endif %};
|
||||
ssl_certificate /etc/nginx/default-cert.pem;
|
||||
ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/default-key.pem;
|
||||
ssl_protocols {{ HTTPS_PROTOCOLS }};
|
||||
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
|
||||
ssl_session_tickets off;
|
||||
ssl_session_timeout 1d;
|
||||
ssl_session_cache shared:MozSSL:10m;
|
||||
{% if "TLSv1.2" in HTTPS_PROTOCOLS +%}
|
||||
ssl_dhparam /etc/nginx/dhparam;
|
||||
ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384;
|
||||
{% endif +%}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
location ~ ^/.well-known/acme-challenge/ {
|
||||
root /opt/bunkerized-nginx/acme-challenge;
|
||||
}
|
||||
12
confs/global/multisite-default-server.conf
Normal file
12
confs/global/multisite-default-server.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
||||
server {
|
||||
{% if LISTEN_HTTP == "yes" %}listen 0.0.0.0:{{ HTTP_PORT }} default_server;{% endif +%}
|
||||
server_name _;
|
||||
{% if has_value("AUTO_LETS_ENCRYPT", "yes") %}include /etc/nginx/multisite-default-server-https.conf;{% endif +%}
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/multisite-default-server-lets-encrypt-webroot.conf;
|
||||
{% if USE_API == "yes" %}
|
||||
location ^~ {{ API_URI }} {
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/api.conf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% if DISABLE_DEFAULT_SERVER == "yes" %}include /etc/nginx/multisite-disable-default-server.conf;{% endif +%}
|
||||
}
|
||||
3
confs/global/multisite-disable-default-server.conf
Normal file
3
confs/global/multisite-disable-default-server.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
location / {
|
||||
return 444;
|
||||
}
|
||||
31
confs/global/nginx-temp.conf
Normal file
31
confs/global/nginx-temp.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_lua_module.so;
|
||||
|
||||
daemon on;
|
||||
|
||||
pid /tmp/nginx-temp.pid;
|
||||
|
||||
events {
|
||||
worker_connections 1024;
|
||||
use epoll;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
http {
|
||||
proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;
|
||||
client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;
|
||||
fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;
|
||||
uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;
|
||||
scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;
|
||||
lua_package_path "/opt/bunkerized-nginx/lua/?.lua;/opt/bunkerized-nginx/plugins/?.lua;/opt/bunkerized-nginx/deps/lib/lua/?.lua;;";
|
||||
lua_package_cpath "/opt/bunkerized-nginx/deps/lib/?.so;/opt/bunkerized-nginx/deps/lib/lua/?.so;;";
|
||||
server {
|
||||
listen 0.0.0.0:%HTTP_PORT% default_server;
|
||||
server_name _;
|
||||
location ~ ^/.well-known/acme-challenge/ {
|
||||
root /opt/bunkerized-nginx/acme-challenge;
|
||||
}
|
||||
%USE_API%
|
||||
location / {
|
||||
return 444;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
146
confs/global/nginx.conf
Normal file
146
confs/global/nginx.conf
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
|
||||
# /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
|
||||
|
||||
# load dynamic modules
|
||||
load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_cookie_flag_filter_module.so;
|
||||
load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_geoip2_module.so;
|
||||
load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_headers_more_filter_module.so;
|
||||
load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_lua_module.so;
|
||||
load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_modsecurity_module.so;
|
||||
load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_brotli_filter_module.so;
|
||||
load_module /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngx_http_brotli_static_module.so;
|
||||
|
||||
# PID file
|
||||
pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
|
||||
|
||||
# worker number (default = auto)
|
||||
worker_processes {{ WORKER_PROCESSES }};
|
||||
|
||||
# faster regexp
|
||||
pcre_jit on;
|
||||
|
||||
# config files for dynamic modules
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/modules/*.conf;
|
||||
|
||||
# max open files for each worker
|
||||
worker_rlimit_nofile {{ WORKER_RLIMIT_NOFILE }};
|
||||
|
||||
events {
|
||||
# max connections per worker
|
||||
worker_connections {{ WORKER_CONNECTIONS }};
|
||||
|
||||
# epoll seems to be the best on Linux
|
||||
use epoll;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
http {
|
||||
# zero copy within the kernel
|
||||
sendfile on;
|
||||
|
||||
# send packets only if filled
|
||||
tcp_nopush on;
|
||||
|
||||
# remove 200ms delay
|
||||
tcp_nodelay on;
|
||||
|
||||
# load mime types and set default one
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/mime-types.conf;
|
||||
default_type application/octet-stream;
|
||||
|
||||
# write logs to local syslog
|
||||
log_format logf '{{ LOG_FORMAT }}';
|
||||
access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log logf;
|
||||
error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log {{ LOG_LEVEL }};
|
||||
|
||||
# temp paths
|
||||
proxy_temp_path /tmp/proxy_temp;
|
||||
client_body_temp_path /tmp/client_temp;
|
||||
fastcgi_temp_path /tmp/fastcgi_temp;
|
||||
uwsgi_temp_path /tmp/uwsgi_temp;
|
||||
scgi_temp_path /tmp/scgi_temp;
|
||||
|
||||
# close connections in FIN_WAIT1 state
|
||||
reset_timedout_connection on;
|
||||
|
||||
# timeouts
|
||||
client_body_timeout 10;
|
||||
client_header_timeout 10;
|
||||
keepalive_timeout 15;
|
||||
send_timeout 10;
|
||||
|
||||
# resolvers to use
|
||||
resolver {{ DNS_RESOLVERS }} ipv6=off;
|
||||
|
||||
# remove ports when sending redirects
|
||||
port_in_redirect off;
|
||||
|
||||
# lua path and dicts
|
||||
lua_package_path "/opt/bunkerized-nginx/lua/?.lua;/opt/bunkerized-nginx/plugins/?.lua;/opt/bunkerized-nginx/deps/lib/lua/?.lua;;";
|
||||
lua_package_cpath "/opt/bunkerized-nginx/deps/lib/?.so;/opt/bunkerized-nginx/deps/lib/lua/?.so;;";
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_WHITELIST_IP", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict whitelist_ip_cache 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_WHITELIST_REVERSE", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict whitelist_reverse_cache 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_BLACKLIST_IP", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict blacklist_ip_cache 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_BLACKLIST_REVERSE", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict blacklist_reverse_cache 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_DNSBL", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict dnsbl_cache 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("BLOCK_PROXIES", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict proxies_data 250m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("BLOCK_ABUSERS", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict abusers_data 50m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("BLOCK_TOR_EXIT_NODE", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict tor_exit_nodes_data 1m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("BLOCK_USER_AGENT", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict user_agents_data 1m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("BLOCK_USER_AGENT", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict user_agents_cache 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("BLOCK_REFERRER", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict referrers_data 1m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("BLOCK_REFERRER", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict referrers_cache 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_BAD_BEHAVIOR", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict behavior_ban 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_BAD_BEHAVIOR", "yes") %}lua_shared_dict behavior_count 10m;{% endif +%}
|
||||
lua_shared_dict plugins_data 10m;
|
||||
|
||||
# shared memory zone for limit_req
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_LIMIT_REQ", "yes") %}limit_req_zone $binary_remote_addr$uri zone=limit:{{ LIMIT_REQ_CACHE }} rate={{ LIMIT_REQ_RATE }};{% endif +%}
|
||||
|
||||
# shared memory zone for limit_conn
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_LIMIT_CONN", "yes") %}limit_conn_zone $binary_remote_addr zone=ddos:{{ LIMIT_CONN_CACHE }};{% endif +%}
|
||||
|
||||
# whitelist or blacklist country
|
||||
{% if BLACKLIST_COUNTRY != "" or WHITELIST_COUNTRY != "" %}include /etc/nginx/geoip.conf;{% endif +%}
|
||||
|
||||
# zone for proxy_cache
|
||||
{% if has_value("USE_PROXY_CACHE", "yes") %}proxy_cache_path /tmp/proxy_cache keys_zone=proxycache:{{ PROXY_CACHE_PATH_ZONE_SIZE }} {{ PROXY_CACHE_PATH_PARAMS }};{% endif +%}
|
||||
|
||||
# custom http confs
|
||||
include /opt/bunkerized-nginx/http-confs/*.conf;
|
||||
|
||||
# LUA init block
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/init-lua.conf;
|
||||
|
||||
# default server when MULTISITE=yes
|
||||
{% if MULTISITE == "yes" %}include /etc/nginx/multisite-default-server.conf;{% endif +%}
|
||||
|
||||
# server config(s)
|
||||
{% if MULTISITE == "yes" and SERVER_NAME != "" %}
|
||||
{% set map_servers = {} %}
|
||||
{% for server_name in SERVER_NAME.split(" ") %}
|
||||
{% if server_name + "_SERVER_NAME" in all %}
|
||||
{% set x = map_servers.update({server_name : all[server_name + "_SERVER_NAME"].split(" ")}) %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% for server_name in SERVER_NAME.split(" ") %}
|
||||
{% if not server_name in map_servers %}
|
||||
{% set found = {"res": false} %}
|
||||
{% for first_server, servers in map_servers.items() %}
|
||||
{% if server_name in servers %}
|
||||
{% set x = found.update({"res" : true}) %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% if not found["res"] %}
|
||||
{% set x = map_servers.update({server_name : [server_name]}) %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% for first_server in map_servers +%}
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/{{ first_server }}/server.conf;
|
||||
{% endfor %}
|
||||
{% elif MULTISITE == "no" +%}
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/server.conf;
|
||||
{% endif %}
|
||||
|
||||
# API
|
||||
{% if USE_API == "yes" %}include /etc/nginx/api.conf;{% endif +%}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# /etc/nginx/gzip.conf
|
||||
|
||||
# enable/disable gzip compression
|
||||
gzip %USE_GZIP%;
|
||||
gzip_comp_level %GZIP_COMP_LEVEL%;
|
||||
gzip_disable msie6;
|
||||
gzip_min_length %GZIP_MIN_LENGTH%;
|
||||
gzip_proxied any;
|
||||
gzip_types %GZIP_TYPES%;
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
|
||||
listen 0.0.0.0:443 ssl %HTTP2%;
|
||||
ssl_certificate %HTTPS_CERT%;
|
||||
ssl_certificate_key %HTTPS_KEY%;
|
||||
ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
|
||||
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
|
||||
ssl_session_tickets off;
|
||||
%STRICT_TRANSPORT_SECURITY%
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
limit_req_status 429;
|
||||
limit_req zone=limit burst=%LIMIT_REQ_BURST% nodelay;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
|
||||
set $session_secret %ANTIBOT_SESSION_SECRET%;
|
||||
|
||||
access_by_lua_block {
|
||||
|
||||
local use_whitelist_ip = %USE_WHITELIST_IP%
|
||||
local use_whitelist_reverse = %USE_WHITELIST_REVERSE%
|
||||
local use_blacklist_ip = %USE_BLACKLIST_IP%
|
||||
local use_blacklist_reverse = %USE_BLACKLIST_REVERSE%
|
||||
local use_dnsbl = %USE_DNSBL%
|
||||
local use_antibot_cookie = %USE_ANTIBOT_COOKIE%
|
||||
local use_antibot_javascript = %USE_ANTIBOT_JAVASCRIPT%
|
||||
local use_antibot_captcha = %USE_ANTIBOT_CAPTCHA%
|
||||
local use_antibot_recaptcha = %USE_ANTIBOT_RECAPTCHA%
|
||||
|
||||
-- include LUA code
|
||||
local whitelist = require "whitelist"
|
||||
local blacklist = require "blacklist"
|
||||
local dnsbl = require "dnsbl"
|
||||
local cookie = require "cookie"
|
||||
local javascript = require "javascript"
|
||||
local captcha = require "captcha"
|
||||
local recaptcha = require "recaptcha"
|
||||
|
||||
-- antibot
|
||||
local antibot_uri = "%ANTIBOT_URI%"
|
||||
|
||||
-- check if already in whitelist cache
|
||||
if use_whitelist_ip and whitelist.ip_cached_ok() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.OK)
|
||||
end
|
||||
if use_whitelist_reverse and whitelist.reverse_cached_ok() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.OK)
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- check if already in blacklist cache
|
||||
if use_blacklist_ip and blacklist.ip_cached_ko() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
end
|
||||
if use_blacklist_reverse and blacklist.reverse_cached_ko() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- check if already in dnsbl cache
|
||||
if use_dnsbl and dnsbl.cached_ko() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- check if IP is whitelisted (only if not in cache)
|
||||
if use_whitelist_ip and not whitelist.ip_cached() then
|
||||
if whitelist.check_ip() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.OK)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- check if reverse is whitelisted (only if not in cache)
|
||||
if use_whitelist_reverse and not whitelist.reverse_cached() then
|
||||
if whitelist.check_reverse() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.OK)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- check if IP is blacklisted (only if not in cache)
|
||||
if use_blacklist_ip and not blacklist.ip_cached() then
|
||||
if blacklist.check_ip() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- check if reverse is blacklisted (only if not in cache)
|
||||
if use_blacklist_reverse and not blacklist.reverse_cached() then
|
||||
if blacklist.check_reverse() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- check if IP is in DNSBLs (only if not in cache)
|
||||
if use_dnsbl and not dnsbl.cached() then
|
||||
if dnsbl.check() then
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- cookie check
|
||||
if use_antibot_cookie then
|
||||
if not cookie.is_set("uri") then
|
||||
if ngx.var.request_uri ~= antibot_uri then
|
||||
cookie.set({uri = ngx.var.request_uri})
|
||||
return ngx.redirect(antibot_uri)
|
||||
end
|
||||
return ngx.exit(ngx.HTTP_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
else
|
||||
if ngx.var.request_uri == antibot_uri then
|
||||
return ngx.redirect(cookie.get("uri"))
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- javascript check
|
||||
if use_antibot_javascript then
|
||||
if not cookie.is_set("javascript") then
|
||||
if ngx.var.request_uri ~= antibot_uri then
|
||||
cookie.set({uri = ngx.var.request_uri, challenge = javascript.get_challenge()})
|
||||
return ngx.redirect(antibot_uri)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- captcha check
|
||||
if use_antibot_captcha then
|
||||
if not cookie.is_set("captcha") then
|
||||
if ngx.var.request_uri ~= antibot_uri and ngx.var.request_uri ~= "/favicon.ico" then
|
||||
cookie.set({uri = ngx.var.request_uri})
|
||||
return ngx.redirect(antibot_uri)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
-- recaptcha check
|
||||
if use_antibot_recaptcha then
|
||||
if not cookie.is_set("recaptcha") then
|
||||
if ngx.var.request_uri ~= antibot_uri and ngx.var.request_uri ~= "/favicon.ico" then
|
||||
cookie.set({uri = ngx.var.request_uri})
|
||||
return ngx.redirect(antibot_uri)
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
end
|
||||
|
||||
ngx.exit(ngx.OK)
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
%INCLUDE_ANTIBOT_JAVASCRIPT%
|
||||
|
||||
%INCLUDE_ANTIBOT_CAPTCHA%
|
||||
|
||||
%INCLUDE_ANTIBOT_RECAPTCHA%
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
map $http_user_agent $bad_user_agent {
|
||||
default no;
|
||||
%BLOCK_USER_AGENT%
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
|
||||
SecUploadDir /tmp
|
||||
SecUploadKeepFiles On
|
||||
SecRule FILES_TMPNAMES "@inspectFile /opt/scripts/clamav.sh" \
|
||||
"phase:2,t:none,deny,msg:'Virus found in uploaded file',id:'399999'"
|
||||
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
|
||||
modsecurity on;
|
||||
modsecurity_rules_file /etc/nginx/modsecurity-rules.conf;
|
||||
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
|
||||
|
||||
# run as daemon
|
||||
daemon on;
|
||||
|
||||
# do NOT run as root
|
||||
user nginx;
|
||||
|
||||
# worker number = CPU core(s)
|
||||
worker_processes auto;
|
||||
|
||||
# faster regexp
|
||||
pcre_jit on;
|
||||
|
||||
# config files for dynamic modules
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/modules/*.conf;
|
||||
|
||||
events {
|
||||
# max connections per worker
|
||||
worker_connections 1024;
|
||||
|
||||
# epoll seems to be the best on Linux
|
||||
use epoll;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
http {
|
||||
# zero copy within the kernel
|
||||
sendfile on;
|
||||
|
||||
# send packets only if filled
|
||||
tcp_nopush on;
|
||||
|
||||
# remove 200ms delay
|
||||
tcp_nodelay on;
|
||||
|
||||
# load mime types and set default one
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/mime.types;
|
||||
default_type application/octet-stream;
|
||||
|
||||
# load gzip custom config
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/gzip.conf;
|
||||
|
||||
# maximum request body size
|
||||
client_max_body_size %MAX_CLIENT_SIZE%;
|
||||
|
||||
# load caching custom config
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/cache.conf;
|
||||
|
||||
# close connections in FIN_WAIT1 state
|
||||
reset_timedout_connection on;
|
||||
|
||||
# timeouts
|
||||
client_body_timeout 12;
|
||||
client_header_timeout 12;
|
||||
keepalive_timeout 15;
|
||||
send_timeout 10;
|
||||
|
||||
# enable/disable sending nginx version
|
||||
server_tokens %SERVER_TOKENS%;
|
||||
|
||||
# resolvers to use
|
||||
resolver %DNS_RESOLVERS% ipv6=off;
|
||||
|
||||
# get real IP address if behind a reverse proxy
|
||||
%PROXY_REAL_IP%
|
||||
|
||||
# write logs to local syslog
|
||||
access_log syslog:server=unix:/dev/log,nohostname,facility=local0,severity=notice combined;
|
||||
error_log syslog:server=unix:/dev/log,nohostname,facility=local0 warn;
|
||||
|
||||
# lua path and dicts
|
||||
lua_package_path "/usr/local/lib/lua/?.lua;;";
|
||||
%WHITELIST_IP_CACHE%
|
||||
%WHITELIST_REVERSE_CACHE%
|
||||
%BLACKLIST_IP_CACHE%
|
||||
%BLACKLIST_REVERSE_CACHE%
|
||||
%DNSBL_CACHE%
|
||||
|
||||
# shared memory zone for limit_req
|
||||
%LIMIT_REQ_ZONE%
|
||||
|
||||
# server config
|
||||
include /etc/nginx/server.conf;
|
||||
|
||||
# list of blocked country
|
||||
%BLOCK_COUNTRY%
|
||||
|
||||
# list of blocker user agents
|
||||
%BLOCK_USER_AGENT%
|
||||
|
||||
# enable/disable ModSecurity
|
||||
%USE_MODSECURITY%
|
||||
|
||||
# custom http confs
|
||||
include /http-confs/*.conf;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,800 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Introduction ]] --------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack
|
||||
# detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web
|
||||
# application. They are written for the open source, cross-platform
|
||||
# ModSecurity Web Application Firewall.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# See also:
|
||||
# https://coreruleset.org/
|
||||
# https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
|
||||
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ System Requirements ]] -------------------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# CRS requires ModSecurity version 2.8.0 or above.
|
||||
# We recommend to always use the newest ModSecurity version.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The configuration directives/settings in this file are used to control
|
||||
# the OWASP ModSecurity CRS. These settings do **NOT** configure the main
|
||||
# ModSecurity settings (modsecurity.conf) such as SecRuleEngine,
|
||||
# SecRequestBodyAccess, SecAuditEngine, SecDebugLog, and XML processing.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The CRS assumes that modsecurity.conf has been loaded. It is bundled with
|
||||
# ModSecurity. If you don't have it, you can get it from:
|
||||
# 2.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v2/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
|
||||
# 3.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v3/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The order of file inclusion in your webserver configuration should always be:
|
||||
# 1. modsecurity.conf
|
||||
# 2. crs-setup.conf (this file)
|
||||
# 3. rules/*.conf (the CRS rule files)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Please refer to the INSTALL file for detailed installation instructions.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Mode of Operation: Anomaly Scoring vs. Self-Contained ]] ---------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The CRS can run in two modes:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode (default) ]] --
|
||||
# In CRS3, anomaly mode is the default and recommended mode, since it gives the
|
||||
# most accurate log information and offers the most flexibility in setting your
|
||||
# blocking policies. It is also called "collaborative detection mode".
|
||||
# In this mode, each matching rule increases an 'anomaly score'.
|
||||
# At the conclusion of the inbound rules, and again at the conclusion of the
|
||||
# outbound rules, the anomaly score is checked, and the blocking evaluation
|
||||
# rules apply a disruptive action, by default returning an error 403.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Self-Contained Mode ]] --
|
||||
# In this mode, rules apply an action instantly. This was the CRS2 default.
|
||||
# It can lower resource usage, at the cost of less flexibility in blocking policy
|
||||
# and less informative audit logs (only the first detected threat is logged).
|
||||
# Rules inherit the disruptive action that you specify (i.e. deny, drop, etc).
|
||||
# The first rule that matches will execute this action. In most cases this will
|
||||
# cause evaluation to stop after the first rule has matched, similar to how many
|
||||
# IDSs function.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Alert Logging Control ]] --
|
||||
# In the mode configuration, you must also adjust the desired logging options.
|
||||
# There are three common options for dealing with logging. By default CRS enables
|
||||
# logging to the webserver error log (or Event viewer) plus detailed logging to
|
||||
# the ModSecurity audit log (configured under SecAuditLog in modsecurity.conf).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - To log to both error log and ModSecurity audit log file, use: "log,auditlog"
|
||||
# - To log *only* to the ModSecurity audit log file, use: "nolog,auditlog"
|
||||
# - To log *only* to the error log file, use: "log,noauditlog"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Examples for the various modes follow.
|
||||
# You must leave one of the following options enabled.
|
||||
# Note that you must specify the same line for phase:1 and phase:2.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Default: Anomaly Scoring mode, log to error log, log to ModSecurity audit log
|
||||
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
|
||||
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf.example
|
||||
# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
|
||||
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
|
||||
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,pass"
|
||||
SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,pass"
|
||||
|
||||
# Example: Anomaly Scoring mode, log only to ModSecurity audit log
|
||||
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
|
||||
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf.example
|
||||
# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
|
||||
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
|
||||
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,nolog,auditlog,pass"
|
||||
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,nolog,auditlog,pass"
|
||||
|
||||
# Example: Self-contained mode, return error 403 on blocking
|
||||
# - In this configuration the default disruptive action becomes 'deny'. After a
|
||||
# rule triggers, it will stop processing the request and return an error 403.
|
||||
# - You can also use a different error status, such as 404, 406, et cetera.
|
||||
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
|
||||
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
|
||||
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
|
||||
|
||||
# Example: Self-contained mode, redirect back to homepage on blocking
|
||||
# - In this configuration the 'tag' action includes the Host header data in the
|
||||
# log. This helps to identify which virtual host triggered the rule (if any).
|
||||
# - Note that this might cause redirect loops in some situations; for example
|
||||
# if a Cookie or User-Agent header is blocked, it will also be blocked when
|
||||
# the client subsequently tries to access the homepage. You can also redirect
|
||||
# to another custom URL.
|
||||
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
|
||||
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Paranoia Level Initialization ]] ---------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The Paranoia Level (PL) setting allows you to choose the desired level
|
||||
# of rule checks that will add to your anomaly scores.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules
|
||||
# giving you a higher level of security. However, higher paranoia levels
|
||||
# also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic due to
|
||||
# false alarms (also named false positives or FPs). If you use higher
|
||||
# paranoia levels, it is likely that you will need to add some exclusion
|
||||
# rules for certain requests and applications receiving complex input.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - A paranoia level of 1 is default. In this level, most core rules
|
||||
# are enabled. PL1 is advised for beginners, installations
|
||||
# covering many different sites and applications, and for setups
|
||||
# with standard security requirements.
|
||||
# At PL1 you should face FPs rarely. If you encounter FPs, please
|
||||
# open an issue on the CRS GitHub site and don't forget to attach your
|
||||
# complete Audit Log record for the request with the issue.
|
||||
# - Paranoia level 2 includes many extra rules, for instance enabling
|
||||
# many regexp-based SQL and XSS injection protections, and adding
|
||||
# extra keywords checked for code injections. PL2 is advised
|
||||
# for moderate to experienced users desiring more complete coverage
|
||||
# and for installations with elevated security requirements.
|
||||
# PL2 comes with some FPs which you need to handle.
|
||||
# - Paranoia level 3 enables more rules and keyword lists, and tweaks
|
||||
# limits on special characters used. PL3 is aimed at users experienced
|
||||
# at the handling of FPs and at installations with a high security
|
||||
# requirement.
|
||||
# - Paranoia level 4 further restricts special characters.
|
||||
# The highest level is advised for experienced users protecting
|
||||
# installations with very high security requirements. Running PL4 will
|
||||
# likely produce a very high number of FPs which have to be
|
||||
# treated before the site can go productive.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rules in paranoia level 2 or higher will log their PL to the audit log;
|
||||
# example: [tag "paranoia-level/2"]. This allows you to deduct from the
|
||||
# audit log how the WAF behavior is affected by paranoia level.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It is important to also look into the variable
|
||||
# tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded (Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED)
|
||||
# defined below. Enabling it closes a possible bypass of CRS.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900000,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.paranoia_level=1"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# It is possible to execute rules from a higher paranoia level but not include
|
||||
# them in the anomaly scoring. This allows you to take a well-tuned system on
|
||||
# paranoia level 1 and add rules from paranoia level 2 without having to fear
|
||||
# the new rules would lead to false positives that raise your score above the
|
||||
# threshold.
|
||||
# This optional feature is enabled by uncommenting the following rule and
|
||||
# setting the tx.executing_paranoia_level.
|
||||
# Technically, rules up to the level defined in tx.executing_paranoia_level
|
||||
# will be executed, but only the rules up to tx.paranoia_level affect the
|
||||
# anomaly scores.
|
||||
# By default, tx.executing_paranoia_level is set to tx.paranoia_level.
|
||||
# tx.executing_paranoia_level must not be lower than tx.paranoia_level.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Please notice that setting tx.executing_paranoia_level to a higher paranoia
|
||||
# level results in a performance impact that is equally high as setting
|
||||
# tx.paranoia_level to said level.
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900001,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.executing_paranoia_level=1"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED ]] -----------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ModSecurity selects the body processor based on the Content-Type request
|
||||
# header. But clients are not always setting the Content-Type header for their
|
||||
# request body payloads. This will leave ModSecurity with limited vision into
|
||||
# the payload. The variable tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded lets you force the
|
||||
# URLENCODED body processor in these situations. This is off by default, as it
|
||||
# implies a change of the behaviour of ModSecurity beyond CRS (the body
|
||||
# processor applies to all rules, not only CRS) and because it may lead to
|
||||
# false positives already on paranoia level 1. However, enabling this variable
|
||||
# closes a possible bypass of CRS so it should be considered.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900010,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded=1"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Severity Levels ]] ----------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level.
|
||||
# These are the default scoring points for each severity level.
|
||||
# These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches.
|
||||
# You may adjust these points to your liking, but this is usually not needed.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - CRITICAL severity: Anomaly Score of 5.
|
||||
# Mostly generated by the application attack rules (93x and 94x files).
|
||||
# - ERROR severity: Anomaly Score of 4.
|
||||
# Generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (95x files).
|
||||
# - WARNING severity: Anomaly Score of 3.
|
||||
# Generated mostly by malicious client rules (91x files).
|
||||
# - NOTICE severity: Anomaly Score of 2.
|
||||
# Generated mostly by the protocol rules (92x files).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# In anomaly mode, these scores are cumulative.
|
||||
# So it's possible for a request to hit multiple rules.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# (Note: In this file, we use 'phase:1' to set CRS configuration variables.
|
||||
# In general, 'phase:request' is used. However, we want to make absolutely sure
|
||||
# that all configuration variables are set before the CRS rules are processed.)
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900100,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Blocking Threshold Levels ]] ------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Here, you can specify at which cumulative anomaly score an inbound request,
|
||||
# or outbound response, gets blocked.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Most detected inbound threats will give a critical score of 5.
|
||||
# Smaller violations, like violations of protocol/standards, carry lower scores.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ At default value ]
|
||||
# If you keep the blocking thresholds at the defaults, the CRS will work
|
||||
# similarly to previous CRS versions: a single critical rule match will cause
|
||||
# the request to be blocked and logged.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Using higher values ]
|
||||
# If you want to make the CRS less sensitive, you can increase the blocking
|
||||
# thresholds, for instance to 7 (which would require multiple rule matches
|
||||
# before blocking) or 10 (which would require at least two critical alerts - or
|
||||
# a combination of many lesser alerts), or even higher. However, increasing the
|
||||
# thresholds might cause some attacks to bypass the CRS rules or your policies.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ New deployment strategy: Starting high and decreasing ]
|
||||
# It is a common practice to start a fresh CRS installation with elevated
|
||||
# anomaly scoring thresholds (>100) and then lower the limits as your
|
||||
# confidence in the setup grows. You may also look into the Sampling
|
||||
# Percentage section below for a different strategy to ease into a new
|
||||
# CRS installation.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Anomaly Threshold / Paranoia Level Quadrant ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# High Anomaly Limit | High Anomaly Limit
|
||||
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
|
||||
# -> Fresh Site | -> Experimental Site
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Low Anomaly Limit | Low Anomaly Limit
|
||||
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
|
||||
# -> Standard Site | -> High Security Site
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the defaults:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900110,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Application Specific Rule Exclusions ]] ----------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some well-known applications may undertake actions that appear to be
|
||||
# malicious. This includes actions such as allowing HTML or Javascript within
|
||||
# parameters. In such cases the CRS aims to prevent false positives by allowing
|
||||
# administrators to enable prebuilt, application specific exclusions on an
|
||||
# application by application basis.
|
||||
# These application specific exclusions are distinct from the rules that would
|
||||
# be placed in the REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS configuration file as
|
||||
# they are prebuilt for specific applications. The 'REQUEST-900' file is
|
||||
# designed for users to add their own custom exclusions. Note, using these
|
||||
# application specific exclusions may loosen restrictions of the CRS,
|
||||
# especially if used with an application they weren't designed for. As a result
|
||||
# they should be applied with care.
|
||||
# To use this functionality you must specify a supported application. To do so
|
||||
# uncomment rule 900130. In addition to uncommenting the rule you will need to
|
||||
# specify which application(s) you'd like to enable exclusions for. Only a
|
||||
# (very) limited set of applications are currently supported, please use the
|
||||
# filenames prefixed with 'REQUEST-903' to guide you in your selection.
|
||||
# Such filenames use the following convention:
|
||||
# REQUEST-903.9XXX-{APPNAME}-EXCLUSIONS-RULES.conf
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It is recommended if you run multiple web applications on your site to limit
|
||||
# the effects of the exclusion to only the path where the excluded webapp
|
||||
# resides using a rule similar to the following example:
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /wordpress/" setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Modify and uncomment this rule to select which application:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900130,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_cpanel=1,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_drupal=1,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_dokuwiki=1,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_nextcloud=1,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_xenforo=1"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ HTTP Policy Settings ]] ------------------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This section defines your policies for the HTTP protocol, such as:
|
||||
# - allowed HTTP versions, HTTP methods, allowed request Content-Types
|
||||
# - forbidden file extensions (e.g. .bak, .sql) and request headers (e.g. Proxy)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# These variables are used in the following rule files:
|
||||
# - REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
|
||||
# - REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf
|
||||
# - REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
|
||||
|
||||
# HTTP methods that a client is allowed to use.
|
||||
# Default: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|
||||
# Example: for RESTful APIs, add the following methods: PUT PATCH DELETE
|
||||
# Example: for WebDAV, add the following methods: CHECKOUT COPY DELETE LOCK
|
||||
# MERGE MKACTIVITY MKCOL MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH PUT UNLOCK
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900200,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Content-Types that a client is allowed to send in a request.
|
||||
# Default: application/x-www-form-urlencoded|multipart/form-data|text/xml|\
|
||||
# application/xml|application/soap+xml|application/x-amf|application/json|\
|
||||
# application/octet-stream|application/csp-report|\
|
||||
# application/xss-auditor-report|text/plain
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900220,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded|multipart/form-data|text/xml|application/xml|application/soap+xml|application/x-amf|application/json|application/octet-stream|application/csp-report|application/xss-auditor-report|text/plain'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Allowed HTTP versions.
|
||||
# Default: HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
|
||||
# Example for legacy clients: HTTP/0.9 HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
|
||||
# Note that some web server versions use 'HTTP/2', some 'HTTP/2.0', so
|
||||
# we include both version strings by default.
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900230,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Forbidden file extensions.
|
||||
# Guards against unintended exposure of development/configuration files.
|
||||
# Default: .asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/
|
||||
# Example: .bak/ .config/ .conf/ .db/ .ini/ .log/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .rdb/ .sql/
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900240,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Forbidden request headers.
|
||||
# Header names should be lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
|
||||
# Blocking Proxy header prevents 'httpoxy' vulnerability: https://httpoxy.org
|
||||
# Default: /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /translate/ /if/
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900250,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /translate/ /if/'"
|
||||
|
||||
# File extensions considered static files.
|
||||
# Extensions include the dot, lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
|
||||
# Used in DoS protection rule. See section "Anti-Automation / DoS Protection".
|
||||
# Default: /.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900260,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.static_extensions=/.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Content-Types charsets that a client is allowed to send in a request.
|
||||
# Default: utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
||||
# Use "|" to separate multiple charsets like in the rule defining
|
||||
# tx.allowed_request_content_type.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900280,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset=utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ HTTP Argument/Upload Limits ]] -----------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Here you can define optional limits on HTTP get/post parameters and uploads.
|
||||
# This can help to prevent application specific DoS attacks.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# These values are checked in REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf.
|
||||
# Beware of blocking legitimate traffic when enabling these limits.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Block request if number of arguments is too high
|
||||
# Default: unlimited
|
||||
# Example: 255
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900300,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.max_num_args=255"
|
||||
|
||||
# Block request if the length of any argument name is too high
|
||||
# Default: unlimited
|
||||
# Example: 100
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900310,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100"
|
||||
|
||||
# Block request if the length of any argument value is too high
|
||||
# Default: unlimited
|
||||
# Example: 400
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900320,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.arg_length=400"
|
||||
|
||||
# Block request if the total length of all combined arguments is too high
|
||||
# Default: unlimited
|
||||
# Example: 64000
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900330,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000"
|
||||
|
||||
# Block request if the file size of any individual uploaded file is too high
|
||||
# Default: unlimited
|
||||
# Example: 1048576
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900340,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.max_file_size=1048576"
|
||||
|
||||
# Block request if the total size of all combined uploaded files is too high
|
||||
# Default: unlimited
|
||||
# Example: 1048576
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900350,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=1048576"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]] -------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Adding the Core Rule Set to an existing productive site can lead to false
|
||||
# positives, unexpected performance issues and other undesired side effects.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It can be beneficial to test the water first by enabling the CRS for a
|
||||
# limited number of requests only and then, when you have solved the issues (if
|
||||
# any) and you have confidence in the setup, to raise the ratio of requests
|
||||
# being sent into the ruleset.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Adjust the percentage of requests that are funnelled into the Core Rules by
|
||||
# setting TX.sampling_percentage below. The default is 100, meaning that every
|
||||
# request gets checked by the CRS. The selection of requests, which are going
|
||||
# to be checked, is based on a pseudo random number generated by ModSecurity.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
|
||||
# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
|
||||
# written. If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
|
||||
# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
|
||||
# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 901150 "nolog"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ATTENTION: If this TX.sampling_percentage is below 100, then some of the
|
||||
# requests will bypass the Core Rules completely and you lose the ability to
|
||||
# protect your service with ModSecurity.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to enable this feature:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction "id:900400,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.sampling_percentage=100"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Project Honey Pot HTTP Blacklist ]] ------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Optionally, you can check the client IP address against the Project Honey Pot
|
||||
# HTTPBL (dnsbl.httpbl.org). In order to use this, you need to register to get a
|
||||
# free API key. Set it here with SecHttpBlKey.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Project Honeypot returns multiple different malicious IP types.
|
||||
# You may specify which you want to block by enabling or disabling them below.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Ref: https://www.projecthoneypot.org/httpbl.php
|
||||
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecHttpBlKey
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment these rules to use this feature:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecHttpBlKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
|
||||
#SecAction "id:900500,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.block_search_ip=1,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.block_suspicious_ip=1,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.block_harvester_ip=1,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.block_spammer_ip=1"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ GeoIP Database ]] ------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# There are some rulesets that inspect geolocation data of the client IP address
|
||||
# (geoLookup). The CRS uses geoLookup to implement optional country blocking.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# To use geolocation, we make use of the MaxMind GeoIP database.
|
||||
# This database is not included with the CRS and must be downloaded.
|
||||
# You should also update the database regularly, for instance every month.
|
||||
# The CRS contains a tool to download it to util/geo-location/GeoIP.dat:
|
||||
# util/upgrade.py --geoip
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This product includes GeoLite data created by MaxMind, available from:
|
||||
# http://www.maxmind.com.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/10/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-geolocation-data.html
|
||||
# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-ip-forensics.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecGeoLookupDB util/geo-location/GeoIP.dat
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Block Countries ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rules in the IP Reputation file can check the client against a list of high
|
||||
# risk country codes. These countries have to be defined in the variable
|
||||
# tx.high_risk_country_codes via their ISO 3166 two-letter country code:
|
||||
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2#Officially_assigned_code_elements
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If you are sure that you are not getting any legitimate requests from a given
|
||||
# country, then you can disable all access from that country via this variable.
|
||||
# The rule performing the test has the rule id 910100.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule requires SecGeoLookupDB to be enabled and the GeoIP database to be
|
||||
# downloaded (see the section "GeoIP Database" above.)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# By default, the list is empty. A list used by some sites was the following:
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes=UA ID YU LT EG RO BG TR RU PK MY CN'"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900600,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes='"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Anti-Automation / DoS Protection ]] ------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Optional DoS protection against clients making requests too quickly.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# When a client is making more than 100 requests (excluding static files) within
|
||||
# 60 seconds, this is considered a 'burst'. After two bursts, the client is
|
||||
# blocked for 600 seconds.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Requests to static files are not counted towards DoS; they are listed in the
|
||||
# 'tx.static_extensions' setting, which you can change in this file (see
|
||||
# section "HTTP Policy Settings").
|
||||
#
|
||||
# For a detailed description, see rule file REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900700,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.dos_burst_time_slice=60',\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.dos_counter_threshold=100',\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.dos_block_timeout=600'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Check UTF-8 encoding ]] ------------------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The CRS can optionally check request contents for invalid UTF-8 encoding.
|
||||
# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the
|
||||
# site; otherwise it will result in false positives.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900950,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Blocking Based on IP Reputation ]] ------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Blocking based on reputation is permanent in the CRS. Unlike other rules,
|
||||
# which look at the indvidual request, the blocking of IPs is based on
|
||||
# a persistent record in the IP collection, which remains active for a
|
||||
# certain amount of time.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# There are two ways an individual client can become flagged for blocking:
|
||||
# - External information (RBL, GeoIP, etc.)
|
||||
# - Internal information (Core Rules)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The record in the IP collection carries a flag, which tags requests from
|
||||
# individual clients with a flag named IP.reput_block_flag.
|
||||
# But the flag alone is not enough to have a client blocked. There is also
|
||||
# a global switch named tx.do_reput_block. This is off by default. If you set
|
||||
# it to 1 (=On), requests from clients with the IP.reput_block_flag will
|
||||
# be blocked for a certain duration.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Variables
|
||||
# ip.reput_block_flag Blocking flag for the IP collection record
|
||||
# ip.reput_block_reason Reason (= rule message) that caused to blocking flag
|
||||
# tx.do_reput_block Switch deciding if we really block based on flag
|
||||
# tx.reput_block_duration Setting to define the duration of a block
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It may be important to know, that all the other core rules are skipped for
|
||||
# requests, when it is clear that they carry the blocking flag in question.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900960,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.do_reput_block=1"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uncomment this rule to change the blocking time:
|
||||
# Default: 300 (5 minutes)
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecAction \
|
||||
# "id:900970,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# setvar:tx.reput_block_duration=300"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ Collection timeout ]] --------------------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Set the SecCollectionTimeout directive from the ModSecurity default (1 hour)
|
||||
# to a lower setting which is appropriate to most sites.
|
||||
# This increases performance by cleaning out stale collection (block) entries.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This value should be greater than or equal to:
|
||||
# tx.reput_block_duration (see section "Blocking Based on IP Reputation") and
|
||||
# tx.dos_block_timeout (see section "Anti-Automation / DoS Protection").
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecCollectionTimeout
|
||||
|
||||
# Please keep this directive uncommented.
|
||||
# Default: 600 (10 minutes)
|
||||
SecCollectionTimeout 600
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -- [[ End of setup ]] --------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
|
||||
# has been loaded. If you are not planning to use this setup template,
|
||||
# you must manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
|
||||
# the CRS rules/* files.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
|
||||
# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecAction \
|
||||
"id:900990,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
setvar:tx.crs_setup_version=320"
|
||||
@@ -1,165 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The purpose of this file is to hold LOCAL exceptions for your site. The
|
||||
# types of rules that would go into this file are one where you want to
|
||||
# short-circuit inspection and allow certain transactions to pass through
|
||||
# inspection or if you want to alter rules that are applied.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This file is named REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS.conf.example for a
|
||||
# very specific reason. Files affixed with the .example extension are designed
|
||||
# to contain user created/modified data. The '.example'. extension should be
|
||||
# renamed to end in .conf. The advantage of this is that when OWASP CRS is
|
||||
# updated, the updates will not overwrite a user generated configuration file.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# As a result of this design paradigm users are encouraged NOT to directly
|
||||
# modify rules. Instead they should use this
|
||||
# REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS and the
|
||||
# RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS file to modify OWASP rules using
|
||||
# methods similar to the examples specified below.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS and
|
||||
# RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS serve different purposes. ModSecurity
|
||||
# effectively maintains two different context: startup, and per transaction.
|
||||
# As a rule, directives are processed within the startup context. While they
|
||||
# can affect the per transaction context they generally remain fixed during the
|
||||
# execution of ModSecurity.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# As a result if one wanted to disable a rule at bootup the SecRuleRemoveById
|
||||
# directive or one of its siblings would have to be placed AFTER the rule is
|
||||
# listed, otherwise it will not have knowledge of the rules existence (since
|
||||
# these rules are read in at the same time). This means that when using
|
||||
# directives that effect SecRules, these exceptions should be placed AFTER all
|
||||
# the existing rules. This is why RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS is
|
||||
# designed such that it loads LAST.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Conversely, ModSecurity supports several actions that can change the state of
|
||||
# the underlying configuration during the per transaction context, this is when
|
||||
# rules are being processed. Generally, these are accomplished by using the
|
||||
# 'ctl' action. As these are part of a rule, they will be evaluated in the
|
||||
# order rules are applied (by physical location, considering phases). As a
|
||||
# result of this ordering a 'ctl' action should be placed with consideration to
|
||||
# when it will be executed. This is particularly relevant for the 'ctl' options
|
||||
# that involve modifying ID's (such as ruleRemoveById). In these cases it is
|
||||
# important that such rules are placed BEFORE the rule ID they will affect.
|
||||
# Unlike the setup context, by the time we process rules in the per-transaction
|
||||
# context, we are already aware of all the rule ID's. It is by this logic that
|
||||
# we include rules such as this BEFORE all the remaining rules. As a result
|
||||
# REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS is designed to load FIRST.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# As a general rule:
|
||||
# ctl:ruleEngine -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveById -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveByMsg -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveByTag -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByMsg -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecRuleRemoveById -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
|
||||
# SecRuleRemoveByMsg -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
|
||||
# SecRuleRemoveByTag -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
|
||||
# SecRuleUpdateActionById -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
|
||||
# SecRuleUpdateTargetById -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
|
||||
# SecRuleUpdateTargetByMsg -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
|
||||
# SecRuleUpdateTargetByTag -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# What follows are a group of examples that show you how to perform rule
|
||||
# exclusions.
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Example Exclusion Rule: Disable inspection for an authorized client
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This ruleset allows you to control how ModSecurity will handle traffic
|
||||
# originating from Authorized Vulnerability Scanning (AVS) sources. See
|
||||
# related blog post -
|
||||
# http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/12/advanced-topic-of-the-week-handling-authorized-scanning-traffic.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
# White-list ASV network block (no blocking or logging of AVS traffic) Update
|
||||
# IP network block as appropriate for your AVS traffic
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ModSec Rule Exclusion: Disable Rule Engine for known ASV IP
|
||||
# SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.1.100" \
|
||||
# "id:1000,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# ctl:ruleEngine=Off"
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Example Exclusion Rule: Removing a specific ARGS parameter from inspection
|
||||
# for an individual rule
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule shows how to conditionally exclude the "password"
|
||||
# parameter for rule 942100 when the REQUEST_URI is /index.php
|
||||
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: 942100 SQL Injection Detected via libinjection
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /index.php" \
|
||||
# "id:1001,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;ARGS:password"
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Example Exclusion Rule: Removing a specific ARGS parameter from inspection
|
||||
# for only certain attacks
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Attack rules within the CRS are tagged, with tags such as 'attack-lfi',
|
||||
# 'attack-sqli', 'attack-xss', 'attack-injection-php', et cetera.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: Disable inspection of ARGS:pwd
|
||||
# for all rules tagged attack-sqli
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-login.php" \
|
||||
# "id:1002,\
|
||||
# phase:2,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-sqli;ARGS:pwd"
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Example Exclusion Rule: Removing a specific ARGS parameter from inspection
|
||||
# for all CRS rules
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule illustrates that we can use tagging very effectively to whitelist a
|
||||
# common false positive across an entire ModSecurity instance. This can be done
|
||||
# because every rule in OWASP_CRS is tagged with OWASP_CRS. This will NOT
|
||||
# affect custom rules.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: Disable inspection of ARGS:pwd
|
||||
# for all CRS rules
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-login.php" \
|
||||
# "id:1003,\
|
||||
# phase:2,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pwd"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Example Exclusion Rule: Removing a range of rules
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule illustrates that we can remove a rule range via a ctl action.
|
||||
# This uses the fact, that rules are grouped by topic in rule files covering
|
||||
# a certain id range.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: Disable all SQLi and XSS rules
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /admin" \
|
||||
# "id:1004,\
|
||||
# phase:2,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=941000-942999"
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The application specific rule exclusion files
|
||||
# REQUEST-903.9001-DRUPAL-EXCLUSION-RULES.conf
|
||||
# REQUEST-903.9002-WORDPRESS-EXCLUSION-RULES.conf
|
||||
# bring additional examples which can be useful then tuning a service.
|
||||
@@ -1,423 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This file REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf initializes the Core Rules
|
||||
# and performs preparatory actions. It also fixes errors and omissions
|
||||
# of variable definitions in the file crs-setup.conf.
|
||||
# The setup.conf can and should be edited by the user, this file
|
||||
# is part of the CRS installation and should not be altered.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Rules Version ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule version data is added to the "Producer" line of Section H of the Audit log:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Producer: ModSecurity for Apache/2.9.1 (http://www.modsecurity.org/); OWASP_CRS/3.1.0.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecComponentSignature
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecComponentSignature "OWASP_CRS/3.2.0"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Default setup values ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
|
||||
# file is included at the correct time. This detects situations where
|
||||
# necessary settings are not defined, for instance if the file
|
||||
# inclusion order is incorrect, or if the user has forgotten to
|
||||
# include the crs-setup.conf file.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If you are upgrading from an earlier version of the CRS and you are
|
||||
# getting this error, please make a new copy of the setup template
|
||||
# crs-setup.conf.example to crs-setup.conf, and re-apply your policy
|
||||
# changes. There have been many changes in settings syntax from CRS2
|
||||
# to CRS3, so an old setup file may cause unwanted behavior.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If you are not planning to use the crs-setup.conf template, you must
|
||||
# manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
|
||||
# the CRS rules/* files.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
|
||||
# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_setup_version "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901001,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
deny,\
|
||||
status:500,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
auditlog,\
|
||||
msg:'ModSecurity Core Rule Set is deployed without configuration! Please copy the crs-setup.conf.example template to crs-setup.conf, and include the crs-setup.conf file in your webserver configuration before including the CRS rules. See the INSTALL file in the CRS directory for detailed instructions.',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Default setup values ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some constructs or individual rules will fail if certain parameters
|
||||
# are not set in the setup.conf file. The following rules will catch
|
||||
# these cases and assign sane default values.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Default Inbound Anomaly Threshold Level (rule 900110 in setup.conf)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:inbound_anomaly_score_threshold "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901100,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default Outbound Anomaly Threshold Level (rule 900110 in setup.conf)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:outbound_anomaly_score_threshold "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901110,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default Paranoia Level (rule 900000 in setup.conf)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:paranoia_level "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901120,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.paranoia_level=1'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default Executing Paranoia Level (rule 900000 in setup.conf)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:executing_paranoia_level "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901125,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.executing_paranoia_level=%{TX.PARANOIA_LEVEL}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default Sampling Percentage (rule 900400 in setup.conf)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:sampling_percentage "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901130,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.sampling_percentage=100'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default Anomaly Scores (rule 900100 in setup.conf)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:critical_anomaly_score "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901140,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.critical_anomaly_score=5'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:error_anomaly_score "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901141,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.error_anomaly_score=4'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:warning_anomaly_score "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901142,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.warning_anomaly_score=3'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:notice_anomaly_score "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901143,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.notice_anomaly_score=2'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default do_reput_block
|
||||
SecRule &TX:do_reput_block "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901150,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.do_reput_block=0'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default block duration
|
||||
SecRule &TX:reput_block_duration "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901152,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.reput_block_duration=300'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default HTTP policy: allowed_methods (rule 900200)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:allowed_methods "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901160,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default HTTP policy: allowed_request_content_type (rule 900220)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:allowed_request_content_type "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901162,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=application/x-www-form-urlencoded|multipart/form-data|text/xml|application/xml|application/soap+xml|application/x-amf|application/json|application/octet-stream|application/csp-report|application/xss-auditor-report|text/plain'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default HTTP policy: allowed_request_content_type_charset (rule 900270)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:allowed_request_content_type_charset "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901168,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset=utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default HTTP policy: allowed_http_versions (rule 900230)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:allowed_http_versions "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901163,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default HTTP policy: restricted_extensions (rule 900240)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:restricted_extensions "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901164,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default HTTP policy: restricted_headers (rule 900250)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:restricted_headers "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901165,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /translate/ /if/'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default HTTP policy: static_extensions (rule 900260)
|
||||
SecRule &TX:static_extensions "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901166,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.static_extensions=/.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default enforcing of body processor URLENCODED
|
||||
SecRule &TX:enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:901167,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded=0'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Initialize internal variables ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Initialize anomaly scoring variables.
|
||||
# All _score variables start at 0, and are incremented by the various rules
|
||||
# upon detection of a possible attack.
|
||||
# sql_error_match is used for shortcutting rules for performance reasons.
|
||||
|
||||
SecAction \
|
||||
"id:901200,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl3=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl4=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rfi_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.session_fixation_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl3=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl4=0',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.sql_error_match=0'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Initialize collections ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Create both Global and IP collections for rules to use.
|
||||
# There are some CRS rules that assume that these two collections
|
||||
# have already been initiated.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@rx ^.*$" \
|
||||
"id:901318,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,t:sha1,t:hexEncode,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.ua_hash=%{MATCHED_VAR}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecAction \
|
||||
"id:901321,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
initcol:global=global,\
|
||||
initcol:ip=%{remote_addr}_%{tx.ua_hash},\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.real_ip=%{remote_addr}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Initialize Correct Body Processing ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Force request body variable and optionally request body processor
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Force body variable
|
||||
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "!@rx (?:URLENCODED|MULTIPART|XML|JSON)" \
|
||||
"id:901340,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
msg:'Enabling body inspection',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
|
||||
ctl:forceRequestBodyVariable=On,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Force body processor URLENCODED
|
||||
SecRule TX:enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:901350,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
msg:'Enabling forced body inspection for ASCII content',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "!@rx (?:URLENCODED|MULTIPART|XML|JSON)" \
|
||||
"ctl:requestBodyProcessor=URLENCODED"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is used to send only a limited percentage of requests into the Core
|
||||
# Rule Set. The selection is based on TX.sampling_percentage and a pseudo
|
||||
# random number calculated below.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Use this to ease into a new Core Rules installation with an existing
|
||||
# productive service.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# See
|
||||
# https://www.netnea.com/cms/2016/04/26/easing-in-conditional-modsecurity-rule-execution-based-on-pseudo-random-numbers/
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Generate the pseudo random number
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ATTENTION: This is no cryptographically secure random number. It's just
|
||||
# a cheap way to get some random number suitable for sampling.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# We take the entropy contained in the UNIQUE_ID. We hash that variable and
|
||||
# take the first integer numbers out of it. Theoretically, it is possible
|
||||
# there are no integers in a sha1 hash. We make sure we get two
|
||||
# integer numbers by taking the last two digits from the DURATION counter
|
||||
# (in microseconds).
|
||||
# Finally, leading zeros are removed from the two-digit random number.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:sampling_percentage "@eq 100" \
|
||||
"id:901400,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-SAMPLING"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule UNIQUE_ID "@rx ^." \
|
||||
"id:901410,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:sha1,t:hexEncode,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'TX.sampling_rnd100=%{MATCHED_VAR}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule DURATION "@rx (..)$" \
|
||||
"id:901420,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'TX.sampling_rnd100=%{TX.sampling_rnd100}%{TX.1}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:sampling_rnd100 "@rx ^[a-f]*([0-9])[a-f]*([0-9])" \
|
||||
"id:901430,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'TX.sampling_rnd100=%{TX.1}%{TX.2}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:sampling_rnd100 "@rx ^0([0-9])" \
|
||||
"id:901440,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'TX.sampling_rnd100=%{TX.1}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Sampling decision
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
|
||||
# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
|
||||
# being written. If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
|
||||
# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
|
||||
# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 901450 "nolog"
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:sampling_rnd100 "!@lt %{tx.sampling_percentage}" \
|
||||
"id:901450,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
msg:'Sampling: Disable the rule engine based on sampling_percentage \
|
||||
%{TX.sampling_percentage} and random number %{TX.sampling_rnd100}.',\
|
||||
ctl:ruleEngine=Off"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-SAMPLING"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Configuration Plausibility Checks
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Make sure executing paranoia level is not lower than paranoia level
|
||||
SecRule TX:executing_paranoia_level "@lt %{tx.paranoia_level}" \
|
||||
"id:901500,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
deny,\
|
||||
status:500,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Executing paranoia level configured is lower than the paranoia level itself. This is illegal. Blocking request. Aborting.'"
|
||||
@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# These exclusions remedy false positives in a default Drupal install.
|
||||
# The exclusions are only active if crs_exclusions_drupal=1 is set.
|
||||
# See rule 900130 in crs-setup.conf.example for instructions.
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ POLICY ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Drupal is a complex application that is hard to secure with the CRS. This set
|
||||
# of exclusion rules aims to sanitise the CRS in a way that allows a default
|
||||
# Drupal setup to be installed and configured without much hassle as far as
|
||||
# ModSecurity and the CRS are concerned.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The exclusion rules are fairly straight forward in the sense that they
|
||||
# disable CRS on a set of well-known parameter fields that are often the source
|
||||
# of false positives / false alarms of the CRS. This includes namely the
|
||||
# session cookie, the password fields and article/node bodies.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is based on two assumptions: - You have a basic trust in your
|
||||
# authenticated users who are allowed to edit nodes. - Drupal allows html
|
||||
# content in nodes and it protects your users from attacks via these fields.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If you think these assumptions are wrong or if you would prefer a more
|
||||
# careful/secure approach, you can disable the exclusion rules handling of said
|
||||
# node body false positives. Do this by placing the following directive in
|
||||
# RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecRuleRemoveById 9001200-9001299
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This will mean the CRS remain intact for the editing of node bodies.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The exclusion rules in this file work without the need to define a Drupal
|
||||
# installation path prefix. Instead they look at the URI from the end - or
|
||||
# they use regular expressions when targeting dynamic URL. This is all not
|
||||
# totally foolproof. In some cases, an advanced attacker might be able to
|
||||
# doctor a request in a way that one of these exclusion rules is triggered
|
||||
# and the request will bypass all further inspection despite not being a
|
||||
# Drupal request at all. These exclusion rules could thus be leveraged to
|
||||
# disable the CRS completely. This is why these rules are off by default.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The CRS rules covered by this ruleset are the rules with Paranoia Level 1 and
|
||||
# 2. If you chose to run Paranoia Level 3 or 4, you will be facing additional
|
||||
# false positives which you need to handle yourself.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This set of exclusion rules does not cover any additional Drupal modules
|
||||
# outside of core.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The exclusion rules are based on Drupal 8.1.10.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# And finally: This set of exclusion rules is in an experimental state. If you
|
||||
# encounter false positives with the basic Drupal functionality and they are
|
||||
# not covered by this rule file, then please report them. The aim is to be able
|
||||
# to install and run Drupal core in a seamless manner protected by
|
||||
# ModSecurity / CRS up to the paranoia level 2.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_drupal|TX:crs_exclusions_drupal "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9001000,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-DRUPAL-RULE-EXCLUSIONS"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Table of Contents ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 9001100 Session Cookie
|
||||
# 9001110 Password
|
||||
# 9001120 FREE for use
|
||||
# 9001130 FREE for use
|
||||
# 9001140 Content and Descriptions
|
||||
# 9001150 FREE for use
|
||||
# 9001160 Form Token
|
||||
# 9001170 Text Formats and Editors
|
||||
# 9001180 WYSIWYG/CKEditor Assets and Upload
|
||||
# 9001190 FREE for use
|
||||
# 9001200 Content and Descriptions
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The rule id range from 9001200 to 9001999 is reserved for future
|
||||
# use (Drupal plugins / modules).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Session Cookie ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Giving the session cookie a dynamic name is most unfortunate
|
||||
# from a ModSecurity perspective. The rule language does not allow
|
||||
# us to disable rules in a granular way for individual cookies with
|
||||
# dynamic names. So we need to disable rule causing false positives
|
||||
# for all cookies and their names.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion Session Cookie: 942450 SQL Hex Encoding Identified
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecAction "id:9001100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942450;REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942450;REQUEST_COOKIES"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Password ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Disable the CRS completely for all occurrences of passwords.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /core/install.php" \
|
||||
"id:9001110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:account[pass][pass1],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:account[pass][pass2]"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /user/login" \
|
||||
"id:9001112,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin/people/create" \
|
||||
"id:9001114,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass[pass1],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass[pass2]"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /user/[0-9]+/edit$" \
|
||||
"id:9001116,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:current_pass,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass[pass1],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass[pass2]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Admin Settings (general) ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Disable known false positives for various fields used on admin pages.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion: 920271 Invalid character in request on multiple fields/paths
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion: 942430 Restricted SQL Character Anomaly Detection (args)
|
||||
# Disabled completely for admin/config pages
|
||||
# For the people/accounts page, we disable the CRS completely for a number of
|
||||
# freeform text fields.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /admin/config/" \
|
||||
"id:9001122,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=942430"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin/config/people/accounts" \
|
||||
"id:9001124,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920271,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=942440,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:user_mail_cancel_confirm_body,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:user_mail_password_reset_body,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:user_mail_register_admin_created_body,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:user_mail_register_no_approval_required_body,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:user_mail_register_pending_approval_body,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:user_mail_status_activated_body,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:user_mail_status_blocked_body,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:user_mail_status_canceled_body"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin/config/development/configuration/single/import" \
|
||||
"id:9001126,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920271,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=942440"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin/config/development/maintenance" \
|
||||
"id:9001128,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=942440"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Content and Descriptions ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Disable known false positives for field "ids[]".
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion: 942130 SQL Injection Attack: SQL Tautology Detected
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /contextual/render" \
|
||||
"id:9001140,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942130;ARGS:ids[]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Form Token / Build ID ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion for form_build_id: 942440 SQL Comment Sequence Detected on ...
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion for form_token: 942450 SQL Hex Encoding
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion for form_build_id: 942450 SQL Hex Encoding
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is applied site-wide.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecAction "id:9001160,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942440;ARGS:form_build_id,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942450;ARGS:form_token,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942450;ARGS:form_build_id"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Text Formats and Editors ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Disable the CRS completely for two fields triggering many, many rules
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion for two fields: 942440 SQL Comment Sequence Detected
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin/config/content/formats/manage/full_html" \
|
||||
"id:9001170,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:editor[settings][toolbar][button_groups],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:filters[filter_html][settings][allowed_html]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ WYSIWYG/CKEditor Assets and Upload ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Disable the unnecessary requestBodyAccess and for binary uploads
|
||||
# bigger than an arbitrary limit of 31486341 bytes.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Extensive checks make sure these uploads are really legitimate.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq POST" \
|
||||
"id:9001180,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /admin/content/assets/add/[a-z]+$" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:/S?SESS[a-f0-9]+/ "@rx ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" \
|
||||
"ctl:requestBodyAccess=Off"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq POST" \
|
||||
"id:9001182,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /admin/content/assets/manage/[0-9]+$" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:destination "@streq admin/content/assets" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "@gt 31486341" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:/S?SESS[a-f0-9]+/ "@rx ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" \
|
||||
"ctl:requestBodyAccess=Off"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq POST" \
|
||||
"id:9001184,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /file/ajax/field_asset_[a-z0-9_]+/[ua]nd/0/form-[a-z0-9A-Z_-]+$" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "@gt 31486341" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx ^(?i)multipart/form-data" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:/S?SESS[a-f0-9]+/ "@rx ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" \
|
||||
"ctl:requestBodyAccess=Off"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Content and Descriptions ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Disable the CRS completely for node bodies and other free text fields.
|
||||
# Other rules are disabled individually.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion for ARGS:uid[0][target_id]: 942410 SQL Injection Attack
|
||||
# Rule Exclusion for ARGS:destination: 932110 RCE: Windows Command Inj.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /node/add/article" \
|
||||
"id:9001200,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:body[0][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942410;ARGS:uid[0][target_id]"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /node/add/page" \
|
||||
"id:9001202,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:body[0][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942410;ARGS:uid[0][target_id]"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /node/[0-9]+/edit$" \
|
||||
"id:9001204,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:body[0][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942410;ARGS:uid[0][target_id],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932110;ARGS:destination"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /block/add" \
|
||||
"id:9001206,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:body[0][value]"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin/structure/block/block-content/manage/basic" \
|
||||
"id:9001208,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:description"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /editor/filter_xss/(?:full|basic)_html$" \
|
||||
"id:9001210,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:value"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /user/[0-9]+/contact$" \
|
||||
"id:9001212,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message[0][value]"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin/config/development/maintenance" \
|
||||
"id:9001214,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:maintenance_mode_message"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin/config/services/rss-publishing" \
|
||||
"id:9001216,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:feed_description"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-DRUPAL-RULE-EXCLUSIONS"
|
||||
@@ -1,683 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# These exclusions remedy false positives in a default WordPress install.
|
||||
# The exclusions are only active if crs_exclusions_wordpress=1 is set.
|
||||
# See rule 900130 in crs-setup.conf.example for instructions.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Note that the WordPress comment field itself is currently NOT excluded
|
||||
# from checking. The reason is that malicious content is regularly being
|
||||
# posted to WordPress comment forms, and there have been various cases
|
||||
# of XSS and even RCE vulnerabilities exploited by WordPress comments.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_wordpress|TX:crs_exclusions_wordpress "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9002000,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-WORDPRESS"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_wordpress|TX:crs_exclusions_wordpress "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9002001,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-WORDPRESS"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ WordPress Front-End ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Login form ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# User login password
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-login.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pwd"
|
||||
|
||||
# Reset password
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-login.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq resetpass" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1-text,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass2"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Comments ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Post comment
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-comments-post.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:url"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Gutenberg Editor ]
|
||||
# Used when a user (auto)saves a post/page with Gutenberg.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Gutenberg
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx ^/wp\-json/wp/v[0-9]+/(?:posts|pages)" \
|
||||
"id:9002140,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:content,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:json.content"
|
||||
|
||||
# Gutenberg via rest_route for sites without pretty permalinks
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /index.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002141,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:rest_route "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:rest_route "@rx ^/wp/v[0-9]+/(?:posts|pages)" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:content,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:json.content"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Live preview ]
|
||||
# Used when an administrator customizes the site and previews the result
|
||||
# as a normal user.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Theme select
|
||||
# Example: wp_customize=on&theme=twentyfifteen&customized=
|
||||
# {"old_sidebars_widgets_data":{"wp_inactive_widgets":[],
|
||||
# "sidebar-1":["search-2","recent-posts-2","recent-comments-2",
|
||||
# "archives-2","categories-2","meta-2"]}}&nonce=XXX&
|
||||
# customize_messenger_channel=preview-0
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:wp_customize "@streq on" \
|
||||
"id:9002150,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942300;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942330;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942460;ARGS:customized"
|
||||
|
||||
# Appearance -> Widgets -> Live Preview
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:wp_customize "@streq on" \
|
||||
"id:9002160,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@rx ^(?:|customize_save|update-widget)$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942300;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942330;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942460;ARGS:customized,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920230;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941320;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942180;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942330;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:partials,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942460;ARGS:partials"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Self calls to wp-cron.php?doing_wp_cron=[timestamp]
|
||||
# These requests may be missing Accept, Content-Length headers.
|
||||
# This rule must run in phase:1.
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-cron.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002200,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920180,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920300"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Cookies ]
|
||||
|
||||
# WP Session Manager
|
||||
# Cookie: _wp_session=[hex]||[timestamp]||[timestamp]
|
||||
# detected SQLi using libinjection with fingerprint 'n&1'
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:_wp_session "@rx ^[0-9a-f]+\|\|\d+\|\|\d+$" \
|
||||
"id:9002300,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &REQUEST_COOKIES:_wp_session "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;REQUEST_COOKIES:_wp_session"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ WordPress Administration Back-End (wp-admin) ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Skip this section for performance unless /wp-admin/ is in filename
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "!@contains /wp-admin/" \
|
||||
"id:9002400,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-WORDPRESS-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "!@contains /wp-admin/" \
|
||||
"id:9002401,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-WORDPRESS-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Installation ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# WordPress installation: exclude database password
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/setup-config.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002410,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:step "@streq 2" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:step "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pwd"
|
||||
|
||||
# WordPress installation: exclude admin password
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/install.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002420,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:step "@streq 2" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:step "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:admin_password,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:admin_password2,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1-text"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ User management ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Edit logged-in user
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/profile.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002520,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq update" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:url,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:facebook,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:googleplus,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:instagram,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:linkedin,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1-text,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Edit user
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/user-edit.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002530,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq update" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:url,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1-text,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Create user
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/user-new.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002540,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq createuser" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:url,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1-text,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass2"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ General exclusions ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# _wp_http_referer and wp_http_referer are passed on a lot of wp-admin pages
|
||||
SecAction \
|
||||
"id:9002600,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920230;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932150;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941100;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942130;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942440;ARGS:_wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920230;ARGS:wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932150;ARGS:wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941100;ARGS:wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942130;ARGS:wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:wp_http_referer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:wp_http_referer"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Content editing ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Edit posts and pages
|
||||
# /wp-admin/post.php, /wp-admin/post.php?t=[timestamp]
|
||||
# - Themes do not properly escape post_title in HTML, so beware of XSS
|
||||
# and be conservative in excluding this parameter.
|
||||
# - Parameter _wp_http_referer can appear multiple times.
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/post.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002700,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@rx ^(?:edit|editpost)$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-sqli;ARGS:post_title,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:content,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920272,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=921180"
|
||||
|
||||
# Autosave posts and pages
|
||||
# ARGS_NAMES:data[wp-check-locked-posts][] can appear multiple times
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002710,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq heartbeat" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-sqli;ARGS:data[wp_autosave][post_title],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:data[wp_autosave][content],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS_NAMES:data[wp-refresh-post-lock][post_id],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS_NAMES:data[wp-refresh-post-lock][lock],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS_NAMES:data[wp-check-locked-posts][],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=921180,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920272"
|
||||
|
||||
# Edit menus
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/nav-menus.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002720,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq update" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942460;ARGS:menu-name,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941330;ARGS:nav-menu-data,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941340;ARGS:nav-menu-data,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:nav-menu-data,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:nav-menu-data,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942330;ARGS:nav-menu-data,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:nav-menu-data,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:nav-menu-data,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:nav-menu-data,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942460;ARGS:nav-menu-data"
|
||||
|
||||
# Edit text widgets (can contain custom HTML)
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002730,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@rx ^(?:save-widget|update-widget)$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[0][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[1][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[2][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[3][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[4][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[5][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[6][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[7][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[8][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[9][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[10][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[11][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[12][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[13][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[14][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[15][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[16][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[17][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[18][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[19][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[20][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[21][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[22][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[23][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[24][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[25][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[26][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[27][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[28][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[29][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[30][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[31][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[32][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[33][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[34][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[35][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[36][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[37][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[38][text],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:widget-text[39][text]"
|
||||
|
||||
# Reorder widgets
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002740,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq widgets-order" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-1],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-1],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-2],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-2],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-3],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-3],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-4],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-4],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-5],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-5],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-6],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-6],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-7],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:sidebars[sidebar-7]"
|
||||
|
||||
# Create permalink sample for new post
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002750,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq sample-permalink" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-sqli;ARGS:new_title"
|
||||
|
||||
# Add external link to menu
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002760,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq add-menu-item" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:menu-item[-1][menu-item-url]"
|
||||
|
||||
# Editor: Add Media, Insert Media, Insert into page
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002770,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq send-attachment-to-editor" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:html"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Options and Settings ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Change site URL
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/options.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002800,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:option_page "@streq general" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:option_page "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq update" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:home,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:siteurl"
|
||||
|
||||
# Permalink settings
|
||||
# permalink_structure=/index.php/%year%/%monthnum%/%day%/%postname%/
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/options-permalink.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002810,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920230;ARGS:selection,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920272;ARGS:selection,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:selection,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920230;ARGS:permalink_structure,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920272;ARGS:permalink_structure,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:permalink_structure,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920272;REQUEST_BODY"
|
||||
|
||||
# Comments blacklist and moderation list
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/options.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002820,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:option_page "@streq discussion" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:option_page "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq update" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:blacklist_keys,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:moderation_keys"
|
||||
|
||||
# Posts/pages overview search
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-admin/edit.php" \
|
||||
"id:9002830,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:s"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Helpers ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# /wp-admin/load-scripts.php?c=0&load%5B%5D=hoverIntent,common,
|
||||
# admin-bar,wp-ajax-response,jquery-color,wp-lists,quicktags,
|
||||
# jquery-query,admin-comments,svg-painter,heartbeat,&load%5B%5D=
|
||||
# wp-auth-check,wp-a11y,wplink,jquery-ui-core,jquery-ui-widget,
|
||||
# jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-autocomplete&ver=4.6.1
|
||||
#
|
||||
# /wp-admin/load-styles.php?c=0&dir=ltr&load%5B%5D=dashicons,
|
||||
# admin-bar,buttons,media-views,common,forms,admin-menu,dashboard,
|
||||
# list-tables,edit,revisions,media,themes,about,nav-menu&load%5B%5D=
|
||||
# s,widgets,site-icon,l10n,wp-auth-check&ver=4.6.1
|
||||
#
|
||||
# /wp-admin/load-scripts.php?c=0&load%5B%5D=hoverIntent,common,
|
||||
# admin-bar,jquery-ui-widget,jquery-ui-position,wp-pointer,
|
||||
# wp-ajax-response,jquery-color,wp-lists,quicktags,
|
||||
# jqu&load%5B%5D=ery-query,admin-comments,jquery-ui-core,
|
||||
# jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-sortable,postbox,dashboard,underscore,
|
||||
# customize-base,customize&load%5B%5D=-loader,thickbox,plugin-install,
|
||||
# wp-util,wp-a11y,updates,shortcode,media-upload,svg-painter,
|
||||
# jquery-ui-accordion&ver=3f9999390861a0133beda3ee8acf152e
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /wp-admin/load-(?:scripts|styles)\.php$" \
|
||||
"id:9002900,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=921180,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920273;ARGS_NAMES:load[],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942432;ARGS_NAMES:load[],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942360;ARGS:load[],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:load[],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942431;ARGS:load[],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942432;ARGS:load[]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-WORDPRESS-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-WORDPRESS"
|
||||
@@ -1,355 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# These exclusions remedy false positives in a default NextCloud install.
|
||||
# They will likely work with OwnCloud too, but you may have to modify them.
|
||||
# The exclusions are only active if crs_exclusions_nextcloud=1 is set.
|
||||
# See rule 900130 in crs-setup.conf.example for instructions.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# To relax upload restrictions for only the php files that need it,
|
||||
# you put something like this in crs-setup.conf:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /(?:remote.php|index.php)/" \
|
||||
# "id:9003330,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# pass,\
|
||||
# tx.restricted_extensions='.bak/ .config/ .conf/'"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Large uploads can be modified with SecRequestBodyLimit. Or they
|
||||
# can be more controlled by using the following:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@endsWith /index.php/apps/files/ajax/upload.php" \
|
||||
# "id:9003610,\
|
||||
# phase:1,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# nolog,\
|
||||
# ctl:requestBodyLimit=1073741824"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ---------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_nextcloud|TX:crs_exclusions_nextcloud "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9003000,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-NEXTCLOUD"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_nextcloud|TX:crs_exclusions_nextcloud "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9003001,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-NEXTCLOUD"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ File Manager ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The web interface uploads files, and interacts with the user.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /remote.php/webdav" \
|
||||
"id:9003100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveByTag=attack-injection-php,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=941000-942999,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=951000-951999,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=953100-953130,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920420,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920440"
|
||||
|
||||
# Skip PUT parsing for invalid encoding / protocol violations in binary files.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq PUT" \
|
||||
"id:9003105,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /remote.php/webdav" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920000-920999,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=932000-932999,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=921150,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=930110,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=930120"
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow the data type 'text/vcard'
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /remote.php/dav/files/" \
|
||||
"id:9003110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=%{tx.allowed_request_content_type}|text/vcard'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow the data type 'application/octet-stream'
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@rx ^(?:PUT|MOVE)$" \
|
||||
"id:9003115,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /remote\.php/dav/(?:files|uploads)/" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=%{tx.allowed_request_content_type}|application/octet-stream'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow data types like video/mp4
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq PUT" \
|
||||
"id:9003116,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx (?:/public\.php/webdav/|/remote\.php/dav/uploads/)" \
|
||||
"ctl:ruleRemoveById=920340,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920420"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow characters like /../ in files.
|
||||
# Allow all kind of filetypes.
|
||||
# Allow source code.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /remote.php/dav/files/" \
|
||||
"id:9003120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=930100-930110,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=951000-951999,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=953100-953130,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920440"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Searchengine ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NexCloud uses a search field for filename or content queries.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /index.php/core/search" \
|
||||
"id:9003125,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-injection-php;ARGS:query,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941000-942999;ARGS:query,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932000-932999;ARGS:query"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ DAV ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NextCloud uses DAV methods with index.php and remote.php to do many things
|
||||
# The default ones in ModSecurity are: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Looking through the code, and via testing, I found these:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# File manager: PUT DELETE MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH
|
||||
# Calendars: REPORT
|
||||
# Others in the code or js files: PATCH MKCOL MOVE TRACE
|
||||
# Others that I added just in case, and they seem related:
|
||||
# CHECKOUT COPY LOCK MERGE MKACTIVITY UNLOCK.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /(?:remote|index|public)\.php/" \
|
||||
"id:9003130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=%{tx.allowed_methods} PUT PATCH CHECKOUT COPY DELETE LOCK MERGE MKACTIVITY MKCOL MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH UNLOCK REPORT TRACE jsonp'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# We need to allow DAV methods for sharing files, and removing shares
|
||||
# DELETE - when the share is removed
|
||||
# PUT - when setting a password / expiration time
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /ocs/v[0-9]+\.php/apps/files_sharing/" \
|
||||
"id:9003140,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=%{tx.allowed_methods} PUT DELETE'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Preview and Thumbnails ]
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /index.php/core/preview.png" \
|
||||
"id:9003150,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932150;ARGS:file"
|
||||
|
||||
# Filepreview for trashbin
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /index.php/apps/files_trashbin/ajax/preview.php" \
|
||||
"id:9003155,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932150;ARGS:file,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942190;ARGS:file"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /index\.php/(?:apps/gallery/thumbnails|logout$)" \
|
||||
"id:9003160,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941120;ARGS:requesttoken"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Ownnote ]
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /index.php/apps/ownnote/" \
|
||||
"id:9003300,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=941150"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Text Editor ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This file can save anything, and it's name could be lots of things.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /index.php/apps/files_texteditor/" \
|
||||
"id:9003310,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:filecontents,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=921110-921160;ARGS:filecontents,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=932150;ARGS:filename,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920370-920390;ARGS:filecontents,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920370-920390;ARGS_COMBINED_SIZE"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Address Book ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Allow the data type 'text/vcard'
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /remote.php/dav/addressbooks/" \
|
||||
"id:9003320,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=%{tx.allowed_request_content_type}|text/vcard'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Calendar ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Allow the data type 'text/calendar'
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /remote.php/dav/calendars/" \
|
||||
"id:9003330,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=%{tx.allowed_request_content_type}|text/calendar'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Notes ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# We want to allow a lot of things as the user is
|
||||
# allowed to note on anything.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /index.php/apps/notes/" \
|
||||
"id:9003340,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveByTag=attack-injection-php"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Bookmarks ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Allow urls in data.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /index.php/apps/bookmarks/" \
|
||||
"id:9003350,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=931130"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Login forms ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# This removes checks on the 'password' and related fields:
|
||||
|
||||
# User login password.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@contains /index.php/login" \
|
||||
"id:9003400,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941100;ARGS:requesttoken,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:password"
|
||||
|
||||
# Reset password.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /index.php/login" \
|
||||
"id:9003410,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:action "@streq resetpass" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:action "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1-text,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass2"
|
||||
|
||||
# Change Password and Setting up a new user/password
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /index.php/settings/users" \
|
||||
"id:9003500,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:newuserpassword,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:password"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-NEXTCLOUD-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-NEXTCLOUD"
|
||||
@@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# These exclusions remedy false positives in a default Dokuwiki install.
|
||||
# The exclusions are only active if crs_exclusions_dokuwiki=1 is set.
|
||||
# See rule 900130 in crs-setup.conf.example for instructions.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Note, if you want to relax the upload restrictions,
|
||||
# see rule 900240. For Dokuwiki you can limit the exception
|
||||
# to the ajax.php file:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /lib/exe/ajax.php" ...
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_dokuwiki|TX:crs_exclusions_dokuwiki "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9004000,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-DOKUWIKI"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_dokuwiki|TX:crs_exclusions_dokuwiki "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9004001,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-DOKUWIKI"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Dokuwiki Front-End ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Note on files specified:
|
||||
# /doku.php: shows pages, saves, edits, admin
|
||||
# /lib/exe/ajax.php: autosave, uploads
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Allow pages to be edited, and ajax to save drafts.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ARGS 'wikitext', 'suffix', and 'prefix' must allow the same things,
|
||||
# as the page (in part or whole) is passed via 'suffix/prefix' at times.
|
||||
# attack-protocol (921110-921160/920230): Allows odd characters on the page.
|
||||
# CRS: (still need attack-protocol specified.)
|
||||
# attack-injection-php (930000-933999): Allows code on page.
|
||||
# attack-sqli (940000-942999): Allows SQL expressions on page.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Others:
|
||||
# 930100-930110;REQUEST_BODY: if there's a /../ in the text.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ARGS:summary (the text in the 'summary' box on page edits.):
|
||||
# Allowing 930120-930130 lets user save summaries with
|
||||
# system file names. This should not be needed in normal
|
||||
# use. But leaving a note here of how to allow in rule below:
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930120;ARGS:summary
|
||||
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930130;ARGS:summary
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Also, can't specify:
|
||||
# SecRule ARGS:do "@streq edit" \
|
||||
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /lib/exe/ajax.php"\
|
||||
# because at times the do=edit can get dropped, so if we use
|
||||
# above the edit will get blocked when the page is saved.
|
||||
|
||||
# Hint: those using .htaccess rewrites can remove/replace
|
||||
# this first 'SecRule...' line with 'SecAction \' (unsupported).
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx (?:/doku.php|/lib/exe/ajax.php)$" \
|
||||
"id:9004100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq POST" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:/S?DW[a-f0-9]+/ "@rx ^[%a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-protocol;ARGS:wikitext,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:wikitext,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-protocol;ARGS:suffix,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:suffix,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-protocol;ARGS:prefix,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:prefix,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=930100-930110;REQUEST_BODY"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow it to upload files. But check for cookies just to make sure.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /lib/exe/ajax.php" \
|
||||
"id:9004110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq POST" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:/S?DW[a-f0-9]+/ "@rx ^[%a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=%{tx.allowed_request_content_type}|application/octet-stream'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Show the index, even if things like "postgresql" or other things show up.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /doku.php" \
|
||||
"id:9004130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:do "@streq index" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:do "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=951240,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=953110"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Login form ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Turn off checks for password.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /doku.php" \
|
||||
"id:9004200,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:do "@streq login" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:do "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:p"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Admin Area ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Skip this section for performance unless do=admin is in request
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:do "!@streq admin" \
|
||||
"id:9004300,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-DOKUWIKI-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:do "!@streq admin" \
|
||||
"id:9004310,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-DOKUWIKI-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Reset password ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Turn off checks for pass1, pass1-text, pass2
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /doku.php" \
|
||||
"id:9004320,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:do "@streq login" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:do "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass1-text,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pass2"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Save config ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Allow the config to be saved:
|
||||
# 942200: If the user adds "..." to tagline: ARGS:config[tagline]
|
||||
# 942430: if ARGS:config[hidepages] has pages looking like sql statements
|
||||
# 942430,942440: "--- //[[@MAIL@|@NAME@]] @DATE@//"]" in ARGS:config[signature]
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /doku.php" \
|
||||
"id:9004370,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:page "@streq config" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:page "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq POST" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:/S?DW[a-f0-9]+/ "@rx ^[%a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=920230;ARGS:config[dformat],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:config[tagline],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430;ARGS:config[hidepages],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942430-942440;ARGS:config[signature]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# When the config loads after a save, it gets blocked because
|
||||
# it has 'readdir' and lines that look like sql
|
||||
# 942430,942440: "--- //[[@MAIL@|@NAME@]] @DATE@//"]" in ARGS:config[signature]
|
||||
# 951240,953110: When the page reloads, it triggers
|
||||
# postgress and php code disclosure rules.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /doku.php" \
|
||||
"id:9004380,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
noauditlog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS:page "@streq config" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS:page "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES:/S?DW[a-f0-9]+/ "@rx ^[%a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=951240,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=953110"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# End [ Admin Area ]
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-DOKUWIKI-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-DOKUWIKI"
|
||||
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# These exclusions remedy false positives in a default cPanel environment.
|
||||
# The exclusions are only active if crs_exclusions_cpanel=1 is set.
|
||||
# See rule 900130 in crs-setup.conf.example for instructions.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_cpanel|TX:crs_exclusions_cpanel "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9005000,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-CPANEL"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_cpanel|TX:crs_exclusions_cpanel "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9005001,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-CPANEL"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ cPanel whm-server-status ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Cpanel's WHM auto generates requests to /whm-server-status from
|
||||
# 127.0.0.1 (triggers rule 920280, non-blocking, log only) Once every 5 minutes.
|
||||
# These false positives have a low impact (logged, non-blocking) to a large number of users (all cPanel admins).
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule to allow cPanel whm-server-status requests from localhost without log entry.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_LINE "@rx ^GET /whm-server-status(?:/|/\?auto)? HTTP/[12]\.[01]$" \
|
||||
"id:9005100,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-apache',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-generic',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 127.0.0.1,::1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920280,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=920350"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-CPANEL"
|
||||
@@ -1,509 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# These exclusions remedy false positives in a default XenForo install.
|
||||
# The exclusions are only active if crs_exclusions_xenforo=1 is set.
|
||||
# See rule 900130 in crs-setup.conf.example for instructions.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_xenforo|TX:crs_exclusions_xenforo "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9006000,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-XENFORO"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:crs_exclusions_xenforo|TX:crs_exclusions_xenforo "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:9006001,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-XENFORO"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XenForo Front-End ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Proxy for images and remote content embedded in forum posts
|
||||
# GET /xf/proxy.php?image=https://example.com/some.jpg&hash=foo
|
||||
# GET /xf/proxy.php?link=https://example.com&hash=foo
|
||||
# POST /xf/proxy.php, body: referrer=...
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /proxy.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006100,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:image,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:link,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:referrer,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942230;ARGS:referrer"
|
||||
|
||||
# Store drafts for private message, forum post, thread reply
|
||||
# POST /xf/conversations/draft
|
||||
# POST /xf/conversations/convo-title.12345/draft
|
||||
# POST /xf/forums/forum-title.12345/draft
|
||||
# POST /xf/threads/thread-title-%E2%98%85.12345/draft
|
||||
#
|
||||
# attachment_hash_combined example:
|
||||
# {"type":"post","context":{"post_id":12345},"hash":"0123456789abcdef..."}
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /(?:conversations|(?:conversations|forums|threads)/.*\.\d+)/draft$" \
|
||||
"id:9006110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:href,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:title,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message_html,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined"
|
||||
|
||||
# Send PM, edit post, create thread, reply to thread
|
||||
# POST /xf/conversations/add
|
||||
# POST /xf/conversations/add-preview
|
||||
# POST /xf/conversations/messages/1463947/edit
|
||||
# POST /xf/posts/12345/edit
|
||||
# POST /xf/posts/12345/preview
|
||||
# POST /xf/conversations/convo-title.12345/add-reply
|
||||
# POST /xf/threads/thread-title.12345/add-reply
|
||||
# POST /xf/threads/thread-title.12345/reply-preview
|
||||
# POST /xf/forums/forum-title.12345/post-thread
|
||||
# POST /xf/forums/forum-title.12345/thread-preview
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /(?:conversations/add(?:-preview)?|conversations/messages/\d+/edit|posts/\d+/(?:edit|preview)|(?:conversations|threads)/.*\.\d+/(?:add-reply|reply-preview)|forums/.*\.\d+/(?:post-thread|thread-preview))$" \
|
||||
"id:9006120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:title,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message_html,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined"
|
||||
|
||||
# Quote
|
||||
# POST /xf/posts/12345/quote
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /posts/\d+/quote$" \
|
||||
"id:9006130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:quoteHtml"
|
||||
|
||||
# Multi quote
|
||||
# POST /xf/conversations/convo-title.12345/multi-quote
|
||||
# POST /xf/threads/thread-title.12345/multi-quote
|
||||
# quotes={"12345":["quote-html"]}
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /(?:conversations|threads)/.*\.\d+/multi-quote$" \
|
||||
"id:9006140,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:quotes,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[0][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[1][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[2][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[3][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[4][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[5][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[6][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[7][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[8][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:insert[9][value]"
|
||||
|
||||
# Delete thread
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /threads/.*\.\d+/delete$" \
|
||||
"id:9006150,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942130;ARGS:starter_alert_reason"
|
||||
|
||||
# Inline moderate thread
|
||||
# POST /xf/inline-mod/
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@streq /inline-mod/" \
|
||||
"id:9006160,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message"
|
||||
|
||||
# Warn member
|
||||
# POST /xf/members/name.12345/warn
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /members/\*\.\d+/warn$" \
|
||||
"id:9006170,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:conversation_message,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:notes"
|
||||
|
||||
# Editor
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@endsWith /index.php?editor/to-html" \
|
||||
"id:9006200,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:bb_code,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:attachment_hash_combined"
|
||||
|
||||
# Editor
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@endsWith /index.php?editor/to-bb-code" \
|
||||
"id:9006210,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:html"
|
||||
|
||||
# Post attachment
|
||||
# POST /xf/account/avatar
|
||||
# POST /xf/attachments/upload?type=post&context[thread_id]=12345&hash=foo
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /(?:account/avatar|attachments/upload)$" \
|
||||
"id:9006220,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveById=200003,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942220;ARGS:flowChunkSize,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942440;ARGS:flowIdentifier,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942440;ARGS:flowFilename,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942440;ARGS:flowRelativePath"
|
||||
|
||||
# Media
|
||||
# POST /xf/index.php?editor/media
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@endsWith /index.php?editor/media" \
|
||||
"id:9006230,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:url,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942130;ARGS:url"
|
||||
|
||||
# Emoji
|
||||
# GET /xf/index.php?misc/find-emoji&q=(%0A%0A
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /index\.php\?misc/find-emoji&q=" \
|
||||
"id:9006240,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=921151;ARGS:q"
|
||||
|
||||
# Login
|
||||
# POST /xf/login/login
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /login/login" \
|
||||
"id:9006300,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:password"
|
||||
|
||||
# Register account
|
||||
# POST /xf/register/register
|
||||
# The password is passed in a variable-name form parameter. We don't
|
||||
# want to exclude all parameters completely as this would cause an
|
||||
# unacceptable bypass. So, we exclude only commonly hit rules.
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /register/register" \
|
||||
"id:9006310,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942130;ARGS,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:reg_key"
|
||||
|
||||
# Edit account
|
||||
# POST /xf/account/account-details
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /account/account-details" \
|
||||
"id:9006320,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:custom_fields[picture],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:about_html"
|
||||
|
||||
# Lost password
|
||||
# POST /xf/lost-password/user-name.12345/confirm?c=foo
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /lost-password/.*\.\d+/confirm$" \
|
||||
"id:9006330,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:c"
|
||||
|
||||
# Set forum signature
|
||||
# POST /xf/account/signature
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /account/signature" \
|
||||
"id:9006340,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:signature_html"
|
||||
|
||||
# Search
|
||||
# POST /xf/search/search
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /search/search" \
|
||||
"id:9006400,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:keywords,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:constraints,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:constraints,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:constraints,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:constraints"
|
||||
|
||||
# Search within thread
|
||||
# GET /xf/threads/foo.12345/page12?highlight=foo
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /threads/.*\.\d+/(?:page\d+)?$" \
|
||||
"id:9006410,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:highlight"
|
||||
|
||||
# Search within search result
|
||||
# GET /xf/search/12345/?q=foo
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /search/\d+/$" \
|
||||
"id:9006420,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:q"
|
||||
|
||||
# Contact form
|
||||
# POST /xf/misc/contact
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /misc/contact" \
|
||||
"id:9006500,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:subject"
|
||||
|
||||
# Report post
|
||||
# POST /xf/posts/12345/report
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx /posts/\d+/report$" \
|
||||
"id:9006510,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message"
|
||||
|
||||
# Alternate thread view route
|
||||
# /xf/index.php?threads/title-having-some-sql.12345/
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Especially threads with the HAVING sql keyword are FP prone.
|
||||
# This rule has some chains to narrow down the exclusion,
|
||||
# making it harder for an attacker to abuse the ARGS_NAMES
|
||||
# exclusion on other endpoints.
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /index.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006600,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq GET" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &ARGS "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /index\.php\?threads/.*\.\d+/$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;ARGS_NAMES,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942230;ARGS_NAMES"
|
||||
|
||||
# Browser fingerprint (DBTech security extension)
|
||||
# May Contain various javascript/XSS false positives
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@endsWith /index.php?dbtech-security/fingerprint" \
|
||||
"id:9006700,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:components[14][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:components[15][value],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:components[16][value]"
|
||||
|
||||
# Get location info
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /misc/location-info" \
|
||||
"id:9006710,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:location"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XenForo Global Exclusions ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# _xfRedirect, _xfRequestUri can appear on various endpoints.
|
||||
# Cookies can appear on all endpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
SecAction \
|
||||
"id:9006800,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931120;ARGS:_xfRedirect,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941150;ARGS:_xfRedirect,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931120;ARGS:_xfRequestUri,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=941150;ARGS:_xfRequestUri,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942130;ARGS:_xfRequestUri,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942230;ARGS:_xfRequestUri,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:_xfRequestUri,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;REQUEST_COOKIES:xf_csrf,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942210;REQUEST_COOKIES:xf_csrf,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942440;REQUEST_COOKIES:xf_csrf,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942150;REQUEST_COOKIES:xf_emoji_usage,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942410;REQUEST_COOKIES:xf_emoji_usage,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;REQUEST_COOKIES:xf_ls,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;REQUEST_COOKIES:xf_user"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XenForo Administration Back-End ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Skip this section for performance unless requested file is admin.php
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "!@endsWith /admin.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006900,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-XENFORO-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "!@endsWith /admin.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006901,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-XENFORO-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
# Admin edit user
|
||||
# POST /xf/admin.php?users/the-user-name.12345/edit
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006910,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /admin\.php\?users/.*\.\d+/edit$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:profile[about],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:profile[website]"
|
||||
|
||||
# Admin save user
|
||||
# POST /xf/admin.php?users/the-user-name.12345/save
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006920,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /admin\.php\?users/.*\.\d+/save$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:custom_fields[occupation],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:custom_fields[personal_quote],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:profile[about],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:profile[signature],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:custom_fields[sexuality],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:custom_fields[picture],\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=931130;ARGS:profile[website]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Admin edit forum notice
|
||||
# POST /xf/admin.php?notices/0/save
|
||||
# POST /xf/admin.php?notices/forum-name.12345/save
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006930,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /admin\.php\?notices/(?:.*\.)?\d+/save$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:message,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:title"
|
||||
|
||||
# Admin batch thread update
|
||||
# POST /xf/admin.php?threads/batch-update/action
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006940,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /admin\.php\?threads/batch-update/action$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:criteria,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:criteria,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942330;ARGS:criteria,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:criteria,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:criteria"
|
||||
|
||||
# Edit forum theme
|
||||
# POST /xf/admin.php?styles/title.1234/style-properties/group&group=basic
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /admin.php" \
|
||||
"id:9006950,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /admin\.php\?styles/" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942200;ARGS:json,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942260;ARGS:json,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942330;ARGS:json,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942340;ARGS:json,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942370;ARGS:json"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-XENFORO-ADMIN"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-XENFORO"
|
||||
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# This file is used as an exception mechanism to remove common false positives
|
||||
# that may be encountered.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Exception for Apache SSL pinger
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_LINE "@streq GET /" \
|
||||
"id:905100,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-apache',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-generic',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 127.0.0.1,::1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleEngine=Off,\
|
||||
ctl:auditEngine=Off"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Exception for Apache internal dummy connection
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_LINE "@rx ^(?:GET /|OPTIONS \*) HTTP/[12]\.[01]$" \
|
||||
"id:905110,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-apache',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-generic',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 127.0.0.1,::1" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@rx ^.*\(internal dummy connection\)$" \
|
||||
"t:none,\
|
||||
ctl:ruleEngine=Off,\
|
||||
ctl:auditEngine=Off"
|
||||
@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:910011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:910012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ IP Reputation Block Flag Check ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The first check we do is to see if the client IP address has already
|
||||
# been blacklisted by rules from previous requests.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# If the rule matches, it will do a skipAfter and pick up processing
|
||||
# at the end of the request phase for actual blocking.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule TX:DO_REPUT_BLOCK "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:910000,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'Request from Known Malicious Client (Based on previous traffic violations).',\
|
||||
logdata:'Previous Block Reason: %{ip.reput_block_reason}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
tag:'IP_REPUTATION/MALICIOUS_CLIENT',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain,\
|
||||
skipAfter:BEGIN-REQUEST-BLOCKING-EVAL"
|
||||
SecRule IP:REPUT_BLOCK_FLAG "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ GeoIP Checks ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule requires activating the SecGeoLookupDB directive
|
||||
# in the crs-setup.conf file and specifying
|
||||
# the list of blocked countries (tx.high_risk_country_codes).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule does a GeoIP resolution on the client IP address.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule TX:HIGH_RISK_COUNTRY_CODES "!@rx ^$" \
|
||||
"id:910100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'Client IP is from a HIGH Risk Country Location.',\
|
||||
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule TX:REAL_IP "@geoLookup" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule GEO:COUNTRY_CODE "@within %{tx.high_risk_country_codes}" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ IP Reputation Checks ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ModSecurity Rules from Trustwave SpiderLabs: IP Blacklist Alert
|
||||
# Ref: http://www.modsecurity.org/projects/commercial/rules/
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule checks the client IP address against a list of recent IPs captured
|
||||
# from the SpiderLabs web honeypot systems (last 48 hours).
|
||||
#
|
||||
#SecRule TX:REAL_IP "@ipMatchFromFile ip_blacklist.data" \
|
||||
# "id:910110,\
|
||||
# phase:2,\
|
||||
# block,\
|
||||
# t:none,\
|
||||
# msg:'Client IP in Trustwave SpiderLabs IP Reputation Blacklist.',\
|
||||
# tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
# tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
# tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
# tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
# severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
# setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
# setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
# setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
# expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# First check if we have already run an @rbl check for this IP by checking in IP collection.
|
||||
# If we have, then skip doing another check.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule IP:PREVIOUS_RBL_CHECK "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:910120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-RBL-LOOKUP"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Check Client IP against ProjectHoneypot's HTTP Blacklist
|
||||
# Ref: http://www.projecthoneypot.org/httpbl_api.php
|
||||
#
|
||||
# To use the blacklist, you must register for an HttpBL API Key
|
||||
# and choose the traffic types to block. See section
|
||||
# "Project Honey Pot HTTP Blacklist" in crs-setup.conf.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecHttpBlKey
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Skip HttpBL checks if user has not defined one of the TX:block_* variables.
|
||||
# This prevents error "Operator error: RBL httpBl called but no key defined: set SecHttpBlKey"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:block_suspicious_ip "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:910130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-RBL-CHECK"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:block_harvester_ip "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:block_spammer_ip "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:block_search_ip "@eq 0"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:REAL_IP "@rbl dnsbl.httpbl.org" \
|
||||
"id:910140,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.httpbl_msg=%{tx.0}',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule TX:httpbl_msg "@rx RBL lookup of .*?.dnsbl.httpbl.org succeeded at TX:checkip. (.*?): .*" \
|
||||
"capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.httpbl_msg=%{tx.1}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# The following regexs are generated based off re_operators.c
|
||||
SecRule TX:block_search_ip "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:910150,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Blacklist match for search engine IP',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-RBL-CHECK"
|
||||
SecRule TX:httpbl_msg "@rx Search Engine" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=1',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=86400'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:block_spammer_ip "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:910160,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Blacklist match for spammer IP',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-RBL-CHECK"
|
||||
SecRule TX:httpbl_msg "@rx (?i)^.*? spammer .*?$" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=1',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=86400'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:block_suspicious_ip "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:910170,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Blacklist match for suspicious IP',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-RBL-CHECK"
|
||||
SecRule TX:httpbl_msg "@rx (?i)^.*? suspicious .*?$" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=1',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=86400'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:block_harvester_ip "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:910180,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Blacklist match for harvester IP',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-RBL-CHECK"
|
||||
SecRule TX:httpbl_msg "@rx (?i)^.*? harvester .*?$" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=1',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=86400'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecAction \
|
||||
"id:910190,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=1',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.previous_rbl_check=86400'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-RBL-LOOKUP"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-RBL-CHECK"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:910013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:910014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:910015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:910016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:910017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:910018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION"
|
||||
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:911011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:911012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Allowed Request Methods ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# tx.allowed_methods is defined in the crs-setup.conf file
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "!@within %{tx.allowed_methods}" \
|
||||
"id:911100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
msg:'Method is not allowed by policy',\
|
||||
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-generic',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/POLICY/METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-15',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A6',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/RE1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:911013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:911014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:911015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:911016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:911017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:911018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
|
||||
@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Anti-Automation rules to detect Denial of Service attacks.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Description of mechanics:
|
||||
# When a request hits a non-static resource (TX:STATIC_EXTENSIONS), then a counter for the IP
|
||||
# address is being raised (IP:DOS_COUNTER). If the counter (IP:DOS_COUNTER) hits a limit
|
||||
# (TX:DOS_COUNTER_THRESHOLD), then a burst is identified (IP:DOS_BURST_COUNTER) and the
|
||||
# counter (IP:DOS_COUNTER) is reset. The burst counter expires within a timeout period
|
||||
# (TX:DOS_BURST_TIME_SLICE).
|
||||
# If the burst counter (IP:DOS_BURST_COUNTER) is greater equal 2, then the blocking flag
|
||||
# is being set (IP:DOS_BLOCK). The blocking flag (IP:DOS_BLOCK) expires within a timeout
|
||||
# period (TX:DOS_BLOCK_TIMEOUT). All this counting happens in phase 5.
|
||||
# There is a stricter sibling to this rule (912170) in paranoia level 2, where the
|
||||
# burst counter check (IP:DOS_BURST_COUNTER) hits at greater equal 1.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The blocking is done in phase 1: When the blocking flag is encountered (IP:DOS_BLOCK),
|
||||
# then the request is dropped without sending a response. If this happens, then a
|
||||
# counter is # raised (IP:DOS_BLOCK_COUNTER).
|
||||
# When an IP address is blocked for the first time, then the blocking is reported in a
|
||||
# message and a flag (IP:DOS_BLOCK_FLAG) is set. This flag expires in 60 seconds.
|
||||
# When an IP address is blocked and the flag (IP:DOS_BLOCK_FLAG) is set, then the
|
||||
# blocking is not being reported (to prevent a flood of alerts). When the flag
|
||||
# (IP:DOS_BLOCK_FLAG) has expired and a new request is being blocked, then the
|
||||
# counter (IP:DOS_BLOCK_COUNTER) is being reset to 0 and the block is being treated
|
||||
# as the first block (-> alert).
|
||||
# In order to be able to display the counter (IP:DOS_BLOCK_COUNTER) and resetting
|
||||
# it at the same time, we copy the counter (IP:DOS_BLOCK_COUNTER) into a different
|
||||
# variable (TX:DOS_BLOCK_COUNTER), which is then displayed in turn.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Variables:
|
||||
# IP:DOS_BLOCK Flag if an IP address should be blocked
|
||||
# IP:DOS_BLOCK_COUNTER Counter of blocked requests
|
||||
# IP:DOS_BLOCK_FLAG Flag keeping track of alert. Flag expires after 60 seconds.
|
||||
# IP:DOS_BURST_COUNTER Burst counter
|
||||
# IP:DOS_COUNTER Request counter (static resources are ignored)
|
||||
# TX:DOS_BLOCK_COUNTER Copy of IP:DOS_BLOCK_COUNTER (needed for display reasons)
|
||||
# TX:DOS_BLOCK_TIMEOUT Period in seconds a blocked IP will be blocked
|
||||
# TX:DOS_COUNTER_THRESHOLD Limit of requests, where a burst is identified
|
||||
# TX:DOS_BURST_TIME_SLICE Period in seconds when we will forget a burst
|
||||
# TX:STATIC_EXTENSIONS Paths which can be ignored with regards to DoS
|
||||
#
|
||||
# As a precondition for these rules, please set the following three variables:
|
||||
# - TX:DOS_BLOCK_TIMEOUT
|
||||
# - TX:DOS_COUNTER_THRESHOLD
|
||||
# - TX:DOS_BURST_TIME_SLICE
|
||||
#
|
||||
# And make sure that TX:STATIC_EXTENSIONS is also set.
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Skip if variables defining DoS protection are not set
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule &TX:dos_burst_time_slice "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:912100,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-DOS-PROTECTION-CHECKS"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:dos_counter_threshold "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:dos_block_timeout "@eq 0"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule &TX:dos_burst_time_slice "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"id:912110,\
|
||||
phase:5,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
chain,\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-DOS-PROTECTION-CHECKS"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:dos_counter_threshold "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"chain"
|
||||
SecRule &TX:dos_block_timeout "@eq 0"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:912011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:912012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Anti-Automation / DoS Protection : Block ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Block and track # of requests and log
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule IP:DOS_BLOCK "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:912120,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
drop,\
|
||||
msg:'Denial of Service (DoS) attack identified from %{tx.real_ip} (%{tx.dos_block_counter} hits since last alert)',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-dos',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &IP:DOS_BLOCK_FLAG "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"setvar:'ip.dos_block_counter=+1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.dos_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.dos_block_counter=%{ip.dos_block_counter}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.dos_block_counter=0',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.dos_block_flag=60'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Block and track # of requests but don't log
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule IP:DOS_BLOCK "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:912130,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
drop,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-dos',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.dos_block_counter=+1'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Anti-Automation / DoS Protection: Count requests ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Skip if we have blocked the request
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule IP:DOS_BLOCK "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:912140,\
|
||||
phase:5,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-dos',\
|
||||
skipAfter:END-DOS-PROTECTION-CHECKS"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# DOS Counter: Count the number of requests to non-static resources
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_BASENAME "@rx .*?(\.[a-z0-9]{1,10})?$" \
|
||||
"id:912150,\
|
||||
phase:5,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-dos',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.extension=/%{TX.1}/',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXTENSION "!@within %{tx.static_extensions}" \
|
||||
"setvar:'ip.dos_counter=+1'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Check DOS Counter
|
||||
# If the request count is greater than or equal to user settings,
|
||||
# we raise the burst counter. This happens via two separate rules:
|
||||
# - 912160: raise from 0 to 1
|
||||
# - 912161: raise from 1 to 2
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This approach with two rules avoids raising the burst counter
|
||||
# from 0 to 2 via two concurrent requests. We do not raise the
|
||||
# burst counter beyond 2.
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule IP:DOS_COUNTER "@ge %{tx.dos_counter_threshold}" \
|
||||
"id:912160,\
|
||||
phase:5,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-dos',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &IP:DOS_BURST_COUNTER "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"setvar:'ip.dos_burst_counter=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'!ip.dos_counter',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.dos_burst_counter=%{tx.dos_burst_time_slice}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule IP:DOS_COUNTER "@ge %{tx.dos_counter_threshold}" \
|
||||
"id:912161,\
|
||||
phase:5,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-dos',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &IP:DOS_BURST_COUNTER "@ge 1" \
|
||||
"setvar:'ip.dos_burst_counter=2',\
|
||||
setvar:'!ip.dos_counter',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.dos_burst_counter=%{tx.dos_burst_time_slice}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Check DOS Burst Counter and set Block
|
||||
# Check the burst counter - if greater than or equal to 2, then we set the IP
|
||||
# block variable for a given expiry and issue an alert.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule IP:DOS_BURST_COUNTER "@ge 2" \
|
||||
"id:912170,\
|
||||
phase:5,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Potential Denial of Service (DoS) Attack from %{tx.real_ip} - # of Request Bursts: %{ip.dos_burst_counter}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-dos',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.dos_block=1',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.dos_block=%{tx.dos_block_timeout}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:912013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:912014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:912019,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Check DOS Burst Counter and set Block
|
||||
# Check the burst counter - if greater than or equal to 1, then we set the IP
|
||||
# block variable for a given expiry and issue an alert.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is a stricter sibling of rule 912170.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule IP:DOS_BURST_COUNTER "@ge 1" \
|
||||
"id:912171,\
|
||||
phase:5,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Potential Denial of Service (DoS) Attack from %{tx.real_ip} - # of Request Bursts: %{ip.dos_burst_counter}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-dos',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.dos_block=1',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.dos_block=%{tx.dos_block_timeout}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:912015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:912016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:912017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:912018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION"
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "END-DOS-PROTECTION-CHECKS"
|
||||
@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:913011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:913012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Vulnerability Scanner Checks ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# These rules inspect the default User-Agent and Header values sent by
|
||||
# various commercial and open source vuln scanners.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The following rules contain User-Agent lists:
|
||||
# 913100 - security scanners (data file scanners-user-agents.data)
|
||||
# 913101 - scripting/generic HTTP clients (data file scripting-user-agents.data)
|
||||
# 913102 - web crawlers/bots (data file crawlers-user-agents.data)
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@pmFromFile scanners-user-agents.data" \
|
||||
"id:913100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Found User-Agent associated with security scanner',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-scanner',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/AUTOMATION/SECURITY_SCANNER',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-21',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A7',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS "@pmFromFile scanners-headers.data" \
|
||||
"id:913110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Found request header associated with security scanner',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-scanner',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/AUTOMATION/SECURITY_SCANNER',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-21',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A7',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS "@pmFromFile scanners-urls.data" \
|
||||
"id:913120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Found request filename/argument associated with security scanner',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-scanner',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/AUTOMATION/SECURITY_SCANNER',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-21',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A7',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:913013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:913014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Scripting/Generic User-Agents ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule detects user-agents associated with various HTTP client libraries
|
||||
# and scripting languages. Detection suggests attempted access by some
|
||||
# automated tool.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is a sibling of rule 913100.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@pmFromFile scripting-user-agents.data" \
|
||||
"id:913101,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Found User-Agent associated with scripting/generic HTTP client',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-scripting',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/AUTOMATION/SCRIPTING',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-21',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A7',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Crawler User-Agents ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule detects user-agents associated with various crawlers, SEO tools,
|
||||
# and bots, which have been reported to potentially misbehave.
|
||||
# These crawlers can have legitimate uses when used with authorization.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is a sibling of rule 913100.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@pmFromFile crawlers-user-agents.data" \
|
||||
"id:913102,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Found User-Agent associated with web crawler/bot',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-crawler',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/AUTOMATION/CRAWLER',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-21',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A7',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_flag=1',\
|
||||
setvar:'ip.reput_block_reason=%{rule.msg}',\
|
||||
expirevar:'ip.reput_block_flag=%{tx.reput_block_duration}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:913015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:913016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:913017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:913018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:921011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:921012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ HTTP Request Smuggling ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Rule Logic ]
|
||||
# This rule looks for a CR/LF character in combination with a HTTP / WEBDAV method name.
|
||||
# This would point to an attempt to inject a 2nd request into the request, thus bypassing
|
||||
# tests carried out on the primary request.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ References ]
|
||||
# http://projects.webappsec.org/HTTP-Request-Smuggling
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx [\n\r]+(?:get|post|head|options|connect|put|delete|trace|track|patch|propfind|propatch|mkcol|copy|move|lock|unlock)\s+[^\s]+(?:\s+http|[\r\n])" \
|
||||
"id:921110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Request Smuggling Attack',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/REQUEST_SMUGGLING',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ HTTP Response Splitting ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Rule Logic ]
|
||||
# These rules look for Carriage Return (CR) %0d and Linefeed (LF) %0a characters.
|
||||
# These characters may cause problems if the data is returned in a respones header and
|
||||
# may be interpreted by an intermediary proxy server and treated as two separate
|
||||
# responses.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ References ]
|
||||
# http://projects.webappsec.org/HTTP-Response-Splitting
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx [\r\n]\W*?(?:content-(?:type|length)|set-cookie|location):" \
|
||||
"id:921120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Response Splitting Attack',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/RESPONSE_SPLITTING',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:\bhttp\/(?:0\.9|1\.[01])|<(?:html|meta)\b)" \
|
||||
"id:921130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Response Splitting Attack',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/RESPONSE_SPLITTING',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ HTTP Header Injection ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Rule Logic ]
|
||||
# These rules look for Carriage Return (CR) %0d and Linefeed (LF) %0a characters,
|
||||
# on their own or in combination with header field names.
|
||||
# These characters may cause problems if the data is returned in a respones header
|
||||
# and interpreted by the client.
|
||||
# The rules are similar to rules defending against the HTTP Request Splitting and
|
||||
# Request Smuggling rules.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ References ]
|
||||
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_header_injection
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS "@rx [\n\r]" \
|
||||
"id:921140,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Header Injection Attack via headers',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/HEADER_INJECTION',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Detect newlines in argument names.
|
||||
# Checking for GET arguments has been moved to paranoia level 2 (921151)
|
||||
# in order to mitigate possible false positives.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
|
||||
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx [\n\r]" \
|
||||
"id:921150,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Header Injection Attack via payload (CR/LF detected)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/HEADER_INJECTION',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS_GET_NAMES|ARGS_GET "@rx (?:\n|\r)+(?:\s|location|refresh|(?:set-)?cookie|(?:x-)?(?:forwarded-(?:for|host|server)|host|via|remote-ip|remote-addr|originating-IP))\s*:" \
|
||||
"id:921160,\
|
||||
phase:1,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Header Injection Attack via payload (CR/LF and header-name detected)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/HEADER_INJECTION',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:921013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:921014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Detect newlines in GET argument values.
|
||||
# These may point to a HTTP header injection attack, but can also sometimes
|
||||
# occur in benign query parameters.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# See also: rule 921140, 921150
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule ARGS_GET "@rx [\n\r]" \
|
||||
"id:921151,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Header Injection Attack via payload (CR/LF detected)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/HEADER_INJECTION',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:921015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:921016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# -=[ HTTP Parameter Polution ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Rule Logic ]
|
||||
# These rules look for multiple parameters with the same name.
|
||||
# 921170 counts the occurrences of the individual parameters.
|
||||
# 921180 checks if any counter is > 1.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# One HPP attack vector is to try evade signature filters by distributing the
|
||||
# attack payload across multiple parameters with the same name.
|
||||
# This works as many security devices only apply signatures to individual
|
||||
# parameter payloads, however the back-end web application may (in the case
|
||||
# of ASP.NET) consolidate all of the payloads into one thus making the
|
||||
# attack payload active.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ References ]
|
||||
# http://tacticalwebappsec.blogspot.com/2009/05/http-parameter-pollution.html
|
||||
# https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/460.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx ." \
|
||||
"id:921170,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-460',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
setvar:'TX.paramcounter_%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=+1'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:/paramcounter_.*/ "@gt 1" \
|
||||
"id:921180,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
msg:'HTTP Parameter Pollution (%{TX.1})',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-protocol',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/HTTP_PARAMETER_POLLUTION',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-460',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule MATCHED_VARS_NAMES "@rx TX:paramcounter_(.*)" \
|
||||
"capture,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:921017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:921018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
|
||||
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:930011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:930012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Directory Traversal Attacks ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Ref: https://github.com/wireghoul/dotdotpwn
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Encoded /../ Payloads ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI_RAW|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|XML:/* "@rx (?i)(?:\x5c|(?:%(?:c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f|5c|9v)|1%(?:[19p]c|8s|af))|2(?:5(?:c(?:0%25af|1%259c)|2f|5c)|%46|f)|(?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8|e)0%80%a|bg%q)f|%3(?:2(?:%(?:%6|4)6|F)|5%%63)|u(?:221[56]|002f|EFC8|F025)|1u|5c)|0x(?:2f|5c)|\/))(?:%(?:(?:f(?:(?:c%80|8)%8)?0%8|e)0%80%ae|2(?:(?:5(?:c0%25a|2))?e|%45)|u(?:(?:002|ff0)e|2024)|%32(?:%(?:%6|4)5|E)|c0(?:%[256aef]e|\.))|\.(?:%0[01]|\?)?|\?\.?|0x2e){2}(?:\x5c|(?:%(?:c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f|5c|9v)|1%(?:[19p]c|8s|af))|2(?:5(?:c(?:0%25af|1%259c)|2f|5c)|%46|f)|(?:(?:f(?:8%8)?0%8|e)0%80%a|bg%q)f|%3(?:2(?:%(?:%6|4)6|F)|5%%63)|u(?:221[56]|002f|EFC8|F025)|1u|5c)|0x(?:2f|5c)|\/))" \
|
||||
"id:930100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'Path Traversal Attack (/../)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-lfi',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/DIR_TRAVERSAL',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Decoded /../ Payloads ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|XML:/* "@rx (?:^|[\\/])\.\.(?:[\\/]|$)" \
|
||||
"id:930110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:removeNulls,t:cmdLine,\
|
||||
msg:'Path Traversal Attack (/../)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-lfi',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/DIR_TRAVERSAL',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
multiMatch,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ OS File Access ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Ref: https://github.com/lightos/Panoptic/blob/master/cases.xml
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile lfi-os-files.data" \
|
||||
"id:930120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:normalizePathWin,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'OS File Access Attempt',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-lfi',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/FILE_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-33',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A4',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.4',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Restricted File Access ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Detects attempts to retrieve application source code, metadata,
|
||||
# credentials and version control history possibly reachable in a web root.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@pmFromFile restricted-files.data" \
|
||||
"id:930130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:normalizePathWin,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Restricted File Access Attempt',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-lfi',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/FILE_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-33',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A4',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.4',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:930013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:930014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:930015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:930016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:930017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:930018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
|
||||
@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
#
|
||||
# RFI Attacks
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:931011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:931012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
|
||||
# These rules look for common types of Remote File Inclusion (RFI) attack methods.
|
||||
# - URL Contains an IP Address
|
||||
# - The PHP "include()" Function
|
||||
# - RFI Data Ends with Question Mark(s) (?)
|
||||
# - RFI Host Doesn't Match Local Host
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ References ]=-
|
||||
# http://projects.webappsec.org/Remote-File-Inclusion
|
||||
# http://tacticalwebappsec.blogspot.com/2009/06/generic-remote-file-inclusion-attack.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule ARGS "@rx ^(?i:file|ftps?|https?):\/\/(?:\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})" \
|
||||
"id:931100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: URL Parameter using IP Address',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rfi',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/RFI',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule QUERY_STRING|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)(?:\binclude\s*\([^)]*|mosConfig_absolute_path|_CONF\[path\]|_SERVER\[DOCUMENT_ROOT\]|GALLERY_BASEDIR|path\[docroot\]|appserv_root|config\[root_dir\])=(?:file|ftps?|https?):\/\/" \
|
||||
"id:931110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
|
||||
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: Common RFI Vulnerable Parameter Name used w/URL Payload',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rfi',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/RFI',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS "@rx ^(?i:file|ftps?|https?).*?\?+$" \
|
||||
"id:931120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: URL Payload Used w/Trailing Question Mark Character (?)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rfi',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/RFI',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:931013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:931014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS "@rx ^(?i:file|ftps?|https?)://(.*)$" \
|
||||
"id:931130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: Off-Domain Reference/Link',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rfi',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/RFI',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rfi_parameter_%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{tx.1}',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule TX:/rfi_parameter_.*/ "!@beginsWith %{request_headers.host}" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:931015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:931016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:931017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:931018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
|
||||
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
@@ -1,740 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:933011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:933012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ PHP Injection Attacks ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ References ]
|
||||
# http://rips-scanner.sourceforge.net/
|
||||
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_Top_5#P1:_Remote_Code_Executionh
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Open Tag Found ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Detects PHP open tags "<?" and "<?php".
|
||||
# http://www.php.net/manual/en/language.basic-syntax.phptags.php
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Care is taken to avoid false positives in XML declarations "<?xml..."
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Also detects "[php]", "[/php]" and "[\php]" tags used by some applications
|
||||
# to indicate PHP dynamic content.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Previously, this rule also checked for the PHP close tag '?>', but
|
||||
# this resulted in false positives which were difficult to prevent.
|
||||
# Therefore, that pattern is now checked by rule 933190 in paranoia levels
|
||||
# 3 or higher.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Not supported by re2 (?!re).
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:<\?(?!xml\s)|<\?php|\[(?:/|\\\\)?php\])" \
|
||||
"id:933100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: PHP Open Tag Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Script Uploads ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Block file uploads with filenames ending in PHP related extensions
|
||||
# (.php, .phps, .phtml, .php5 etc).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Many application contain Unrestricted File Upload vulnerabilities.
|
||||
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Attackers may use such a vulnerability to achieve remote code execution
|
||||
# by uploading a .php file. If the upload storage location is predictable
|
||||
# and not adequately protected, the attacker may then request the uploaded
|
||||
# .php file and have the code within it executed on the server.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Also block files with just dot (.) characters after the extension:
|
||||
# https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2013/08/15/time-to-patch-joomla
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some AJAX uploaders use the nonstandard request headers X-Filename,
|
||||
# X_Filename, or X-File-Name to transmit the file name to the server;
|
||||
# scan these request headers as well as multipart/form-data file names.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule FILES|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X_Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X.Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-File-Name "@rx .*\.(?:php\d*|phtml)\.*$" \
|
||||
"id:933110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: PHP Script File Upload Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Configuration Directives ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile php-config-directives.data" \
|
||||
"id:933120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:normalisePath,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Configuration Directive Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule MATCHED_VARS "@pm =" \
|
||||
"capture,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Variables ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile php-variables.data" \
|
||||
"id:933130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:normalisePath,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variables Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP I/O Streams ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The "php://" syntax can be used to refer to various objects, such as local files (for LFI),
|
||||
# remote urls (for RFI), or standard input/request body. Its occurrence indicates a possible attempt
|
||||
# to either inject PHP code or exploit a file inclusion vulnerability in a PHP web app.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Examples:
|
||||
# php://filter/resource=./../../../wp-config.php
|
||||
# php://filter/resource=http://www.example.com
|
||||
# php://stdin
|
||||
# php://input
|
||||
#
|
||||
# http://php.net/manual/en/wrappers.php.php
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)php://(?:std(?:in|out|err)|(?:in|out)put|fd|memory|temp|filter)" \
|
||||
"id:933140,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: I/O Stream Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Wrappers ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# PHP comes with many built-in wrappers for various URL-style protocols for use with the filesystem
|
||||
# functions such as fopen(), copy(), file_exists() and filesize(). Abusing of PHP wrappers like phar://
|
||||
# could lead to RCE as describled by Sam Thomas at BlackHat USA 2018 (https://bit.ly/2yaKV5X), even
|
||||
# wrappers like zlib://, glob://, rar://, zip://, etc... could lead to LFI and expect:// to RCE.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:zlib|glob|phar|ssh2|rar|ogg|expect|zip)://" \
|
||||
"id:933200,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:removeNulls,t:cmdLine,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Wrapper scheme detected',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Functions ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Detecting PHP function names is useful to block PHP code injection attacks.
|
||||
# There are many PHP functions. We have to strike a balance between robust detection
|
||||
# of PHP code in content, and the risk of false positives.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The list of PHP functions is divided into four groups of varying attack/false positive risk.
|
||||
# Four separate rules are used to detect these groups of functions:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Rule 933150: ~40 words highly common to PHP injection payloads and extremely rare in
|
||||
# natural language or other contexts.
|
||||
# Examples: 'base64_decode', 'file_get_contents'.
|
||||
# These words are detected as a match directly using @pmFromFile.
|
||||
# Function names are defined in php-function-names-933150.data
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Rule 933160: ~220 words which are common in PHP code, but have a higher chance to cause
|
||||
# false positives in natural language or other contexts.
|
||||
# Examples: 'chr', 'eval'.
|
||||
# To mitigate false positives, a regexp looks for PHP function syntax, e.g. 'eval()'.
|
||||
# Regexp is generated from function names in util/regexp-assemble/regexp-933160.data
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Rule 933151: ~1300 words of lesser importance. This includes most PHP functions and keywords.
|
||||
# Examples: 'addslashes', 'array_diff'.
|
||||
# For performance reasons, the @pmFromFile operator is used, and many functions from lesser
|
||||
# used PHP extensions are removed.
|
||||
# To mitigate false positives, we only match when the '(' character is also found.
|
||||
# This rule only runs in paranoia level 2 or higher.
|
||||
# Function names are defined in php-function-names-933151.data
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Rule 933161: ~200 words with short or trivial names, possibly leading to false positives.
|
||||
# Examples: 'abs', 'cos'.
|
||||
# To mitigate false positives, a regexp matches on function syntax, e.g. 'abs()'.
|
||||
# This rule only runs in paranoia level 3 or higher.
|
||||
# Regexp is generated from function names in util/regexp-assemble/regexp-933161.data
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Functions: High-Risk PHP Function Names ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rule 933150 contains a small list of function names which are highly indicative of a PHP
|
||||
# injection attack, for example 'base64_decode'.
|
||||
# We block these function names outright, without using a complex regexp or chain.
|
||||
# This could make the detection a bit more robust against possible bypasses.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile php-function-names-933150.data" \
|
||||
"id:933150,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: High-Risk PHP Function Name Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Functions: High-Risk PHP Function Calls ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some PHP function names have a certain risk of false positives, due to short
|
||||
# names, full or partial overlap with common natural language terms, uses in
|
||||
# other contexts, et cetera. Some examples are 'eval', 'exec', 'system'.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# For these function names, we apply a regexp to look for PHP function syntax.
|
||||
# The regexp looks for a word boundary and adjoining parentheses.
|
||||
# For instance, we want to block 'eval()', but we want to allow 'medieval()'.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# We have to be careful of possible bypasses using comment syntax. Examples:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# system(...)
|
||||
# system (...)
|
||||
# system\t(...)
|
||||
# system /*comment*/ (...)
|
||||
# system /*multiline \n comment*/ (...)
|
||||
# system //comment \n (...)
|
||||
# system #comment \n (...)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45260 ]
|
||||
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Regexp generated from util/regexp-assemble/regexp-933160.data using Regexp::Assemble.
|
||||
# See https://coreruleset.org/20190826/optimizing-regular-expressions/ for usage.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Note that after assemble, PHP function syntax pre/postfix is added to the Regexp::Assemble
|
||||
# output. Example: "@rx (?i)\bASSEMBLE_OUTPUT_HERE(?:\s|/\*.*\*/|//.*|#.*)*\(.*\)"
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)\b(?:s(?:e(?:t(?:_(?:e(?:xception|rror)_handler|magic_quotes_runtime|include_path)|defaultstub)|ssion_s(?:et_save_handler|tart))|qlite_(?:(?:(?:unbuffered|single|array)_)?query|create_(?:aggregate|function)|p?open|exec)|tr(?:eam_(?:context_create|socket_client)|ipc?slashes|rev)|implexml_load_(?:string|file)|ocket_c(?:onnect|reate)|h(?:ow_sourc|a1_fil)e|pl_autoload_register|ystem)|p(?:r(?:eg_(?:replace(?:_callback(?:_array)?)?|match(?:_all)?|split)|oc_(?:(?:terminat|clos|nic)e|get_status|open)|int_r)|o(?:six_(?:get(?:(?:e[gu]|g)id|login|pwnam)|mk(?:fifo|nod)|ttyname|kill)|pen)|hp(?:_(?:strip_whitespac|unam)e|version|info)|g_(?:(?:execut|prepar)e|connect|query)|a(?:rse_(?:ini_file|str)|ssthru)|utenv)|r(?:unkit_(?:function_(?:re(?:defin|nam)e|copy|add)|method_(?:re(?:defin|nam)e|copy|add)|constant_(?:redefine|add))|e(?:(?:gister_(?:shutdown|tick)|name)_function|ad(?:(?:gz)?file|_exif_data|dir))|awurl(?:de|en)code)|i(?:mage(?:createfrom(?:(?:jpe|pn)g|x[bp]m|wbmp|gif)|(?:jpe|pn)g|g(?:d2?|if)|2?wbmp|xbm)|s_(?:(?:(?:execut|write?|read)ab|fi)le|dir)|ni_(?:get(?:_all)?|set)|terator_apply|ptcembed)|g(?:et(?:_(?:c(?:urrent_use|fg_va)r|meta_tags)|my(?:[gpu]id|inode)|(?:lastmo|cw)d|imagesize|env)|z(?:(?:(?:defla|wri)t|encod|fil)e|compress|open|read)|lob)|a(?:rray_(?:u(?:intersect(?:_u?assoc)?|diff(?:_u?assoc)?)|intersect_u(?:assoc|key)|diff_u(?:assoc|key)|filter|reduce|map)|ssert(?:_options)?)|h(?:tml(?:specialchars(?:_decode)?|_entity_decode|entities)|(?:ash(?:_(?:update|hmac))?|ighlight)_file|e(?:ader_register_callback|x2bin))|f(?:i(?:le(?:(?:[acm]tim|inod)e|(?:_exist|perm)s|group)?|nfo_open)|tp_(?:nb_(?:ge|pu)|connec|ge|pu)t|(?:unction_exis|pu)ts|write|open)|o(?:b_(?:get_(?:c(?:ontents|lean)|flush)|end_(?:clean|flush)|clean|flush|start)|dbc_(?:result(?:_all)?|exec(?:ute)?|connect)|pendir)|m(?:b_(?:ereg(?:_(?:replace(?:_callback)?|match)|i(?:_replace)?)?|parse_str)|(?:ove_uploaded|d5)_file|ethod_exists|ysql_query|kdir)|e(?:x(?:if_(?:t(?:humbnail|agname)|imagetype|read_data)|ec)|scapeshell(?:arg|cmd)|rror_reporting|val)|c(?:url_(?:file_create|exec|init)|onvert_uuencode|reate_function|hr)|u(?:n(?:serialize|pack)|rl(?:de|en)code|[ak]?sort)|(?:json_(?:de|en)cod|debug_backtrac|tmpfil)e|b(?:(?:son_(?:de|en)|ase64_en)code|zopen)|var_dump)(?:\s|/\*.*\*/|//.*|#.*)*\(.*\)" \
|
||||
"id:933160,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: High-Risk PHP Function Call Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Object Injection ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# PHP Object Injection is an application level vulnerability that could allow
|
||||
# an attacker to perform different kinds of malicious attacks, such as
|
||||
# Code Injection, SQL Injection, Path Traversal and Application Denial of Service,
|
||||
# depending on the context.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The vulnerability occurs when user-supplied input is not properly sanitized
|
||||
# before being passed to the unserialize() PHP function. Since PHP allows object
|
||||
# serialization, attackers could pass ad-hoc serialized strings to a vulnerable
|
||||
# unserialize() call, resulting in an arbitrary PHP object(s) injection into the
|
||||
# application scope.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_Object_Injection
|
||||
#
|
||||
# In serialized form, PHP objects have the following format:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# O:8:"stdClass":1:{s:1:"a";i:2;}
|
||||
# O:3:"Foo":0:{}
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Also detected are PHP objects with a custom unserializer:
|
||||
# http://www.phpinternalsbook.com/classes_objects/serialization.html
|
||||
# These have the following format:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# C:11:"ArrayObject":37:{x:i:0;a:1:{s:1:"a";s:1:"b";};m:a:0:{}}
|
||||
# C:3:"Foo":23:{s:15:"My private data";}
|
||||
#
|
||||
# HTTP headers are inspected, since PHP object injection vulnerabilities have been
|
||||
# found in applications parsing them:
|
||||
# https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-8562 (User-Agent header)
|
||||
# https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39033/ (X-Forwarded-For header)
|
||||
# http://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2015-10 (Host header)
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx [oOcC]:\d+:\".+?\":\d+:{.*}" \
|
||||
"id:933170,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Serialized Object Injection',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Functions: Variable Function Calls ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# PHP 'variable functions' provide an alternate syntax for calling PHP functions.
|
||||
# http://php.net/manual/en/functions.variable-functions.php
|
||||
#
|
||||
# An attacker may use variable function syntax to evade detection of function
|
||||
# names during exploitation of a remote code execution vulnerability.
|
||||
# An example to use the 'file_get_contents' function while evading rule 933150:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# $fn = 'file_' . 'get_' . 'contents';
|
||||
# echo $fn('wp-co' . 'nfig.php');
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some examples from obfuscated malware:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# $OOO0000O0(...)
|
||||
# @$b374k(...)
|
||||
# $_[@-_]($_[@!+_] )
|
||||
#
|
||||
# A breakdown of the regular expression:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# \$+
|
||||
# The variable's '$' char, or multiple '$' for 'variable variables':
|
||||
# http://php.net/manual/en/language.variables.variable.php
|
||||
# (?:[a-zA-Z_\x7f-\xff][a-zA-Z0-9_\x7f-\xff]*|\s*{.+})
|
||||
# One of the following:
|
||||
# - A variable name; regexp from http://php.net/language.variables.basics
|
||||
# - A nonempty expression for variable variables: ${'fn'} or $ {'fn'}
|
||||
# (?:\s|\[.+\]|{.+}|/\*.*\*/|//.*|#.*)*
|
||||
# Optional whitespace, array access, or comments
|
||||
# \(.*\)
|
||||
# Parentheses optionally containing function parameters
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx \$+(?:[a-zA-Z_\x7f-\xff][a-zA-Z0-9_\x7f-\xff]*|\s*{.+})(?:\s|\[.+\]|{.+}|/\*.*\*/|//.*|#.*)*\(.*\)" \
|
||||
"id:933180,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variable Function Call Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# [ PHP Functions: Variable Function Prevent Bypass ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Referring to https://www.secjuice.com/php-rce-bypass-filters-sanitization-waf/
|
||||
# the rule 933180 could be bypassed by using the following payloads:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - (system)('uname')
|
||||
# - (sy.(st).em)('uname')
|
||||
# - (string)"system"('uname')
|
||||
# - define('x', 'sys' . 'tem');(x)/* comment */('uname')
|
||||
# - $y = 'sys'.'tem';($y)('uname')
|
||||
# - define('z', [['sys' .'tem']]);(z)[0][0]('uname');
|
||||
# - (system)(ls)
|
||||
# - (/**/system)(ls/**/);
|
||||
# - (['system'])[0]('uname');
|
||||
# - (++[++system++][++0++])++{/*dsasd*/0}++(++ls++);
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule blocks all payloads above and avoids to block values like:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - [ACME] this is a test (just a test)
|
||||
# - Test (with two) rounded (brackets)
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:(?:\(|\[)[a-zA-Z0-9_.$\"'\[\](){}/*\s]+(?:\)|\])[0-9_.$\"'\[\](){}/*\s]*\([a-zA-Z0-9_.$\"'\[\](){}/*\s].*\)|\([\s]*string[\s]*\)[\s]*(?:\"|'))" \
|
||||
"id:933210,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecode,t:replaceComments,t:compressWhitespace,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variable Function Call Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:933013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:933014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Functions: Medium-Risk PHP Function Names ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# In paranoia level 2, we add additional checks for most PHP functions.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The size of the PHP function list is considerable.
|
||||
# Even after excluding the more obscure PHP extensions, 1300+ functions remain.
|
||||
# For performance and maintenance reasons, this rule does not use a regexp,
|
||||
# but uses a phrase file (@pmFromFile), and additionally looks for an '(' character
|
||||
# in the matched variable.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This approach carries some risk for false positives. Therefore, the function list
|
||||
# has been curated to remove words closely matching natural language and terms often
|
||||
# used in other contexts.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is a stricter sibling of rule 933150.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile php-function-names-933151.data" \
|
||||
"id:933151,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Medium-Risk PHP Function Name Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule MATCHED_VARS "@pm (" \
|
||||
"capture,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:933015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:933016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Variables: Common Variable Indexes ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# In paranoia level 3, we add additional checks for parameters to many PHP variables.
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# One of the more common variables used within attacks on PHP is $_SERVER. Because
|
||||
# of how many different ways PHP has for executing variables (variable variables,
|
||||
# etc) often just looking for $_SERVER will be less effective than looking for the
|
||||
# various indexes within $_SERVER. This rule checks for these indexes.
|
||||
# This rule is located in PL 3 because often developers will use these names as
|
||||
# parameter names or values and this will lead to false positives.
|
||||
# Because this list is not expected to change and it is limited in size we use a
|
||||
# regex in this case to look for these values whereas in its sibling rule we use
|
||||
# @pmFromFile for flexibility and performance.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# To rebuild the regexp:
|
||||
# cd util/regexp-assemble
|
||||
# ./regexp-assemble.pl < regexp-933131.data
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is a stricter sibling of rule 933130.
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:HTTP_(?:ACCEPT(?:_(?:ENCODING|LANGUAGE|CHARSET))?|(?:X_FORWARDED_FO|REFERE)R|(?:USER_AGEN|HOS)T|CONNECTION|KEEP_ALIVE)|PATH_(?:TRANSLATED|INFO)|ORIG_PATH_INFO|QUERY_STRING|REQUEST_URI|AUTH_TYPE)" \
|
||||
"id:933131,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:normalisePath,t:urlDecodeUni,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variables Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Functions: Low-Value PHP Function Calls ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# In paranoia level 3, we add additional checks for the remaining PHP functions.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Most of these function names are likely to cause false positives in natural text
|
||||
# or common parameter values, such as 'abs', 'copy', 'date', 'key', 'max', 'min'.
|
||||
# Therefore, these function names are not scanned in lower paranoia levels.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# To mitigate the risk of false positives somewhat, a regexp is used to look for
|
||||
# PHP function syntax. (See rule 933160 for a description.)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is a stricter sibling of rule 933160.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45262 ]
|
||||
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Regexp generated from util/regexp-assemble/regexp-933161.data using Regexp::Assemble.
|
||||
# See https://coreruleset.org/20190826/optimizing-regular-expressions/ for usage.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Note that after assemble, PHP function syntax pre/postfix is added to the Regexp::Assemble
|
||||
# output. Example: "@rx (?i)\bASSEMBLE_OUTPUT_HERE(?:\s|/\*.*\*/|//.*|#.*)*\(.*\)"
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)\b(?:i(?:s(?:_(?:in(?:t(?:eger)?|finite)|n(?:u(?:meric|ll)|an)|(?:calla|dou)ble|s(?:calar|tring)|f(?:inite|loat)|re(?:source|al)|l(?:ink|ong)|a(?:rray)?|object|bool)|set)|n(?:(?:clud|vok)e|t(?:div|val))|(?:mplod|dat)e|conv)|s(?:t(?:r(?:(?:le|sp)n|coll)|at)|(?:e(?:rializ|ttyp)|huffl)e|i(?:milar_text|zeof|nh?)|p(?:liti?|rintf)|(?:candi|ubst)r|y(?:mlink|slog)|o(?:undex|rt)|leep|rand|qrt)|f(?:ile(?:(?:siz|typ)e|owner|pro)|l(?:o(?:atval|ck|or)|ush)|(?:rea|mo)d|t(?:ell|ok)|unction|close|gets|stat|eof)|c(?:h(?:o(?:wn|p)|eckdate|root|dir|mod)|o(?:(?:(?:nsta|u)n|mpac)t|sh?|py)|lose(?:dir|log)|(?:urren|ryp)t|eil)|e(?:x(?:(?:trac|i)t|p(?:lode)?)|a(?:ster_da(?:te|ys)|ch)|r(?:ror_log|egi?)|mpty|cho|nd)|l(?:o(?:g(?:1[0p])?|caltime)|i(?:nk(?:info)?|st)|(?:cfirs|sta)t|evenshtein|trim)|d(?:i(?:(?:skfreespac)?e|r(?:name)?)|e(?:fined?|coct)|(?:oubleva)?l|ate)|r(?:e(?:(?:quir|cod|nam)e|adlin[ek]|wind|set)|an(?:ge|d)|ound|sort|trim)|m(?:b(?:split|ereg)|i(?:crotime|n)|a(?:i[ln]|x)|etaphone|y?sql|hash)|u(?:n(?:(?:tain|se)t|iqid|link)|s(?:leep|ort)|cfirst|mask)|a(?:s(?:(?:se|o)rt|inh?)|r(?:sort|ray)|tan[2h]?|cosh?|bs)|t(?:e(?:xtdomain|mpnam)|a(?:int|nh?)|ouch|ime|rim)|h(?:e(?:ader(?:s_(?:lis|sen)t)?|brev)|ypot|ash)|p(?:a(?:thinfo|ck)|r(?:intf?|ev)|close|o[sw]|i)|g(?:et(?:t(?:ext|ype)|date)|mdate)|o(?:penlog|ctdec|rd)|b(?:asename|indec)|n(?:atsor|ex)t|k(?:sort|ey)|quotemeta|wordwrap|virtual|join)(?:\s|/\*.*\*/|//.*|#.*)*\(.*\)" \
|
||||
"id:933161,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Low-Value PHP Function Call Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ PHP Script Uploads: Superfluous extension ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Block file uploads with PHP related extensions (.php, .phps, .phtml,
|
||||
# .php5 etc) anywhere in the name, followed by a dot.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Example: index.php.tmp
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Uploading of such files can lead to remote code execution if
|
||||
# Apache is configured with AddType and MultiViews, as Apache will
|
||||
# automatically do a filename match when the extension is unknown.
|
||||
# This configuration is fortunately not common in modern installs.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Blocking these file names might lead to more false positives.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some AJAX uploaders use the nonstandard request headers X-Filename,
|
||||
# X_Filename, or X-File-Name to transmit the file name to the server;
|
||||
# scan these request headers as well as multipart/form-data file names.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is a stricter sibling of rule 933110.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule FILES|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X_Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X.Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-File-Name "@rx .*\.(?:php\d*|phtml)\..*$" \
|
||||
"id:933111,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: PHP Script File Upload Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ PHP Closing Tag Found ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# http://www.php.net/manual/en/language.basic-syntax.phptags.php
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This check was extracted from 933100 (paranoia level 1), since the
|
||||
# checked sequence '?>' commonly causes false positives.
|
||||
# See issue #654 for discussion.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pm ?>" \
|
||||
"id:933190,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
|
||||
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: PHP Closing Tag Found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-php',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/PHP_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:933017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:933018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
|
||||
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:934011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:934012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# [ Insecure unserialization / generic RCE signatures ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Libraries performing insecure unserialization:
|
||||
# - node-serialize: _$$ND_FUNC$$_ (CVE-2017-5941)
|
||||
# - funcster: __js_function
|
||||
#
|
||||
# See:
|
||||
# https://opsecx.com/index.php/2017/02/08/exploiting-node-js-deserialization-bug-for-remote-code-execution/
|
||||
# https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/deserialization-vulnerabilities-attacking-deserialization-in-js/
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some generic snippets used:
|
||||
# - function() {
|
||||
# - new Function(
|
||||
# - eval(
|
||||
# - String.fromCharCode(
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Last two are used by nodejsshell.py,
|
||||
# https://github.com/ajinabraham/Node.Js-Security-Course/blob/master/nodejsshell.py
|
||||
#
|
||||
# As base64 is sometimes (but not always) used to encode serialized values,
|
||||
# use multiMatch and t:base64decode.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Regexp generated from util/regexp-assemble/regexp-934100.data using Regexp::Assemble.
|
||||
# See https://coreruleset.org/20190826/optimizing-regular-expressions/ for usage.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:(?:_(?:\$\$ND_FUNC\$\$_|_js_function)|(?:new\s+Function|\beval)\s*\(|String\s*\.\s*fromCharCode|function\s*\(\s*\)\s*{|this\.constructor)|module\.exports\s*=)" \
|
||||
"id:934100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:base64Decode,\
|
||||
msg:'Node.js Injection Attack',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-javascript',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-injection-nodejs',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/NODEJS_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
multiMatch,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:934013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:934014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:934015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:934016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:934017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:934018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-NODEJS"
|
||||
@@ -1,990 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:941011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:941012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Libinjection - XSS Detection ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Ref: https://github.com/client9/libinjection
|
||||
# Ref: https://speakerdeck.com/ngalbreath/libinjection-from-sqli-to-xss
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Targets ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 941100: PL1 : REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|
|
||||
# REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|
|
||||
# ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/*
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 941101: PL2 : REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@detectXSS" \
|
||||
"id:941100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'XSS Attack Detected via libinjection',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: XSS data found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XSS Filters - Category 1 ]=-
|
||||
# http://xssplayground.net23.net/xssfilter.html
|
||||
# script tag based XSS vectors, e.g., <script> alert(1)</script>
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)<script[^>]*>[\s\S]*?" \
|
||||
"id:941110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'XSS Filter - Category 1: Script Tag Vector',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XSS Filters - Category 2 ]=-
|
||||
# XSS vectors making use of event handlers like onerror, onload etc, e.g., <body onload="alert(1)">
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)[\s\"'`;\/0-9=\x0B\x09\x0C\x3B\x2C\x28\x3B]+on[a-zA-Z]+[\s\x0B\x09\x0C\x3B\x2C\x28\x3B]*?=" \
|
||||
"id:941120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'XSS Filter - Category 2: Event Handler Vector',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XSS Filters - Category 3 ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)[\s\S]((?:x(?:link:href|html|mlns)|!ENTITY.*?(?:SYSTEM|PUBLIC)|data:text\/html|formaction|\@import|base64)\b|pattern\b.*?=)" \
|
||||
"id:941130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'XSS Filter - Category 3: Attribute Vector',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XSS Filters - Category 4 ]=-
|
||||
# XSS vectors making use of javascript uri and tags, e.g., <p style="background:url(javascript:alert(1))">
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)(?:<(?:(?:apple|objec)t|isindex|embed|style|form|meta)\b[^>]*?>[\s\S]*?|(?:=|U\s*?R\s*?L\s*?\()\s*?[^>]*?\s*?S\s*?C\s*?R\s*?I\s*?P\s*?T\s*?:)" \
|
||||
"id:941140,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'XSS Filter - Category 4: Javascript URI Vector',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ NoScript XSS Filters ]=-
|
||||
# Ref: http://noscript.net/
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [NoScript InjectionChecker] HTML injection
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Regexp generated from util/regexp-assemble/regexp-941160.data using Regexp::Assemble.
|
||||
# To rebuild the regexp:
|
||||
# cd util/regexp-assemble
|
||||
# ./regexp-assemble.pl regexp-941160.data
|
||||
# Note that after assemble an ignore case flag (i) is added to the to the Regexp::Assemble output:
|
||||
# Add ignore case flag between '?' and ':': "(?i:...)"
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:(?:<\w[\s\S]*[\s\/]|['\"](?:[\s\S]*[\s\/])?)(?:on(?:d(?:e(?:vice(?:(?:orienta|mo)tion|proximity|found|light)|livery(?:success|error)|activate)|r(?:ag(?:e(?:n(?:ter|d)|xit)|(?:gestur|leav)e|start|drop|over)|op)|i(?:s(?:c(?:hargingtimechange|onnect(?:ing|ed))|abled)|aling)|ata(?:setc(?:omplete|hanged)|(?:availabl|chang)e|error)|urationchange|ownloading|blclick)|Moz(?:M(?:agnifyGesture(?:Update|Start)?|ouse(?:PixelScroll|Hittest))|S(?:wipeGesture(?:Update|Start|End)?|crolledAreaChanged)|(?:(?:Press)?TapGestur|BeforeResiz)e|EdgeUI(?:C(?:omplet|ancel)|Start)ed|RotateGesture(?:Update|Start)?|A(?:udioAvailable|fterPaint))|c(?:o(?:m(?:p(?:osition(?:update|start|end)|lete)|mand(?:update)?)|n(?:t(?:rolselect|extmenu)|nect(?:ing|ed))|py)|a(?:(?:llschang|ch)ed|nplay(?:through)?|rdstatechange)|h(?:(?:arging(?:time)?ch)?ange|ecking)|(?:fstate|ell)change|u(?:echange|t)|l(?:ick|ose))|s(?:t(?:a(?:t(?:uschanged|echange)|lled|rt)|k(?:sessione|comma)nd|op)|e(?:ek(?:complete|ing|ed)|(?:lec(?:tstar)?)?t|n(?:ding|t))|(?:peech|ound)(?:start|end)|u(?:ccess|spend|bmit)|croll|how)|m(?:o(?:z(?:(?:pointerlock|fullscreen)(?:change|error)|(?:orientation|time)change|network(?:down|up)load)|use(?:(?:lea|mo)ve|o(?:ver|ut)|enter|wheel|down|up)|ve(?:start|end)?)|essage|ark)|b(?:e(?:for(?:e(?:(?:scriptexecu|activa)te|u(?:nload|pdate)|p(?:aste|rint)|c(?:opy|ut)|editfocus)|deactivate)|gin(?:Event)?)|oun(?:dary|ce)|l(?:ocked|ur)|roadcast|usy)|a(?:n(?:imation(?:iteration|start|end)|tennastatechange)|fter(?:(?:scriptexecu|upda)te|print)|udio(?:process|start|end)|d(?:apteradded|dtrack)|ctivate|lerting|bort)|DOM(?:Node(?:Inserted(?:IntoDocument)?|Removed(?:FromDocument)?)|(?:CharacterData|Subtree)Modified|A(?:ttrModified|ctivate)|Focus(?:Out|In)|MouseScroll)|r(?:e(?:s(?:u(?:m(?:ing|e)|lt)|ize|et)|adystatechange|pea(?:tEven)?t|movetrack|trieving|ceived)|ow(?:s(?:inserted|delete)|e(?:nter|xit))|atechange)|p(?:op(?:up(?:hid(?:den|ing)|show(?:ing|n))|state)|a(?:ge(?:hide|show)|(?:st|us)e|int)|ro(?:pertychange|gress)|lay(?:ing)?)|t(?:ouch(?:(?:lea|mo)ve|en(?:ter|d)|cancel|start)|ime(?:update|out)|ransitionend|ext)|u(?:s(?:erproximity|sdreceived)|p(?:gradeneeded|dateready)|n(?:derflow|load))|f(?:o(?:rm(?:change|input)|cus(?:out|in)?)|i(?:lterchange|nish)|ailed)|l(?:o(?:ad(?:e(?:d(?:meta)?data|nd)|start)|secapture)|evelchange|y)|g(?:amepad(?:(?:dis)?connected|button(?:down|up)|axismove)|et)|e(?:n(?:d(?:Event|ed)?|abled|ter)|rror(?:update)?|mptied|xit)|i(?:cc(?:cardlockerror|infochange)|n(?:coming|valid|put))|o(?:(?:(?:ff|n)lin|bsolet)e|verflow(?:changed)?|pen)|SVG(?:(?:Unl|L)oad|Resize|Scroll|Abort|Error|Zoom)|h(?:e(?:adphoneschange|l[dp])|ashchange|olding)|v(?:o(?:lum|ic)e|ersion)change|w(?:a(?:it|rn)ing|heel)|key(?:press|down|up)|(?:AppComman|Loa)d|no(?:update|match)|Request|zoom)|s(?:tyle|rc)|background|formaction|lowsrc|ping)[\s\x08]*?=|<[^\w<>]*(?:[^<>\"'\s]*:)?[^\w<>]*\W*?(?:(?:a\W*?(?:n\W*?i\W*?m\W*?a\W*?t\W*?e|p\W*?p\W*?l\W*?e\W*?t|u\W*?d\W*?i\W*?o)|b\W*?(?:i\W*?n\W*?d\W*?i\W*?n\W*?g\W*?s|a\W*?s\W*?e|o\W*?d\W*?y)|i?\W*?f\W*?r\W*?a\W*?m\W*?e|o\W*?b\W*?j\W*?e\W*?c\W*?t|i\W*?m\W*?a?\W*?g\W*?e?|e\W*?m\W*?b\W*?e\W*?d|p\W*?a\W*?r\W*?a\W*?m|v\W*?i\W*?d\W*?e\W*?o|l\W*?i\W*?n\W*?k)[^>\w]|s\W*?(?:c\W*?r\W*?i\W*?p\W*?t|t\W*?y\W*?l\W*?e|e\W*?t[^>\w]|v\W*?g)|m\W*?(?:a\W*?r\W*?q\W*?u\W*?e\W*?e|e\W*?t\W*?a[^>\w])|f\W*?o\W*?r\W*?m))" \
|
||||
"id:941160,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'NoScript XSS InjectionChecker: HTML Injection',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [NoScript InjectionChecker] Attributes injection
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)(?:\W|^)(?:javascript:(?:[\s\S]+[=\\\(\[\.<]|[\s\S]*?(?:\bname\b|\\[ux]\d))|data:(?:(?:[a-z]\w+\/\w[\w+-]+\w)?[;,]|[\s\S]*?;[\s\S]*?\b(?:base64|charset=)|[\s\S]*?,[\s\S]*?<[\s\S]*?\w[\s\S]*?>))|@\W*?i\W*?m\W*?p\W*?o\W*?r\W*?t\W*?(?:\/\*[\s\S]*?)?(?:[\"']|\W*?u\W*?r\W*?l[\s\S]*?\()|\W*?-\W*?m\W*?o\W*?z\W*?-\W*?b\W*?i\W*?n\W*?d\W*?i\W*?n\W*?g[\s\S]*?:[\s\S]*?\W*?u\W*?r\W*?l[\s\S]*?\(" \
|
||||
"id:941170,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'NoScript XSS InjectionChecker: Attribute Injection',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [Blacklist Keywords from Node-Validator]
|
||||
# https://raw.github.com/chriso/node-validator/master/validator.js
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pm document.cookie document.write .parentnode .innerhtml window.location -moz-binding <!-- --> <![cdata[" \
|
||||
"id:941180,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:lowercase,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'Node-Validator Blacklist Keywords',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XSS Filters from IE ]=-
|
||||
# Ref: http://blogs.technet.com/srd/archive/2008/08/18/ie-8-xss-filter-architecture-implementation.aspx
|
||||
# Ref: http://xss.cx/examples/ie/internet-exploror-ie9-xss-filter-rules-example-regexp-mshtmldll.txt
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:<style.*?>.*?(?:@[i\\\\]|(?:[:=]|&#x?0*(?:58|3A|61|3D);?).*?(?:[(\\\\]|&#x?0*(?:40|28|92|5C);?)))" \
|
||||
"id:941190,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:<.*[:]?vmlframe.*?[\s/+]*?src[\s/+]*=)" \
|
||||
"id:941200,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:(?:j|&#x?0*(?:74|4A|106|6A);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:a|&#x?0*(?:65|41|97|61);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:v|&#x?0*(?:86|56|118|76);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:a|&#x?0*(?:65|41|97|61);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:s|&#x?0*(?:83|53|115|73);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:c|&#x?0*(?:67|43|99|63);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:r|&#x?0*(?:82|52|114|72);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:i|&#x?0*(?:73|49|105|69);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:p|&#x?0*(?:80|50|112|70);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:t|&#x?0*(?:84|54|116|74);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?::|&(?:#x?0*(?:58|3A);?|colon;)).)" \
|
||||
"id:941210,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:(?:v|&#x?0*(?:86|56|118|76);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:b|&#x?0*(?:66|42|98|62);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:s|&#x?0*(?:83|53|115|73);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:c|&#x?0*(?:67|43|99|63);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:r|&#x?0*(?:82|52|114|72);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:i|&#x?0*(?:73|49|105|69);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:p|&#x?0*(?:80|50|112|70);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?:t|&#x?0*(?:84|54|116|74);?)(?:\t|&(?:#x?0*(?:9|13|10|A|D);?|tab;|newline;))*(?::|&(?:#x?0*(?:58|3A);?|colon;)).)" \
|
||||
"id:941220,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)<EMBED[\s/+].*?(?:src|type).*?=" \
|
||||
"id:941230,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx <[?]?import[\s\/+\S]*?implementation[\s\/+]*?=" \
|
||||
"id:941240,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:lowercase,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:<META[\s/+].*?http-equiv[\s/+]*=[\s/+]*[\"'`]?(?:(?:c|&#x?0*(?:67|43|99|63);?)|(?:r|&#x?0*(?:82|52|114|72);?)|(?:s|&#x?0*(?:83|53|115|73);?)))" \
|
||||
"id:941250,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:<META[\s/+].*?charset[\s/+]*=)" \
|
||||
"id:941260,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)<LINK[\s/+].*?href[\s/+]*=" \
|
||||
"id:941270,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)<BASE[\s/+].*?href[\s/+]*=" \
|
||||
"id:941280,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)<APPLET[\s/+>]" \
|
||||
"id:941290,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)<OBJECT[\s/+].*?(?:type|codetype|classid|code|data)[\s/+]*=" \
|
||||
"id:941300,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet
|
||||
# US-ASCII encoding bypass listed on XSS filter evasion
|
||||
# Reported by Mazin Ahmed
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:¾|¼).*(?:¾|¼|>)|(?:¾|¼|<).*(?:¾|¼)" \
|
||||
"id:941310,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase,t:urlDecode,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,\
|
||||
msg:'US-ASCII Malformed Encoding XSS Filter - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-tomcat',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# UTF-7 encoding XSS filter evasion for IE.
|
||||
# Reported by Vladimir Ivanov
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:\+ADw\-|\+AD4\-).*(?:\+ADw\-|\+AD4\-|>)|(?:\+ADw\-|\+AD4\-|<).*(?:\+ADw\-|\+AD4\-)" \
|
||||
"id:941350,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:urlDecode,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,\
|
||||
msg:'UTF-7 Encoding IE XSS - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-internet-explorer',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Defend against JSFuck and Hieroglyphy obfuscation of Javascript code
|
||||
#
|
||||
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSFuck
|
||||
# https://github.com/alcuadrado/hieroglyphy
|
||||
#
|
||||
# These JS obfuscations mostly aim for client side XSS exploits, hence the
|
||||
# integration of this rule into the XSS rule group. But serverside JS could
|
||||
# also be attacked via these techniques.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Detection pattern / Core elements of JSFuck and Hieroglyphy are the
|
||||
# following two items:
|
||||
# !![]
|
||||
# !+[]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# ModSecurity always transforms "+" into " " with query strings and the
|
||||
# URLENCODE body processor (but not for JSON). So we need to check for
|
||||
# the following patterns:
|
||||
# !![]
|
||||
# !+[]
|
||||
# ! []
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx ![!+ ]\[\]" \
|
||||
"id:941360,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'JSFuck / Hieroglyphy obfuscation detected',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: Suspicious payload found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A7',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-63',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Prevent 941180 bypass by using JavaScript global variables
|
||||
# Examples:
|
||||
# - /?search=/?a=";+alert(self["document"]["cookie"]);//
|
||||
# - /?search=/?a=";+document+/*foo*/+.+/*bar*/+cookie;//
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:self|document|this|top|window)\s*\)*(?:\[[^\]]+\]|\.\s*document|\.\s*cookie)" \
|
||||
"id:941370,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:removeComments,t:urlDecodeUni,\
|
||||
msg:'JavaScript global variable found',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: Suspicious JS global variable found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A7',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-63',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:941013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:941014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is a stricter sibling of rule 941100.
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@detectXSS" \
|
||||
"id:941101,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'XSS Attack Detected via libinjection',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ XSS Filters - Category 5 ]=-
|
||||
# HTML attribues - src, style and href
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)\b(?:s(?:tyle|rc)|href)\b[\s\S]*?=" \
|
||||
"id:941150,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:jsDecode,t:cssDecode,t:removeNulls,\
|
||||
msg:'XSS Filter - Category 5: Disallowed HTML Attributes',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A3',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-242',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Detect tags that are the most common direct HTML injection points.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# <a href=javascript:...
|
||||
# <applet src="..." type=text/html>
|
||||
# <applet src="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgvWFNTLyk8L3NjcmlwdD4" type=text/html>
|
||||
# <base href=javascript:...
|
||||
# <base href=... // change base URL to something else to exploit relative filename inclusion
|
||||
# <bgsound src=javascript:...
|
||||
# <body background=javascript:...
|
||||
# <body onload=...
|
||||
# <embed src=http://www.example.com/flash.swf allowScriptAccess=always
|
||||
# <embed src="data:image/svg+xml;
|
||||
# <frameset><frame src="javascript:..."></frameset>
|
||||
# <iframe src=javascript:...
|
||||
# <img src=x onerror=...
|
||||
# <input type=image src=javascript:...
|
||||
# <layer src=...
|
||||
# <link href="javascript:..." rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"
|
||||
# <link href="http://www.example.com/xss.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"
|
||||
# <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:..."
|
||||
# <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=http://;javascript:..." // evasion
|
||||
# <meta http-equiv="link" rel=stylesheet content="http://www.example.com/xss.css">
|
||||
# <meta http-equiv="Set-Cookie" content="NEW_COOKIE_VALUE">
|
||||
# <object data=http://www.example.com
|
||||
# <object type=text/x-scriptlet data=...
|
||||
# <object type=application/x-shockwave-flash data=xss.swf>
|
||||
# <object classid=clsid:ae24fdae-03c6-11d1-8b76-0080c744f389><param name=url value=javascript:...></object> // not verified
|
||||
# <script>...</script>
|
||||
# <script src=http://www.example.com/xss.js></script> - TODO add another rule for this
|
||||
# <script src="data:text/javascript,alert(1)"></script>
|
||||
# <script src="data:text/javascript;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydChkb2N1bWVudC5jb29raWUpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pg=="></script>
|
||||
# <style>STYLE</style>
|
||||
# <style type=text/css>STYLE</style>
|
||||
# <style type=text/javascript>alert('xss')</style>
|
||||
# <table background=javascript:...
|
||||
# <td background=javascript:
|
||||
#
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NOTES
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Reference the WASC Script Mapping Project - http://projects.webappsec.org/Script-Mapping
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Not using closing brackets because they are not needed for the
|
||||
# attacks to succeed. The following seems to work in FF: <body/s/onload=...
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Also, browsers sometimes tend to translate < into >, in order to "repair"
|
||||
# what they think was a mistake made by the programmer/template designer.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Browsers are flexible when it comes to what they accept as separator between
|
||||
# tag names and attributes. The following is commonly used in payloads: <img/src=...
|
||||
# A better example: <BODY onload!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;?@[/|\]^=alert("XSS")>
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Grave accents are sometimes used as an evasion technique (as a replacement for quotes),
|
||||
# but I don't believe we need to look for quotes anywhere.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Links do not have to be fully qualified. For example, the following works:
|
||||
# <script src="//ha.ckers.org/.j">
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
|
||||
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/_pk_ref/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx <(?:a|abbr|acronym|address|applet|area|audioscope|b|base|basefront|bdo|bgsound|big|blackface|blink|blockquote|body|bq|br|button|caption|center|cite|code|col|colgroup|comment|dd|del|dfn|dir|div|dl|dt|em|embed|fieldset|fn|font|form|frame|frameset|h1|head|hr|html|i|iframe|ilayer|img|input|ins|isindex|kdb|keygen|label|layer|legend|li|limittext|link|listing|map|marquee|menu|meta|multicol|nobr|noembed|noframes|noscript|nosmartquotes|object|ol|optgroup|option|p|param|plaintext|pre|q|rt|ruby|s|samp|script|select|server|shadow|sidebar|small|spacer|span|strike|strong|style|sub|sup|table|tbody|td|textarea|tfoot|th|thead|title|tr|tt|u|ul|var|wbr|xml|xmp)\W" \
|
||||
"id:941320,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:jsDecode,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Possible XSS Attack Detected - HTML Tag Handler',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A2',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.1',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/_pk_ref/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:[\"'][ ]*(?:[^a-z0-9~_:' ]|in).*?(?:(?:l|\\\\u006C)(?:o|\\\\u006F)(?:c|\\\\u0063)(?:a|\\\\u0061)(?:t|\\\\u0074)(?:i|\\\\u0069)(?:o|\\\\u006F)(?:n|\\\\u006E)|(?:n|\\\\u006E)(?:a|\\\\u0061)(?:m|\\\\u006D)(?:e|\\\\u0065)|(?:o|\\\\u006F)(?:n|\\\\u006E)(?:e|\\\\u0065)(?:r|\\\\u0072)(?:r|\\\\u0072)(?:o|\\\\u006F)(?:r|\\\\u0072)|(?:v|\\\\u0076)(?:a|\\\\u0061)(?:l|\\\\u006C)(?:u|\\\\u0075)(?:e|\\\\u0065)(?:O|\\\\u004F)(?:f|\\\\u0066)).*?=)" \
|
||||
"id:941330,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:compressWhitespace,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A2',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.1',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
|
||||
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/_pk_ref/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)[\"\'][ ]*(?:[^a-z0-9~_:\' ]|in).+?[.].+?=" \
|
||||
"id:941340,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:compressWhitespace,\
|
||||
msg:'IE XSS Filters - Attack Detected.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-8',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-22',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A2',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_AppSensor/IE1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.1',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Defend against AngularJS client side template injection
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Of course, pure client-side AngularJS commands can not be intercepted.
|
||||
# But once a command is sent to the server, the CRS will trigger.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# https://portswigger.net/blog/xss-without-html-client-side-template-injection-with-angularjs
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Example payload:
|
||||
# http://localhost/login?user=%20x%20%7B%7Bconstructor.constructor(%27alert(1)%27)()%7D%7D%20.%20ff
|
||||
# Decoded argument:
|
||||
# {{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx {{.*?}}" \
|
||||
"id:941380,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
msg:'AngularJS client side template injection detected',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: Suspicious payload found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-xss',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/XSS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A7',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-63',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.xss_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:941015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:941016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:941017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:941018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS"
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:943011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:943012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Session fixation
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ References ]=-
|
||||
# http://projects.webappsec.org/Session-Fixation
|
||||
# http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246960/Session%20Fixation
|
||||
# http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/61.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:\.cookie\b.*?;\W*?(?:expires|domain)\W*?=|\bhttp-equiv\W+set-cookie\b)" \
|
||||
"id:943100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
|
||||
msg:'Possible Session Fixation Attack: Setting Cookie Values in HTML',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-fixation',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/SESSION_FIXATION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-37',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-61',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.session_fixation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx ^(?:jsessionid|aspsessionid|asp\.net_sessionid|phpsession|phpsessid|weblogicsession|session_id|session-id|cfid|cftoken|cfsid|jservsession|jwsession)$" \
|
||||
"id:943110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Possible Session Fixation Attack: SessionID Parameter Name with Off-Domain Referer',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-fixation',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/SESSION_FIXATION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-37',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-61',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@rx ^(?:ht|f)tps?://(.*?)\/" \
|
||||
"capture,\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule TX:1 "!@endsWith %{request_headers.host}" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.session_fixation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx ^(?:jsessionid|aspsessionid|asp\.net_sessionid|phpsession|phpsessid|weblogicsession|session_id|session-id|cfid|cftoken|cfsid|jservsession|jwsession)$" \
|
||||
"id:943120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
capture,\
|
||||
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
msg:'Possible Session Fixation Attack: SessionID Parameter Name with No Referer',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-fixation',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/SESSION_FIXATION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-37',\
|
||||
tag:'CAPEC-61',\
|
||||
ctl:auditLogParts=+E,\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@eq 0" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.session_fixation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:943013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:943014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:943015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:943016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:943017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:943018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
|
||||
@@ -1,321 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Many rules check request bodies, use "SecRequestBodyAccess On" to enable it on main modsecurity configuration file.
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:944011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:944012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by an Apache Struts exploit:
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 - Exploit tested: https://github.com/xsscx/cve-2017-5638 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by an Apache Struts Remote Code Execution exploit:
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by an Apache Struts Remote Code Execution exploit:
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9805 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42627 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by an Oracle WebLogic Remote Command Execution exploit:
|
||||
# [ Oracle WebLogic vulnerability CVE-2017-10271 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43458 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@rx java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" \
|
||||
"id:944100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Suspicious Java class detected',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 - Exploit tested: https://github.com/xsscx/cve-2017-5638 ]
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9805 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42627 ]
|
||||
# [ Java deserialization vulnerability/Apache Struts (CVE-2017-9805) ]
|
||||
# [ Java deserialization vulnerability/Oracle Weblogic (CVE-2017-10271) ]
|
||||
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Generic rule to detect processbuilder or runtime calls, if any of thos is found and the same target contains
|
||||
# java. unmarshaller or base64data to trigger a potential payload execution
|
||||
# tested with https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42627/ and https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43458/
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@rx (?:runtime|processbuilder)" \
|
||||
"id:944110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Java process spawn (CVE-2017-9805)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* "@rx (?:unmarshaller|base64data|java\.)" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Magic bytes detected and payload included possibly RCE vulnerable classess detected and process execution methods detected
|
||||
# anomaly score set to critical as all conditions indicate the request try to perform RCE.
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@rx (?:clonetransformer|forclosure|instantiatefactory|instantiatetransformer|invokertransformer|prototypeclonefactory|prototypeserializationfactory|whileclosure|getproperty|filewriter|xmldecoder)" \
|
||||
"id:944120,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Java serialization (CVE-2015-5842)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule MATCHED_VARS "@rx (?:runtime|processbuilder)" \
|
||||
"t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 - Exploit tested: https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn ]
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 - Exploit tested: https://github.com/xsscx/cve-2017-5638 ]
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9805 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42627 ]
|
||||
# [ Oracle WebLogic vulnerability CVE-2017-10271 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43458 ]
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45262 ]
|
||||
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45260 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_FILENAME|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@pmFromFile java-classes.data" \
|
||||
"id:944130,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Suspicious Java class detected',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:944013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:944014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# [ Java deserialization vulnerability/Apache Commons (CVE-2015-4852) ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Detect exploitation of "Java deserialization" Apache Commons.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Based on rules by @spartantri.
|
||||
# https://spartantri.com/ModSecurity/?p=44
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Interesting references about the vulnerability
|
||||
# https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/
|
||||
# https://github.com/GrrrDog/Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Potential false positives with random fields, the anomaly level is set low to avoid blocking request
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@rx \xac\xed\x00\x05" \
|
||||
"id:944200,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Magic bytes Detected, probable java serialization in use',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# Detecting possibe base64 text to match encoded magic bytes \xac\xed\x00\x05 with padding encoded in base64 strings are rO0ABQ KztAAU Cs7QAF
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@rx (?:rO0ABQ|KztAAU|Cs7QAF)" \
|
||||
"id:944210,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Magic bytes Detected Base64 Encoded, probable java serialization in use',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@rx (?:clonetransformer|forclosure|instantiatefactory|instantiatetransformer|invokertransformer|prototypeclonefactory|prototypeserializationfactory|whileclosure|getproperty|filewriter|xmldecoder)" \
|
||||
"id:944240,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,t:lowercase,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Java serialization (CVE-2015-5842)',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
|
||||
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@rx java\b.+(?:runtime|processbuilder)" \
|
||||
"id:944250,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:lowercase,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Suspicious Java method detected',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:944015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:944016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Interesting keywords for possibly RCE on vulnerable classess and methods base64 encoded
|
||||
# Keywords = ['runtime', 'processbuilder', 'clonetransformer', 'forclosure', 'instantiatefactory', 'instantiatetransformer', 'invokertransformer', 'prototypeclonefactory', 'prototypeserializationfactory', 'whileclosure']
|
||||
#for item in keywords:
|
||||
# pad='\x00'
|
||||
# for padding in xrange(3):
|
||||
# print base64.b64encode(''.join([pad*padding,item])).replace('=','')[padding:],
|
||||
#cnVudGltZQ HJ1bnRpbWU BydW50aW1l cHJvY2Vzc2J1aWxkZXI HByb2Nlc3NidWlsZGVy Bwcm9jZXNzYnVpbGRlcg Y2xvbmV0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg GNsb25ldHJhbnNmb3JtZXI BjbG9uZXRyYW5zZm9ybWVy Zm9yY2xvc3VyZQ GZvcmNsb3N1cmU Bmb3JjbG9zdXJl aW5zdGFudGlhdGVmYWN0b3J5 Gluc3RhbnRpYXRlZmFjdG9yeQ BpbnN0YW50aWF0ZWZhY3Rvcnk aW5zdGFudGlhdGV0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg Gluc3RhbnRpYXRldHJhbnNmb3JtZXI BpbnN0YW50aWF0ZXRyYW5zZm9ybWVy aW52b2tlcnRyYW5zZm9ybWVy Gludm9rZXJ0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg BpbnZva2VydHJhbnNmb3JtZXI cHJvdG90eXBlY2xvbmVmYWN0b3J5 HByb3RvdHlwZWNsb25lZmFjdG9yeQ Bwcm90b3R5cGVjbG9uZWZhY3Rvcnk cHJvdG90eXBlc2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbmZhY3Rvcnk HByb3RvdHlwZXNlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25mYWN0b3J5 Bwcm90b3R5cGVzZXJpYWxpemF0aW9uZmFjdG9yeQ d2hpbGVjbG9zdXJl HdoaWxlY2xvc3VyZQ B3aGlsZWNsb3N1cmU
|
||||
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
|
||||
"@rx (?:cnVudGltZQ|HJ1bnRpbWU|BydW50aW1l|cHJvY2Vzc2J1aWxkZXI|HByb2Nlc3NidWlsZGVy|Bwcm9jZXNzYnVpbGRlcg|Y2xvbmV0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg|GNsb25ldHJhbnNmb3JtZXI|BjbG9uZXRyYW5zZm9ybWVy|Zm9yY2xvc3VyZQ|GZvcmNsb3N1cmU|Bmb3JjbG9zdXJl|aW5zdGFudGlhdGVmYWN0b3J5|Gluc3RhbnRpYXRlZmFjdG9yeQ|BpbnN0YW50aWF0ZWZhY3Rvcnk|aW5zdGFudGlhdGV0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg|Gluc3RhbnRpYXRldHJhbnNmb3JtZXI|BpbnN0YW50aWF0ZXRyYW5zZm9ybWVy|aW52b2tlcnRyYW5zZm9ybWVy|Gludm9rZXJ0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg|BpbnZva2VydHJhbnNmb3JtZXI|cHJvdG90eXBlY2xvbmVmYWN0b3J5|HByb3RvdHlwZWNsb25lZmFjdG9yeQ|Bwcm90b3R5cGVjbG9uZWZhY3Rvcnk|cHJvdG90eXBlc2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbmZhY3Rvcnk|HByb3RvdHlwZXNlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25mYWN0b3J5|Bwcm90b3R5cGVzZXJpYWxpemF0aW9uZmFjdG9yeQ|d2hpbGVjbG9zdXJl|HdoaWxlY2xvc3VyZQ|B3aGlsZWNsb3N1cmU)" \
|
||||
"id:944300,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
block,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Base64 encoded string matched suspicious keyword',\
|
||||
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-java',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-rce',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_CRS/WEB_ATTACK/JAVA_INJECTION',\
|
||||
tag:'WASCTC/WASC-31',\
|
||||
tag:'OWASP_TOP_10/A1',\
|
||||
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
|
||||
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
|
||||
ver:'OWASP_CRS/3.2.0',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:944017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:944018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
|
||||
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
|
||||
# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
|
||||
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
|
||||
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
|
||||
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
# Summing up the anomaly score.
|
||||
|
||||
# NOTE: tx.anomaly_score should not be set initially, but masking would lead to difficult bugs.
|
||||
# So we add to it.
|
||||
SecRule TX:PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
|
||||
"id:949060,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.anomaly_score_pl1}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
|
||||
"id:949061,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.anomaly_score_pl2}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
|
||||
"id:949062,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.anomaly_score_pl3}'"
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
|
||||
"id:949063,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
pass,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
nolog,\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.anomaly_score_pl4}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecMarker "BEGIN-REQUEST-BLOCKING-EVAL"
|
||||
|
||||
# These rules use the anomaly score settings specified in the 10 config file.
|
||||
# You should also set the desired disruptive action (deny, redirect, etc...).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ IP Reputation Checks ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Block based on variable IP.REPUT_BLOCK_FLAG and TX.DO_REPUT_BLOCK
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule IP:REPUT_BLOCK_FLAG "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"id:949100,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
deny,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Request Denied by IP Reputation Enforcement.',\
|
||||
logdata:'Previous Block Reason: %{ip.reput_block_reason}',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-reputation-ip',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
chain"
|
||||
SecRule TX:DO_REPUT_BLOCK "@eq 1" \
|
||||
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score=%{tx.anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -=[ Anomaly Mode: Overall Transaction Anomaly Score ]=-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecRule TX:ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" \
|
||||
"id:949110,\
|
||||
phase:2,\
|
||||
deny,\
|
||||
t:none,\
|
||||
log,\
|
||||
msg:'Inbound Anomaly Score Exceeded (Total Score: %{TX.ANOMALY_SCORE})',\
|
||||
tag:'application-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'language-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'platform-multi',\
|
||||
tag:'attack-generic',\
|
||||
severity:'CRITICAL',\
|
||||
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score=%{tx.anomaly_score}'"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:949011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:949012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:949013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:949014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:949015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:949016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:949017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
SecRule TX:EXECUTING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:949018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.executing_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
|
||||
#
|
||||
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
|
||||
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user